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The purpose of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following research question: why and 
how did the Republican Party benefit from the increased flow of money outside traditional 
party structures which resulted from the campaign finance reform of the 1970s? On the basis 
of the partisan theory of reform, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 
subsequent amendments are described as part of a Democratic effort to stop the flow of 
money into Republican coffers. Nevertheless, in light of the financial and electoral success 
experienced by the GOP in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections, it is argued that the 
Democratic campaign finance strategy backfired. The thesis demonstrates that the legislation 
enacted in the 1970s provided interest groups with expanded opportunities to influence 
elections through financial involvement. Furthermore, on the basis of thorough examination 
of the ventures of the increasing amount of political action committees in the wake of the 
FECA, it is argued that conservative leaning groups were disproportionately successful in 
taking advantage of these opportunities. The thesis emphasizes the financial involvement of 
business PACs and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, and connects their 
endeavors to the House and the Senate gains experienced by the Republican Party in 1978 and 
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One of the most significant developments of American politics during the last four decades 
has been the increasing importance of money in elections, specifically presidential and 
congressional elections. Politicians constantly seek support from donors and are afraid of 
casting votes that major contributors will criticize. In 2012 the role of so-called Super-PACs 
received substantial attention in the media. In order to understand the significance of these 
Super-PACs in elections during the 21
st
 century, it is important to examine the campaign 
reform of the 1970s. The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act and all its amendments can 
arguably be said to be products of a determined effort on part of the Democratic Party to limit 
the Republican advantages regarding campaign fundraising. Prior to the FECA, there were no 
limits on individual contributions to political candidates and parties. Thus, the Republican 
Party thrived on their longstanding and strong ties to wealthy individuals and businesses 
which donated huge amounts of money directly to the GOP in the form of individual 
contributions. In fairness, the Democratic Party also received their fair share of donations 
from wealthy individuals, but time and again they were outraised and outspent by their 
opponents. During the 1960s, political campaigns became increasingly expensive and the 
election of 1968 considerably demonstrated the elevated role of money in politics as well as 
the Democratic inability to keep up with this development. In the aftermath of the election, 
Democrats realized the need for reform in order to stop the continuous flow of money into 
Republican coffers and perhaps restore some sort of balance with regards to party fundraising. 
Thus, taking advantage of their current congressional majority, they quickly began framing 
new parameters for campaign financing.       
 Although the FECA regulations were designed to benefit the Democrats and their 
fundraising traditions, however, the legislation was followed by particularly good years for 
the Republicans both financially and electorally. The party was quick to adapt to the new 
campaign finance environment and with a relatively saturated war chest it experienced 
significant electoral gains in both 1978 and 1980. Thus, one can argue that the Democratic 
attempt to block the continuous flow of money into Republican coffers backfired on a large 
scale. Nevertheless, while a number of scholars studying this particular occurrence have 
emphasized the ability of the Republican Party organization to adjust to the new parameters 
requiring them to solicit a large number of small donations, this thesis will highlight the way 
in which the FECA facilitated an increasing flow of money outside traditional party structures 
and analyze how this particular development came to benefit Republican candidates. For a 
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number of reasons which will be carefully outlined throughout the paper, conservative leaning 
groups were much more successful than liberal groups with regards to taking advantage of the 
enlarged authority which was granted political action committees as a result of the 1970s 
reform. A complete account of the endeavors of all PACs of all categories preceding the 
Republican electoral triumphs in 78 and 80, however, is certainly beyond the limits of this 
thesis. Thus, on the basis of certain judgments which will be outlined in the next section, 
emphasis will be placed on the ventures of business PACs, representing connected PACs, and 
the National Conservative Political Action Committee, representing nonconnected ideological 
PACs. As will be revealed, these specific political action committees were especially 
influential and were arguably instrumental in the success experienced by a number of 
conservative challengers in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections.  
1.1 Thesis Statement and Theoretical Approach 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an answer to the following research question: why and 
how did the Republican Party benefit from the increased flow of money outside traditional 
party structures which resulted from the campaign finance reform of the 1970s? As already 
mentioned, the Democratic Party framed and championed extensive campaign finance 
legislation in the 1970s. However, while Democratic reformers might have argued that reform 
was necessary in order to defend the virtue of American democracy which was supposedly 
threatened by the corrupting role of money in politics, I argue that their incentive to push for 
reform derived from a desire to inhibit Republican fundraising. The basis of this argument is 
drawn from the partisan theory of reform which is amply analyzed by Raymond La Raja in 
Small Change: Money, Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform. In essence, the 
theory argues that “[b]ecause money was becoming a more important political resource in the 
twentieth century the two major parties used campaign finance reform to gain advantages over 
the rival party”.1 For the purpose of this thesis, the partisan theory of reform serves as a 
vantage point from which to assess the legislative developments of the seventies. Moreover, 
the design of the FECA and its amendments will be described in terms of its potential to 
impair the already established fundraising traditions of the GOP while simultaneously 
facilitate established Democratic methods.        
 Thus, the first part of this thesis is deliberated in accordance with a broader theory of 
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 Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008), 20. 
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governmental regulation commonly known as the economic theory of regulation. Professors 
of economics Burton A. Abrams and Russell F. Settle argue that the main principle of this 
theory “is that rational, self-interested individuals, groups, or industries seek regulation as a 
means of serving their own interests”.2 This deduction is arguably reflected in the partisan 
theory of reform which, however, specifically pertains to that particular area of federal 
regulation concerning campaign finance. As a result, a reliance on the partisan theory of 
reform effectively translates into broad support for the economic theory of regulation. 
Conversely, it implies a rejection of the public-interest theory of regulation which claims that 
“regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient 
or inequitable market prices”.3 In their deliberation of the campaign finance reform of the 
seventies, Abrams and Settle also reject the public interest incentive and argue heavily in 
support of the main presumption of the economic theory. To reinforce their claim, they 
maintain that “when regulation has the potential for directly affecting the legislators 
themselves (e.g. political campaign regulations), the economic approach suggests that the 
regulation would be designed to serve the legislators’ interest rather than some vaguely 
defined ‘public interest’”.4 In line with Abrams and Settle, I argue that the design of the 
FECA serves to strengthen the legitimacy of the economic theory and invalidate the public 
interest presumption. More specifically, the numerous Democratic advantages integral to the 
legislation suggest that the interest of the public was not the primary concern of the 
legislators. Thus, when evaluated in connection with the FECA, the economic theory of 
regulation arguably gains strength.        
 However, while I agree with Abrams and Settle in terms of their support for the 
economic theory of regulation, I disagree with their claim that the intention of the campaign 
finance reform of the seventies corresponded with its ultimate effect. The changes introduced 
by the FECA and its amendments, they assert, “were highly beneficial to the Democratic 
Party”.5 Contrastingly, I argue that the FECA regulations, despite being largely framed and 
championed by the political left, eventually served to benefit the political right. Nevertheless, 
the conclusions reached by Abrams and Settle are understandable considering the fact that 
they wrote their analysis in the spring of 1978. At that time, some of the FECA amendments 
had not even seen the light of day and the full effect of the legislation had not yet manifested 
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itself in American electoral politics. Today, however, it is widely acknowledged that the 
consequences of the reform were first demonstrated in the 1978 midterms and that they did 
not fully play out until two years later during the congressional elections. Thus, an effort to 
delineate the actual effects of the regulatory reforms of the seventies necessarily needs to be 
especially attentive to the financing and outcome of these elections in particular. Such an 
approach is adopted in this thesis, and on the basis of the electoral gains experienced by the 
GOP in both 78 and 80, it is argued that the Democratic campaign finance reform strategy of 
the seventies eventually backfired.          
 In order to illustrate the way in which the Republican Party benefited from the 
legislation enacted in the 1970s, emphasis is placed on the way in which the reform facilitated 
an increased flow of money outside traditional party structures. More specifically, attention is 
drawn to the growth, as well as the extended electoral involvement, of PACs in the wake of 
the FECA. Nevertheless, because a complete account of PAC growth in the late seventies is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, certain choices had to be made. On the basis of the 
disproportionate increase in the number of business PACs, as well as the business 
community’s established connection to the GOP, chapter three is devoted to an examination 
of the activities of this particular PAC category during the 78 and 80 elections. In the 
discussion of the reasons for the business PAC explosion, a number of theories are referenced 
and rebutted. Conclusively, I argue that Robert Reich’s theory that the extended political 
involvement of businesses was a result of the increased competitiveness between them is too 
limited. The business PAC explosion was rather, I claim, a consequence of a collaborative 
effort on part of the business community to expand their political influence. Furthermore, a 
review of the partisanship of business features an overview of several disparate theories. In 
sum, they all profess that while business has a natural affinity with the conservative ideology 
of the Republican Party, great many corporations value access to political officials over 
ideological concerns and thus donate money to incumbents regardless of party affiliation. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the statistics from the 1978 and 1980 elections dispute this 
deduction in that business PACs gave disproportionate amounts to conservative challengers.            
 Furthermore, on the basis of a number of estimates illustrating that conservative 
nonconnected PACs were the first to successfully utilize the independent expenditure option 
created by a 1976 Supreme Court decision, chapter four is devoted to an analysis of right-
wing independent campaigns during the 1978 and 1980 elections. In an effort to establish the 
actual value of such campaigns, reference is made to a study by Richard N. Engstrom and 
Christopher Kenny. Arguably, their research on independent expenditures in Senate elections 
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develops a theoretical argument that this particular PAC strategy does in fact affect voter 
behavior. More specifically, it is revealed that spending on behalf of the incumbent helps the 
incumbent while spending on behalf of the challenger helps the challenger. Nevertheless, their 
study also exposes a discrepancy with regards to negative campaigns. According to Engstrom 
and Kenny, negative campaigns not only have an overall potential to be more influential, they 
also have a lopsided potential to favor challengers, regardless of which candidate the 
campaign is intended to support. Thus, on the basis of this evidence, the emphasis on the 
independent negative campaigns of the conservative political action committee, NCPAC, 
during the 1978 and 1980 elections is arguably justified. In sum, a great many theories are 
applied throughout the thesis and while some of them are rebutted, others serve to validate the 
paper’s weighting priorities. 
1.2 American Studies 
American Studies is an interdisciplinary field of study of U.S. culture, history, and politics. 
This combination of different disciplines is valuable in that it facilitates a broad understanding 
of both American society in general as well as its significance in the past, the present, and the 
future. Furthermore, researchers of this field are able to evaluate specific aspects of U.S. 
society from a number of perspectives and on the basis of this make generous assumptions 
and reach wide-ranging conclusions. The topic of campaign financing in the U.S. is, 
according to Thomas E. Mann, most frequently analyzed from a political science perspective. 
Scholars of both legislative and administrative processes delve on the issue attempting to 
determine the proper role of money in elections.
6
 Nevertheless, rather than taking a stand on 
the degree to which campaign money should be regulated, this thesis will review campaign 
finance as an inherent and dynamic part of American society. Furthermore, as this is an 
American Studies thesis and not a political science thesis, the following analysis of campaign 
finance reform will be told with reference to a multitude of political, historical, and cultural 
features of the U.S. 
1.3 Methodical Approach 
The principal method applied in this thesis is textual analysis of both primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources include a number of government documents such as acts and 
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court rulings. In addition, in order to obtain broader knowledge of the political implications of 
some of these legislative developments, certain statements and speeches by federal officials 
are applied in the discussion. Furthermore, a significant amount of reliable statistical data has 
been consulted. For the most part, however, the following discussion is based on an analysis 
of secondary sources. A number of books and articles displaying and interpreting results from 
both qualitative and quantitative research on the topic of campaign finance have been visited. 
On the basis of such an approach, the hope is to provide an unbiased historical account which 
considers the multitude of arguments and opinions which have already been outlined.   
1.4 Structure 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The introductory chapter at hand will continue with 
an account of the early history of campaign finance reform. Furthermore, it will provide a 
discussion of the partisan theory of reform which suggests that campaign finance regulation is 
frequently used as a weapon of partisan rivalry and which rebuts the traditional assumption 
that pro-reform legislators are motivated by a general desire to prevent corruption. In order to 
validate the partisan theory of reform, attention will be paid to the distinct resource 
dependencies of the two major parties as well as their competing preferences regarding 
campaign finance regimes. This discussion will emphasize the significance of ideology and 
traditional bases of support and, in addition to providing a preliminary perspective on how 
campaign finance reform has the potential to favor one party over another, it will illustrate the 
limitations pertaining to each party within different regulatory environments.  
 Chapter two sketches the main incentives behind, as well as the details of, the 
campaign finance reform enacted in the seventies. Initially, a review of the parties’ traditional 
sources of support will be provided. Subsequently, the political climate of the 1960s will be 
discussed with particular emphasis on the emergence of the conservative movement and its 
impact on the Republican Party. Arguably, this development is significant in that it indirectly 
led to the Democratic push for reform in the 1970s. As will be demonstrated, the Republican 
Party triumphed in the 1968 election in part because their fundraising efforts were aided by 
the conservative grassroots. The GOP managed to raise unexpected sums of money and the 
Democratic disadvantages in the financing of political campaigns became increasingly visible. 
As a result, the Democratic establishment began to frame reform initiatives designed to 
hamper the Republican lead in the campaign money race. With a comfortable congressional 
majority, they managed to get the Federal Election Campaign Act enacted in 1971. 
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Nevertheless, the Republican gains in the 1972 election, as well as the succeeding Watergate 
revelations, exposed the limited reach of the FECA and thus, Democrats began to work 
towards an overhaul of the legislation. As will be illustrated, the extensive amendments which 
were passed by Congress in 1974 clearly targeted the resource dependency of the Republican 
Party. However, the reform also granted increased authority for political action committees in 
the financing of political campaigns and, as would soon become apparent, this development 
came to benefit the GOP which had the advantage of strong ties with a number of cash flush 
interest groups seeking to influence politics.      
 Chapter three outlines one of the ways in which the campaign finance reform of the 
seventies backfired on the Democrats. More specifically, it analyzes the way in which the 
Republican Party benefited from the growth of business PACs in the aftermath of the FECA. 
The PAC term will be sufficiently defined and the difference between connected and 
nonconnected PACs will be stressed. Furthermore, the socioeconomic, legislative, and 
political conditions encouraging the business PAC explosion will be delineated. Statistics 
displaying corporate PACs as the fastest growing PAC category will be provided and 
attention will be drawn to the general political partisanship of such PACs. The main part of 
the chapter, however, consists of an analysis of the involvement of business PACs in the 1978 
and 1980 congressional elections. As will be revealed, huge amounts of corporate money 
went into these elections and these funds were, to a disproportionate extent, distributed to 
conservative candidates challenging liberal incumbents. Thus, on the basis of these statistics, 
as well as the election returns, it is argued that the business PAC explosion, which was a 
result of the FECA regulations, came to benefit the Republican Party.    
 Chapter four analyzes the way in which the GOP benefited from the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo to eliminate the FECA restrictions on expenditures. As will 
be thoroughly explained, the ruling granted political action committees the authority to spend 
unlimited amounts of money on uncoordinated independent campaigns advocating the 
election or defeat of a candidate. This independent expenditure loophole, as it is often called, 
thus provided PACs with yet another opportunity to influence politics, and a number of 
nonconnected ideological PACs, for the most part conservative in nature, were quick to take 
it. The chapter will review the emergence of the very conservative New Right and highlight 
the significance of the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), one of 
the movement’s most influential PACs. As will be demonstrated, NCPAC’s connection with 
the New Right made it especially capable of utilizing the independent expenditure option, and 
because of the negative approach this organization employed, its independent campaigns were 
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successful, at least in 1978 and 1980. As a result of the massive attacks launched by NCPAC 
against liberal incumbents during these particular elections, the winning chances of 
conservative challengers were considerably elevated.     
 The last chapter of this thesis will summarize the main arguments that have been made 
throughout the thesis. In addition, a brief review of the long-term consequences of the 
political right’s extensive resource mobilization in the wake of the FECA will be provided. 
More specifically, the events of the seventies will be tied to the later development of so-called 
527s and the more recent emergence of Super PACs. As will be demonstrated, the changes 
brought to the campaign finance environment by the FECA set the precedent for the financial 
involvement of outside groups in the future. Furthermore, the right-wing mobilization which 
occurred in the initial years following the legislation was crucial in that it paved the way for 
the dominance of conservative ideas during the 1980s and beyond.   
1.5 General Introduction to Campaign Finance Reform 
1.5.1 The Early History of Campaign Finance Reform 
The discussion of the role of money in politics began over a century ago. In the very first 
comprehensive study of campaign finance, published in 1926, James K. Pollock argued that 
“[s]ince the Civil War scarcely an election has taken place without producing some more or 
less disparaging reference to money matters, and in every presidential campaign of the 
twentieth century the question of party funds has come up for discussion”.7 For the most part, 
the debate has evolved around the potentially corrupting effects of campaign finance. While it 
is true that “the expenses of nominating and electing public officials are the inevitable 
financial costs of democracy,” the role of money in politics is indeed quite complicated.8 
Pollock explained that “[r]egarded in the abstract, the raising of money for expenditure in 
political campaigns seems quite proper and legitimate; but when it appears that sinister 
motives possibly lie behind the contributions of money, then a greater degree of importance 
attaches to the whole problem”.9 In essence, the dependency of political campaigns and 
candidates on both financial and in-kind support facilitates corruption in that those who are 
able to provide these resources are in position to require something in return. The fact that 
wealthy individuals and politicians have the opportunity to engage in quid pro quo exchanges 
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is widely accepted as a threat to democracy. Thus, the campaign finance system in the U.S. 
has long been under scrutiny and “[m]uch of the public debate has focused on the potentially 
corrupting effects of political contributions to candidates and on how to curtail the influence 
of wealthy donors”.10          
 The first federal law regulating money in politics was the Naval Appropriations Bill 
passed in 1867.
11
 At the outset the law “prohibited officers and employees of the government 
from soliciting money from naval yard workers”, but in 1883 it was extended to cover all 
federal civil service workers.
12
 Nevertheless, campaign finance initially received limited 
attention from the federal government and Congress passed very few laws relating to the 
issue. State governments however, were generally more attentive to the problems connected 
to campaign finance, and the first law regulating the use of money in elections was indeed 
passed by the New York State legislature in 1890.
13
 Several other states also adopted the law 
known as the Corrupt Practices Act. However, because it only regulated the expenditures of 
candidates and not political committees, the law was “limited in scope and quite defective”.14 
Most of the early attempts at campaign finance reform were in fact futile and public 
awareness of the issue was limited. However, several social and economic developments at 
the turn of the century sparked the campaign finance debate and put campaign finance reform 
on the agenda for good.          
 As the Industrial Revolution unfolded, and the U.S. gradually developed into an 
urbanized society, a need for new methods of voter mobilization emerged. Because of the 
homogeneous nature of the rural communities of the 1800s, it was fairly easy for political 
parties to establish personal and emotional connections with their voters. By staging local 
parades and rallies, parties generated a local partisan culture which they could rely on for 
support.
15
 However, as large numbers of people moved to the burgeoning cities across the 
country, many close-knit rural communities dissolved and local partisanship was weakened. 
The development towards an increasingly urbanized and heterogeneous electorate consisting 
of people from different countries and different social classes was quite challenging to the 
parties. In addition, the fact that the attention of the public was diverted away from politics 
                                                 
10
 La Raja, Small Change, 1. 
11
 Ibid., 47. 
12
 “Important Dates: Federal Campaign Finance Legislation,” FollowTheMoney.org, accessed November 18, 
2012,  http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200206257.pdf  
13
 Peter Argersinger, Structure, Process, and Party: Essays in American Political History (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
1992), 63. 
14
 Pollock, Party Campaign Funds, 8. 
15
 La Raja, Small Change, 26. 
10 
 
and towards new modes of entertainment further complicated the situation for the parties 
which had to completely reevaluate their strategies of mobilization.
16
 Raymond La Raja 
explains that “American society was trending towards mass culture which could more easily 
be reached through impersonal advertising”.17 Thus, in order to reach the rapidly growing and 
increasingly urbanized American electorate, political parties and candidates became 
dependent on the media. As a result, the expenditures associated with political campaigning 
skyrocketed.
18
           
 The development towards more expensive political campaigns dependent on media 
advertising was in fact also facilitated by the Progressive movement which had its heyday at 
the turn of the century.
19
 The movement’s philosophy was largely based on the antipartisan 
ideas of the Mugwumps of the Gilded Age, and for several years the Progressives ran an 
intense campaign against traditional forms of partisan politics.
20
 They championed 
governmental reforms designed to undermine the power of political parties and they hoped to 
establish a more politically educated electorate independent of political institutions.
21
 
Although the Progressives did not emphasize campaign finance reform at first, they were 
increasingly concerned about the “growing importance of cash for organizing elections and 
motivating voters”.22 Ironically, however, several Progressive reforms aimed at weakening the 
parties had unintentionally served to enhance the role of money in political campaigns. In an 
attempt to eradicate the intermediary function of parties in certain elections, the movement 
established the direct primary as well as the direct election of U.S. Senators.
23
 Thus politics 
was “made more expensive simply by increasing the number of elections”.24 In addition, the 
civil service reforms introduced by the Progressives eventually led to a shortage in “’unpaid’ 
partisans willing to mobilize voters in anticipation of getting a future job”.25 As a result, voter 
mobilization increasingly came to depend on financial resources.     
 Thus, as the budding industrialization and certain Progressive reforms unintentionally 
made political campaigns more reliant on financial resources, political parties and candidates 
had to improve their fundraising strategies. As William McKinley’s campaign manager in the 
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1896 election, Mark Hanna recognized the growing need for campaign money and he 
successfully implemented a new system for raising funds. Hanna realized the benefit of taking 
advantage of the vast financial resources of the growing business community and, “with his 
new administrative and marketing approach to campaigning”, he transformed the Republican 
campaign effort on several levels.
26
 In order to raise enough money to run a successful 
campaign in a gradually modernized society, “Hanna targeted business firms, assessing them 
for fixed sums based on their total capital”.27 The amounts of money requested by Hanna 
were significantly larger than what corporations and other party donors were accustomed to 
contribute, and many were surprised by his aggressive approach.
28
 Nevertheless, Hanna 
managed to raise millions of dollars for the McKinley campaign, “most of which came from 
business or wealthy individuals with interest in government policy”.29 The McKinley 
campaign actually doubled the amount of money spent by Republicans in the previous 
election, and McKinley won the election after having outspent his Democratic opponent 
William Jennings Bryan 5 to 1.
30
        
 The strong relationship between business and political parties was arguably an 
inevitable consequence of the increased need for campaign money. Nevertheless, this 
particular connection was of great concern to the Progressive Movement which argued that 
“corporate funding of politics would corrupt politicians and also undermine the basic 
principle of one person, one vote”.31 In addition, the Progressives now feared that with the 
increased financial support of the business community and wealthy individuals, the parties, 
which they had only managed to undermine locally, might develop into strong national 
institutions.
32
 Thus, in an effort to protect democracy, as well as prevent the parties from 
gaining in strength, the movement added campaign finance reform to their agenda. At the 
outset however, there was little sentiment for the Progressive cries for increased regulation of 
money in politics, and the issue of campaign finance received limited attention at the federal 
level. While certain states had in fact issued laws limiting corporate support of political 
campaigns as early as 1897, the time was not yet ripe for any major changes in the federal 
law. However, this all changed during the election of 1904 when it was revealed that 
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“corporations were providing President Theodore Roosevelt with campaign gifts to buy 
influence with the administration”.33 Both politicians as well as the public were disturbed by 
the news, and as a result the “first organized movement for campaign finance reform” 
commenced.
34
 Nevertheless, reform would not occur until 1907 when Congress passed the 
Tillman Act prohibiting “corporations from making money contributions in connection with 
political elections”.35 This was the first federal law designed to thwart the creation of a 
political system disproportionately influenced by business and prevent quid pro quo exchange 
between the business community and politicians. However, the provisions of the law were too 
narrow and its enforcement mechanisms were too weak.
36
 Thus, the Act was not as effective 
as the Progressives and other reformers had hoped and corporations simply created alternative 
methods for channeling funds to their party or candidate of preference. As a result, regulation 
of corporate political influence continued to figure prominently in the campaign finance 
debate.           
 Nevertheless, “eliminating corporate influence was only one of the ideas being 
advanced at this time to clean up political finance”.37 Unlimited political contributions by 
wealthy individuals was still considered a threat to democracy, and “some reformers pushed 
for limits on individual donations”.38 Full disclosure of all campaign contributions and 
expenditures as well as public financing of campaigns were also suggested as possible 
remedies, and eventually Congress heeded the calls and passed additional campaign finance 
laws.
39
 During the course of the 20
th
 century, more and more money has found its way into 
politics and the financing of political campaigns has frequently been up for discussion in the 
federal government. A number of laws have been passed and the campaign finance system has 
been altered several times. Contrary to popular belief, however, campaign finance legislation 
is not always motivated by a desire to prevent corruption. In fact, partisan interest is often the 
main incentive to propose reform.        
1.5.2 Campaign Finance Reform as a Weapon of Partisan Rivalry  
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At the turn of the century, campaign finance reform was part of a broader Progressive 
“agenda to weaken the influence of political parties and give a new direction to modern 
politics”.40 However, as the need for campaign funds increased and the parties raised more 
and more money from corporations and wealthy individuals, the ideas of the Progressive 
Movement became more relevant and the reform issue gained momentum. Eventually, the 
federal government assumed a more active role in the effort to regulate campaign money and 
in time they became quite invested in the issue. Over the past century, Congress has passed 
several campaign laws which have affected political fundraising in many ways. As a result, 
the parties have frequently had to adapt to new rules and regulations determining how they 
can finance their campaigns. However, before going further into the specifics of some of the 
major reforms and before analyzing how parties are affected by changes in the law, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at why reform happens in the first place. While there are 
several theories on this subject, not all of them are equally reasonable, at least not for the 
purpose of this particular research. Nevertheless, much of the following argumentation is 
based on partisan theory of reform, which emphasizes the different resource dependencies of 
the parties in an effort to explain the timing and design of campaign finance legislation. In 
general, the theory highlights the role of the parties and describes campaign finance reform as 
“a weapon of political rivalry in domestic politics”.41    
1.5.3 The Partisan Theory of Reform 
It is not always easy to understand why campaign finance reform happens. In an effort to 
explain why the Tillman Act was passed, one could argue that it was a direct result of the 
scandalous events surrounding the 1904 election. This particular interpretation of cause and 
effect is based on the public interest theory of reform which emphasizes “the importance of 
scandal as it forces politicians to shake up the status quo and pass laws that reflect the public 
interest”.42 However, this theory arguably overestimates the inherent power of scandal to 
trigger political reform. It is true that “scandal occasionally provides a useful catalyst to win 
over wavering legislators to pass reform,” but “it is not a sufficient or necessary condition”.43 
Several major reforms have in fact been passed in the absence of scandals, and thus, one can 
argue that for the purpose of explaining why campaign finance reform happens, the public 
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interest theory is quite unsatisfactory.
44
 The partisan theory of reform, on the other hand, 
“explains the timing and design of reforms better than the public interest theory”.45   
 “Because money was becoming a more important political resource in the twentieth 
century,” the partisan theory of reform argues, “the two major parties used campaign finance 
reform to gain advantages over the rival party”.46 Such was also the case with the Tillman Act 
which was championed by Democrats who wished to bring an end to the continuous flow of 
corporate money into Republican coffers.
47
 As illustrated by this particular case, “the role of 
scandal is to cast the rival party as ‘corrupt,’ thus allowing the ‘reforming’ party to gain the 
first-mover advantage of proposing a raft of reforms that are better suited for their own 
organization”.48 According to the partisan theory of reform, members of Congress realize the 
inherent power of campaign finance legislation to influence the balance of power in American 
politics and consequently support “regulations strategically to advance partisan and factional 
interests”.49 To be sure, reform is often “pursued in the name of public interest,” but partisan 
goals are in fact “integral to the design and motives for legislation”.50 The theory therefore 
confronts the perception of campaign finance reform as simply a product of the federal 
government’s noble desire to prevent quid pro quo exchanges between public officials and 
donors and protect democracy. In contrast, the theory argues that reform is frequently 
motivated by partisan rivalry and that campaign finance legislation is often designed to 
challenge the resource dependency of the opposing party.     
 In its description of the reform dynamic, the partisan theory of reform greatly 
emphasizes the role of factions. While some factions are positioned within the party structure, 
others can be described as nonpartisan groups “vying for power in the political system”.51 
Nevertheless, both partisan and nonpartisan factions have the habit of pushing for “reform 
based on their own interests”.52 Factions which are positioned outside the party structure and 
which compete with the parties for power might want to reduce “the availability of money to 
political parties and politicians,” and consequently, “enhance their own influence in the policy 
process”.53 On the other hand, partisan factions competing with each other for influence 
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within the party are generally interested in enhancing the value of their own resources and at 
the same time diminish the value of the resources of rival factions. Labor unions, for example, 
“will seek to curtail the role of cash in politics” and consequently enhance the value of the 
nonmonetary resources which they are able to provide.
54
 Factions are adamant about 
protecting their own resources because by keeping parties dependent on their support, they are 
able to maintain a certain degree of political influence.
55
 In fact, “subgroups within party 
coalitions are wary about any reform that cuts into their strategic resources, even if a proposed 
reform might help the party they support”.56 Furthermore, because of their ability to withhold 
their resources, factions become “part of the partisan calculus in pursuing reform”.57 
 In essence, the theory of partisan reform argues that the struggle over campaign 
finance reform is a partisan struggle. Because the two major political parties in the U.S. have 
developed in different directions as regards to who they consider to be their base, they have 
effectively come to rely on dissimilar sources for both financial and in-kind support. In 
addition, they have developed different methods for raising funds. As a result, campaign 
finance laws can hurt or benefit the parties disproportionately and reform can be utilized for 
the purpose of limiting a rival party’s fundraising options. Based on this judgment, the theory 
argues that campaign finance legislation is most likely to occur when one party feels 
threatened by the opposing party’s fundraising advantage.58 This suggests that, in order to 
better understand the timing and design of reform, greater knowledge of the particular 
resource dependency of each party as well as their distinctive preferences regarding campaign 
finance regimes is required. Thus, a brief outline of the gradual development and main 
characteristics of the two major parties will follow. However, in an effort to describe 
Republican and Democratic preferences regarding campaign finance regimes, the significance 
of ideology should not be overlooked. 
1.5.4 Ideology and Base 
During the 19
th
 century, “American parties used their control over nominations and material 
benefits to attract contributions”.59 However, as the patronage system was abolished by a 
number of Progressive reforms, and as the Tillman Act and certain publicity laws discouraged 
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donations from corporations and wealthy individuals, the  parties’ needed to find a way to 
attract small voluntary donors.
60
 Both parties quickly realized that in order to attract the 
masses they had to “be more ideological than American parties had ever been”.61 Even though 
they had “always been ideologically distinct,” American parties had “traditionally focused on 
broad governing principles rather than issue-specific agendas that attract ideological 
supporters”. Nevertheless, the developments at the turn of the century required the parties to 
create coherent national programs and strengthen their ideological identities.
62
 As a result, the 
ideological differences between the parties were greatly accentuated and partisan support was 
increasingly determined by party principles. Consequently, the Republican Party and the 
Democratic Party came to rely on quite distinct bases of support. A base can be described as 
“a party’s most committed and intense supporters: the first line of support, the leading source 
of money, the wellspring of ideological purity”.63 There is no doubt that the parties depend 
heavily on their distinct bases, and this is reflected in how the party organizations are 
structured and also which campaign finance regimes they generally prefer.  
 This suggests that ideology, at least to a certain degree, influences party preferences 
regarding campaign finance reform. The significance of ideology is contested however, and 
some actually argue that distinctive party ideologies are nonexistent in the U.S. and that the 
parties share a range of principles and beliefs. “However much at odds on specific issues,” 
Richard Hofstadter has argued, “the major political traditions have shared a belief in the rights 
of property, the philosophy of economic individualism, the value of competition; they have 
accepted the economic virtues of capitalist culture as necessary qualities of man”.64 Others, 
like Louis Hartz, have argued that the parties did in fact possess distinctive principles, but that 
they “could not mobilize the electorate with ideological appeals, because electors were 
strapped securely in the cultural straitjacket of liberalism”.65 Today however, many 
professionals agree on the importance of ideology in American politics. John Gerring argues 
that since their founding “American parties have articulated views that were (and are) 
coherent, differentiated, and stable”.66 In addition, he claims that “American party history and, 
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by extension, American political history at large have been irreducibly ideological”.67 By 
extension, one can argue that ideology is also quite significant to the history of campaign 
finance reform. Party ideologies however, are complex and dynamic, and both Republican 
and Democratic principles have changed over time. Thus, a brief outline of the basic 
ideological evolution of the parties will be provided.  
1.5.5 The Democratic Party 
According to John Gerring, the ideology of the Democratic Party can be separated into three 
distinct phases. What he calls the Jeffersonian phase lasted from 1828 to 1892 and was 
marked by strong emphasis on such themes as white supremacy, antistatism, and civic 
republicanism.
68
 The next phase dubbed Populism, lasted approximately fifty years, from 
1896 to 1948. In this particular period, egalitarianism, majoritarianism, and Christian 
humanism were important themes for the Democratic Party.
69
 The last phase called 
Universalism lasted from 1948 to 1992 and was marked by a focus on civil rights, social 
welfare, redistribution, and inclusion.
70
 However, it is important to mention that because it is 
dated and only extends to 1992, Gerring’s analysis is quite limited and in some ways 
inadequate. Nevertheless, although this particular separation of Democratic ideology into 
three distinct phases can be questioned on many levels, it does provide an adequate outline of 
the general ideological tendencies of the Democratic Party over the past two centuries. 
Furthermore, this ideological evolution is related to the development of the party’s loyal 
constituencies and trusted base of support. Because of the rather fragmented nature of 
Democratic ideology however, the party has attracted voters and donors from several different 
layers of American society and its main constituencies are quite heterogeneous. The complex 
nature of the Democratic coalition has influenced the party organization in many ways, and 
especially considering which campaign finance reform regime it tends to prefer. 
 Traditionally, the Democratic Party is viewed as a liberal party supportive of labor.
71
 
Labor union support for the Democratic Party surged during the presidency of liberal 
Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the party became heavily dependent on this particular 
group.
72
 Even though the 1950’s saw a slight decrease in pro-Democratic unions, the faction 
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continued as the party’s first line of support.73 The key resources provided by the labor 
movement include “campaign workers and activists willing to mobilize voters”.74 
Consequently, the Democratic Party tends to “prefer regimes that devalue the importance of 
cash versus labor as a political resource”.75 In addition, their dependency on in-kind support 
and the fact that they have traditionally been cash-poor, has led Democrats to “prefer a system 
that subsidizes political campaigns…or minimizes the advantages of wealth through 
contribution and spending limits”.76         
 Nevertheless, the Democratic Party ideology has attracted supporters from many 
spheres of American society, and they have not only depended on labor unions for support. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the party had indeed come to represent “a 
heterogeneous coalition of farmers, unskilled workers, union members, ethnics, minorities, 
and elderly”.77 The comprehensiveness of the Democratic coalition has made it difficult for 
the party organization to centralize power in a national committee, and as a result the 
Democratic Party organization is better fit to mobilize at a local rather than national level. 
When it comes to campaigning, they rely heavily on local parties “which are tailored to 
distinct cultures”.78 In addition, certain Democratic constituencies, such as “urban machines, 
labor unions, and African American churches all possess, or possessed at some time, 
institutionalized ties to masses of citizens who could be exploited for electioneering”.79 The 
party has traditionally relied heavily on these groups, and thus “Democrats favor campaign 
finance regimes that decentralize partisan activity”.80  
1.5.6 The Republican Party          
John Gerring divides what he calls the Whig-Republican party into two distinct ideological 
epochs. The first period called Nationalism lasted from 1828 to 1924.
81
 He argues that during 
these ninety-six years, the party emphasized such themes as Protestantism, moral reform, 
mercantilism, free labor, social harmony, and statism.
82
 Their self-proclaimed mission was to 
“contain the passions of the individual, largely through the actions of an interventionist 
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state”.83 During the 1920s however, the party remade “itself in a Neoliberal image” 
maintaining that “the individual was to be set free from the machinations of the state”.84 
According to Gerring, this Neoliberal epoch lasted from 1928 to 1992 and the major themes 
emphasized by the party were antistatism, free market capitalism, right-wing populism, and 
individualism.
85
 One can argue that this is a fairly generalized description of Republican 
ideology and that it is of little use in a serious evaluation of party principles and 
characteristics. However, Gerring’s outline of the party’s basic ideological progression during 
the past two centuries is useful in that it helps explain the development of the traditional 
Republican constituencies. These bases of support do, in turn, influence the Republican 
preferences regarding campaign finance reform.       
 As suggested by Gerring, the Republican ideology has gone through significant 
transformations during the past centuries. The party which began as “a radical, reformist 
political movement” has eventually become “the conservative party of the nation, offering 
resistance to the activist programs of Democrats to its left”.86 Today, the strength of the 
Republican Party is “that they are more cohesive ideologically and culturally than 
Democrats”.87 Indeed, through much of the twentieth century the party did an excellent job 
defining its ideology and positioning itself to the right of the political spectrum. The 
conservative nature of the Republican ideology has attracted “activists from the ranks of 
upper income groups, business professionals, white-collar workers, and mainline Protestant 
denominations”, and one can argue that “their ideological coherence and affinity with citizens 
of greater wealth give them a broader base of contributors than Democrats”.88 Because of 
their easy access to money, and because of their belief in the conservative idea of laissez-
faire, the Republican Party usually prefers little or no regulation of campaign finance.
89
 In 
addition, because of the homogeneous nature of the Republican coalition, it has been fairly 
easy for the party to “centralize operations without incurring as many political costs for 
various factions within the party”.90 As a result, Republicans have generally opposed 
campaign finance laws facilitating decentralized partisan activity.   
 Although the Republican Party is supported by a range of factions, many would 
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characterize it as the party of business.
91
 To be sure, the Democratic Party also receives 
financial support from business. Nevertheless, research has shown that “most corporations 
prefer Republicans over Democrats and conservatives over liberals”.92 The strong Republican 
connection to the business community has had significant effects on the practices of the party 
organization, and most importantly the party has “adopted a businesslike approach to political 
organizing”.93 With his professional and methodical style of campaigning, Mark Hanna set an 
example which continues to guide the Republican campaign effort. For years, the Republican 
Party has based their fundraising and advertising practices on “the organizing principles of 
business administration”, and as a result their political committees “are more rationally 
organized than Democratic groups”.94       
1.5.7 The Parties Compared        
“Given their unique organizational characteristics and the nature of their factions,” Raymond 
La Raja argues, “the two major parties have sought different kinds of campaign finance 
regimes.”95 Both the ideological as well as the organizational differences between the parties 
have facilitated a federal campaign finance debate driven largely by partisan interest. While 
partisan support of reform is indeed conditional, and cannot be predicted, one can argue that 
there are certain aspects of campaign finance on which the parties fundamentally disagree. In 
sum, “Democrats, with their nonmonetary advantages and decentralized structure, favor a 
system that minimizes the importance of private cash resources and discourages concentration 
of resources”.96 The Republicans on the other hand, with their wealthy constituents and their 
centralized structure, “prefer campaign finance regimes that give them maximum flexibility to 
use money”.97 The party faces few obstacles when it comes to raising money, “not only 
because their constituents are wealthier but also because the party’s unity makes impersonal 
appeals for donations (through direct mail, for example) more successful”.98 Thus, the 
Republican Party generally does not support campaign finance regulations of any kind. 
However, they do tend to “sponsor reforms that limit nonmonetary advantages (restricting 
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union electioneering) or reduce the electoral influence of strong factions in the Democratic 
Party”.99 Furthermore, the parties usually disagree on the issue of disclosure of campaign 
funds. Because much of Democratic campaigning is often conducted through nonparty-
organizations, and because the Republican Party tends to raise more money, Democrats often 
support legislation recommending public disclosure.
100
 Nevertheless, Republicans can also 
employ this particular strategy, especially when they are the minority party. In essence, they 
can “use the same tactics against Democrats to show that they are ‘bought and sold’ by 
interest groups”.101  
1.5.8 Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, the two major parties have drifted in different ideological directions 
and, consequently, they have developed distinct bases of support. Their specific resource 
dependencies have, in turn, induced the parties to prefer contrasting campaign finance 
regimes. Thus, certain campaign laws have the potential to significantly favor one party over 
the other, and on the basis of this deduction, the partisan theory of reform claims that 
campaign finance reform is frequently utilized as a weapon of partisan rivalry. As we shall 
see, this theory helps put the following analysis of the connection between the reform enacted 
in the 1970s and the ensuing electoral success experienced by the GOP in perspective. As will 
be demonstrated in the next chapter, the campaign finance laws enacted in the seventies can 
be counted as a Democratic endeavor to obstruct the fundraising advantages of the Republican 
Party. In essence, the legislative provisions were specifically designed to accommodate the 
campaign finance preferences of the Democratic Party. Paradoxically, however, the first 
elections held in the new campaign finance environment framed by the Democrats were 
marked by significant Republican success, both in terms of fundraising as well as election 
returns. This discrepancy will be the main topic of this thesis and it will be assessed on the 
basis of an unprecedented effort on part of the political right to adjust to the new parameters 
established by these reforms.  
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2 Reform in the 1970s 
2.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this thesis is on how the right wing of American politics has adopted to 
changes in campaign finance law. More specifically, the analysis will consider the ways in 
which this particular faction utilized the new opportunities for raising money produced by 
some of the major campaign finance reforms of the 1970s. Many would argue that the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 1974 amendments were the first effective pieces of 
legislation regulating money in political campaigns.
1
 However, one should not completely 
dismiss the campaign finance laws enacted prior to the 70s. Raymond La Raja argues that, 
although they “may have been ineffective in the sense that they did little to staunch the flow 
of money into politics or make political contributions more transparent to the public”, the 
early campaign laws had a certain impact on future campaign finance legislation.
2
 
Nevertheless, because of the extended scope of the laws, as well as the political ecosystem in 
which they emerged, the FECA of 1971 and 1974 were the first laws which had a 
considerable effect on how American political campaigns were financed. In addition, 
considering the fact that the growth of the right-wing coincided with these legislative 
developments, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the amendments of 1974 
provides a natural starting-point for this analysis. However, before going further into the 
specifics of the laws, and before detailing right-wing response, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at some of the developments leading up to their passing.     
 This chapter will initially provide an overview of the political parties’ traditional ties 
to business and labor. This will be followed by a brief outline of the political climate of the 
1960s, including the increasingly visible Radical Left and the growing conservative 
movement. This section will mainly emphasize the conservative capture of the Republican 
Party and right wing fundraising strategies leading up to the election of 1968. As we shall see, 
this particular election sparked a Democratic desire for increased regulation of campaign 
money and eventually led to the passing of the 1971 FECA. Thus, a detailed description of the 
specifics of this reform will follow. Furthermore, the analysis will account for the immediate 
response of the right-wing and the events leading up to the amendment of the act in the fall of 
                                                 
1
 Raymond La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008), 11. 
2
 La Raja, Small Change, 44. 
23 
 
1974. Finally, the amendments will be thoroughly outlined and the purpose of the reform will 
be connected to the theory of partisan reform.       
2.2 Sources of Support  
As mentioned in the introduction, this analysis will be largely based on the theory of partisan 
reform which suggests that, because of their disparate resource dependencies, the parties are 
affected differently by changes in campaign finance law. Because of their particular traditions 
and ideologies, the parties have developed different bases of support as well as distinct 
fundraising techniques. Thus, seeing as a campaign law can for instance determine which 
sources the parties can legally petition for support, it can increase one party’s access to funds 
while simultaneously hamper the opposing party’s chances of raising campaign money. On 
the basis of this conception, the theory argues that campaign finance reform can be used as a 
weapon of partisan rivalry and that legislation often will “occur during periods of heightened 
electoral uncertainty for one party in presidential elections”.3 In essence, if a party feels that 
they have fallen behind the opposing party in regards to financial strength, they will most 
likely encourage “rule changes that favor their side”. According to Raymond La Raja, this has 
happened on a number of occasions, including in 1971 and in 1974 when the Democrats 
pressed for reforms which were designed to diminish the cash advantage of the Republicans.
4
 
Nevertheless, while the circumstances surrounding the reforms of the 70s will be more 
thoroughly examined later, for now the purpose is simply to bring attention to the fact that the 
reform dynamic is closely related to the sources of campaign contributions as well as party 
fundraising techniques.          
 In essence, the theory of partisan reform helps explain why campaign finance reform 
is often motivated by partisan rivalry. Moreover, it illustrates the connection between the 
parties’ resource dependencies and their preferences regarding campaign finance reform. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, because the Democratic coalition is quite 
heterogeneous, the party has developed a decentralized organizational structure which 
facilitates fundraising at a local rather than national level. In addition, they have traditionally 
depended on non-monetary support from labor unions, and received less cash contributions 
than the Republican Party has. Thus, they have come to prefer campaign reforms which 
promote decentralized fundraising and increase the value of in-kind support. The Republican 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 96. 
4
 Ibid., 97. 
24 
 
Party on the other hand, has developed a rather homogeneous coalition mainly consisting of 
people from the middle and upper income levels. Thus, the party’s organizational structure is 
relatively centralized and they tend to fundraise at a national level. As a result, the Republican 
Party prefers campaign finance laws which favor cash contributions and centralized 
fundraising. Nevertheless, these organizational characteristics not only determine the party’s 
preferences regarding campaign finance reform, they are also influential regarding how they 
adapt to changes in campaign law. The parties will always strive to collect as much campaign 
resources as possible. Thus, if a certain law limits their traditional techniques of fundraising 
or restricts their access to their financial bases, they will employ alternative methods in an 
effort to prevent falling behind in the campaign money race. Nevertheless, their 
organizational structures and their traditional bases of support do in fact limit the parties’ 
available options. In essence, when the parties adapt to campaign finance law, they need to 
consider their own organizational boundaries and their relationship to their donors. As we 
shall see however, these boundaries are not constant as both the party organization and the 
party’s financial base can be transformed as a result of either internal or external 
developments. With regards to the Republican Party, it is particularly important to consider 
the internal changes which occurred during the 1960s. As the conservative faction grew 
increasingly stronger and eventually captured the GOP, the party’s financial base was altered 
and new fundraising techniques were introduced. These changes are important not only 
because they indirectly led to the Democratic push for reform in the 70s, but also because they 
had an impact on how the Republican Party adapted to these new laws. 
2.3 The Conservative Capture of the GOP 
Today, conservatism is generally associated with the Republican Party. Conservative 
principles such as “smaller government, lower taxes, free-market capitalism, 
constitutionalism, and American exceptionalism” are more or less represented in the 
Republican platform, and most Republicans will probably describe themselves as 
conservatives.
5
 However, over the past centuries the Republican emphasis on conservative 
ideas has indeed fluctuated and the party has not always been equally devoted to this 
particular ideology. As already mentioned, John Gerring argues that the Republican Party 
went through an ideological transformation during the 1920s when it discarded some of the 
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more liberal ideas and values it had previously identified with.
6
 To be sure, there were certain 
principles which were not abandoned, and the party did not completely reinvent its ideology. 
Nevertheless, “in response to a new set of challenges to liberty, prosperity, and the American 
nation” the party adopted slightly more conservative “attitudes towards state and society”.7 
Thus, Gerring challenges the widely accepted notion that the Republican Party’s move 
towards the right commenced in the 1960s. “Usually,” Gerring argues, “the ideology of the 
contemporary Republican party…is viewed as the outgrowth of postwar conservatism, a 
conservatism personified in the figure of Barry Goldwater and in the movement designated 
the New Right”.8 According to Gerring however, the conservative ideas which began to 
flourish within the Republican Party in the sixties had actually taken root in the party as early 
as the 1920s.
9
 He portrays Barry Goldwater, the iconic figure of the 1960s conservative 
movement, as “the intellectual stepchild of Hoover”, and he contends that both Goldwater and 
Ronald Reagan “propagated a set of ideas and ideals that had been characteristic of their party 
for quite some time”.10 Nevertheless, while some of their ideas might have circulated within 
the GOP since the 20s, it was not until the sixties that conservatives began to make 
themselves heard in politics and started to resemble a legitimate political force.  
 For much of the 1930s and 40s, the Democratic Party enjoyed a significant majority in 
Congress and American politics was dominated by social reform. There was a strong liberal 
consensus and broad support for Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
policies. Although a Republican entered the White House in 1952 however, many have 
argued that liberalism continued as a major force in American politics through the 50s. For 
much of this decade, the GOP was in fact dominated by a liberal faction that “embraced New 
Deal-style social and economic programs”.11 However, these policies contradicted the beliefs 
of the growing number of conservatives who opposed any kind of governmental regulation 
and championed local control.
12
 Nevertheless, the Republican right-wing was generally 
overlooked and had little political influence. Thus, “a conservative movement began to 
coalesce outside the political structure”.13 Conservatives of different stripes united against the 
liberal domination of the GOP and created an effective grassroots movement. As a result of a 
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general change in public opinion, economic growth in the South, JFK’s fiscal policies, and the 
hard work of right-wing activists, the conservative movement gained a great number of 
followers in the early sixties.
14
 In 1964 right-wing leader Barry Goldwater was nominated as 
the Republican presidential candidate. However, a number of factors, including Goldwater’s 
extremist image, severely hurt his chances in the general election. Eventually he lost in a 
landslide against Democratic candidate Lyndon B. Johnson. Nevertheless, conservatives were 
pleased about their accomplishments during the Goldwater campaign as well as their progress 
within the Republican Party. “By emphasizing grassroots activism, right-wing leaders 
significantly altered the relationship between the GOP and the conservative movement, 
ensured that the movement would outlast its candidate, and set important precedents for future 
campaigns”.15           
 The Goldwater campaign had successfully experimented with certain techniques 
which significantly broadened the conservative constituency and increased the movement’s 
financial worth. The conservatives saw the value of continuing this good trend, and they were 
especially keen on going forward with the Goldwater campaign’s use of direct-mail. “Using 
lists gathered from conservative organizations, Goldwater’s staff sent out frequent mailings 
requesting funds, providing information on campaign activities, and generally building a 
network of supporters”.16 The Goldwater campaign personally addressed people all across the 
country and, because they primarily requested small donations, they appealed to people who 
were unaccustomed to political giving. As a result, the number of small contributors grew 
significantly and the campaign received a total of one million contributions.
17
 Thus, “having 
learned the value of grassroots activism, conservatives continued to cultivate associates at that 
level by direct-mail techniques developed during the 1964 campaign”.18   
 In the years leading up to the 68 election, “the escalating violence of the civil rights 
and student movements as well as growing protests against the Vietnam War made the 
conservative agenda acceptable to more people”.19 For long, the right had felt ignored and 
overlooked because of the excessive focus on the Left. In the early 1960s, “journalists and 
scholars, by spotlighting only the protesters, students, hippies, and demonstrators, ignored the 
action taking place at stage right and therefore presented a lopsided view of the decade”.20 
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However, as left-wing radicalism escalated, the emergent right-wing came to represent a 
counterweight to what many Americans perceived as an alarming trend. As a result, the 
conservative movement suddenly had fewer problems gathering members and their 
constituency grew steadily.
21
 The continuous growth of right-wing supporters was also aided 
by the significant fund-raising effort on part of the conservative strategist Richard Viguerie. 
He copied the direct-mail technique employed by the Goldwater campaign and he “created the 
first mailing list ‘containing most of the active Conservatives in the U.S.’”.22 Consequently, 
“right-wing organizations not only expanded their memberships but also raised considerable 
sums of money”.23 The growing appeal of the right-wing was to a certain extent demonstrated 
by the results of the 1966 midterm elections. The Republican Party secured “forty-seven 
additional seats in the House, three more seats in the Senate, and eight new governorships”.24 
Although it did not give them a majority, many viewed this as a victory for the GOP which 
had not enjoyed congressional power for years. Moreover, the results, including the 
appointment of four new conservative governors, increased the optimism of the Right.
25
 The 
midterm elections confirmed that the Republican Party had not been damaged by the past two 
years of conservative domination. In addition, it illustrated that the measures taken by the 
right-wing after Goldwater’s defeat, including a relaxation of their uncompromising stance 
and increased cooperation with other factions of the GOP as well as their efforts to get rid of 
their extremist image, had indeed worked in their favor.
26
     
 While the conservatives might have preferred Ronald Reagan as the Republican 
candidate in the 1968 election, it was Richard Nixon who eventually secured the nomination. 
Because Nixon was not a staunch conservative like Goldwater or Reagan, many conservatives 
viewed him with skepticism. However, in order to get the nomination, Nixon knew he needed 
the support of the right-wing. Thus, he made several attempts to court the conservatives, 
including “advocating a hard-line stance on Vietnam and an antistatist domestic policy” and 
campaigning “for conservative candidates during the 1966 campaign”.27 To a certain extent, 
one can argue that his tactic worked. Although many right-wingers disagreed with a lot of 
Nixon’s policies, they came to realize that he was “the most ideologically acceptable 
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candidate who could win “.28 Thus, numerous conservatives, perhaps because they felt that 
they had no choice or because they had eventually been persuaded by his conservative 
rhetoric, gave Nixon their support and contributed to his campaign. As we shall see, the 
Nixon campaign, adopting many of the fundraising techniques developed in 1964, turned out 
to be a very successful venture leading to a Republican victory in the general election.   
 Although they had made tremendous progress during the sixties, it was not until 1980 
that the right-wing reached their ultimate goal of getting a devoted conservative in the White 
House. Nevertheless, their success in 1980 was more or less facilitated by the movement’s 
earlier achievements. As we shall see, the 1970’s presented the Republican Party with certain 
challenges which complicated their efforts to raise funds. However, the lessons learned by the 
right-wing during the 60s regarding the significance of cooperation and the value of direct-
mail techniques would ultimately benefit the GOP in the 70s as they struggled to adapt to the 
new campaign laws.
29
 In essence, “the conservatives of the 1970s and 1980s built on the 
structures created in the 1960s and utilized the techniques and the personnel cultivated during 
that time”.30  
2.4 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
Over the past century, researchers of campaign finance have gathered information regarding 
how much the parties’ spend in each election. While this data is an indicator of several social 
and economic trends, its main contribution is it’s manifestation of party characteristics. Most 
importantly, the accumulated data shows that “Republicans consistently outspend 
Democrats”.31 Between 1888 and 2008, the Democratic Party managed to parallel GOP 
campaign spending on six occasions only.
32
 It is important to keep in mind however, that the 
Democratic Party “have possessed important nonmonetary advantages that do not show up in 
financial figures”.33 These advantages include the in-kind support which the Democratic Party 
has received primarily from labor unions. As previously mentioned, labor union support for 
Democrats surged in the 1930s and, while they did provide financial contributions 
occasionally, their main resource consisted of a voluntary workforce capable of mobilizing 
voters through for example get-out-the-vote drives. This kind of support however, is more 
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difficult to measure and does not pertain to this particular discussion regarding campaign 
spending. Nevertheless, the findings validate “the argument that Republicans made the 
transition from labor to cash campaigns more easily than Democrats”.34 In addition, if “set 
against a time line of campaign finance legislation”, the numbers gathered by the researchers 
also reveal the legitimacy of the theory of partisan reform.
35
 Primarily, this format will reveal 
a “correlation between periods of heightened Republican advantage and campaign finance 
reform”.36 In essence, “after an election in which Republicans outspend Democrats by 
roughly two to one, reforms follow”.37 The 1971 reform serves as an example.  
 The 1968 election was devastating for the Democratic Party. In addition to losing the 
presidency, they had also accumulated a record debt which was going to be very difficult to 
pay off.
38
 The Republicans, on the other hand, with Nixon in the foreground, “broke all fund-
raising records”.39 As mentioned, the Nixon campaign borrowed some of the fundraising 
techniques successfully employed by the Goldwater campaign in the previous election. In 
addition to utilizing direct-mail, however, Nixon’s associates adopted a Mark Hanna-style 
approach to fundraising and “established contribution quotas for different industries and 
firms”.40 As a result, Nixon “spent a record sum of $63 million ($342 million in 2004 
dollars)”, and “the 1968 elections once again exposed Democratic weaknesses in competing 
with Republicans for political money in presidential campaigns”.41 The Democratic Party 
became increasingly anxious looking towards the 1972 election, and they decided to take 
action.            
 Several campaign finance laws had been passed since the 1907 Tillman Act which 
prohibited direct contributions from corporations. While some laws set limits on 
contributions, others limited expenditure or required public disclosure. Certain laws targeted 
specific interests, such as the 1943 Smith-Connally Act and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act which 
prohibited “labor organizations form making political contributions through union dues they 
collected from members”.42 These particular Acts were in fact the result of a Republican 
effort to check the nonmonetary advantages of the Democratic Party.
43
 Nevertheless, the main 
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bulk of these early campaign laws were quite narrow and their enforcement mechanisms were 
quite weak. Thus, parties, candidates, labor unions, and corporations easily found ways to 
circumvent the regulations and continued the exchange of political favors and money. The 
legality of their actions can certainly be questioned, but at the time there was no particular 
oversight which could have stopped them. The financing of the 1968 election thus transpired 
in a time when “election finance was largely an extension of the private marketplace”.44 
According to Richard Briffault, “campaigns were funded through private, voluntary 
contributions to parties and candidates, with donors contributing to the extent of their interest 
and wealth, and private economic inequalities were replicated in the political marketplace”.45 
However, the 1968 election clearly demonstrated that such a lenient system did not benefit the 
Democratic Party. Thus, their decision to work towards an overhaul of the campaign finance 
system was reached shortly after their defeat.      
 In the summer of 1970, Democratic Party leaders began outlining a bill which 
established certain parameters for campaign finance which would ultimately work in their 
favor.
46
 The 1970 midterm elections ensured the continuation of a Democratic congressional 
majority, and enhanced the probability of getting a reform proposal passed.
47
 Initially, “they 
decided to push for a bill that would inject public funds into Democratic Party coffers for the 
convention and provide money to presidential candidates”.48 Furthermore, “presidential 
candidates who accepted roughly $20 million in public funds would have to agree to limit 
spending to the amount of the grant”.49 This system would hurt the Republicans more than the 
Democrats, who could still receive support from labor unions which, after the antilabor laws 
of the 40s, had developed political action committees that would remain untouched by the 
new regulations.
50
 The bill also “proposed spending limits on media buys for all federal 
candidates”.51 In essence, any measures that sought to limit expenditures would ultimately 
benefit the cash poor Democratic Party. In addition, “as the incumbent party, Democrats had 
less to fear from scaling back media expenditures, since incumbents generally have greater 
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name recognition than challengers”.52 Eventually, a rather extensive bill, containing a number 
of provisions, was introduced in Congress. In a clever move, however, the Democrats 
presented the bill as an attachment to the Revenue Act, which had already gone through the 
House with the support of the President.
53
 Thus, the Republicans were caught off guard. 
Nevertheless, they quickly understood the implications of this bill and tried to develop an 
effective opposition. However, their efforts were futile and eventually the measure was passed 
in the Senate “by a vote of fifty-two to forty-seven”.54      
 Next, the campaign finance bill would be discussed in conference committee. The 
Democratic strategy had worked so far, and they were convinced that their proposal would not 
be compromised in conference. However, they could not have predicted the actions of the 
chair of the Appropriations Committee, Arizona Democrat Wilbur Mills. Later claiming he 
had no choice; Mills “offered a compromise to Nixon to the effect that public funding of the 
presidential election would be put off until the 1976 elections”.55 Democratic leaders were 
furious with Mills for making this deal. Nevertheless, this would not be the only revision 
forced by the Republicans in conference. In fact, they were able to “remove all preexisting 
contribution and spending limits for candidates”.56 In addition, they secured the inclusion of 
certain provisions limiting “contributions by candidates and their families to their own 
campaigns”.57 This condition was especially harmful to the cash poor Democrats who “were 
typically more open to finding wealthy candidates who would not drain resources from party 
coffers”.58 Perhaps as a result of these Republican revisions, Nixon signed the bill into law on 
February 7, 1972. In a statement, Nixon declared that “the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 is a realistic and enforceable bill, an important step forward in an area which has been of 
great public concern. Because I share that concern, I am pleased to give my approval of this 
bill”.59 Whether this was a reflection of his true feelings is difficult to decide, but as we shall 
see, some of his actions in the following years suggests otherwise.   
 Despite the Republican adjustments, however, Democrats were generally satisfied 












Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: P.L. 92-225: 86 Stat. 3: Feb. 7, 1972 XI (1972) 
Remarks by Mr. Nixon upon signing S. 382 into Law. 8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 213-4, 




 La Raja, Small Change, 74. 
59
 Remarks by Mr. Nixon upon signing S. 382 into Law. 
32 
 
with the FECA. Indeed, compared to earlier efforts at campaign finance regulation, the 1971 
Act was much more extensive. Because the Act addressed “the weaknesses of campaign 
finance reform that prior legislation had missed”, many reformers were convinced that real 
change would follow.
60
 “We have a crackerjack bill here”, Democratic Representative Morris 
K. Udall declared.
61
 “It will stop millionaires from buying Senate seats and the Presidency. It 
brings this television monster under control”.62 In essence, the Federal Election Campaign Act 
touched on three major campaign finance reform issues. It “limited personal contributions, 
established specific ceilings for media expenditures, and required full public disclosure of 
campaign receipts and disbursements”.63 Regarding personal contributions, the act imposed 
ceilings of “$50,000 for presidential and vice presidential candidates, $35,000 for Senate 
candidates, and $25,000 for House candidates”.64 As a response to the increasing use of the 
media in political campaigns , the act “limited the amounts candidate for federal office could 
spend on radio, television, cable television, newspapers, magazines, and automated telephone 
systems in any primary, runoff, special, or general election to $50,000 or 0.10 times the 
voting-age population of the jurisdiction covered by the election”.65 Moreover, the act 
specified that “no more than 60 percent of a candidate’s overall media spending could be 
devoted to radio and television advertising”.66 Furthermore, “the act required every candidate 
or political committee active in a federal campaign to file a quarterly report of receipts and 
expenditures”.67 All contributions and expenditures exceeding $100 had to be filed and donors 
and recipients needed to be identified. In addition, “during election years, additional reports 
had to be filed fifteen days and five days before an election, and any contribution of $5000 or 
more had to be reported within forty-eight hours of its receipt”.68 To be sure, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 contains additional provisions which are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The preceding outline is therefore a simplified version of the act which, in its 
entirety, would fill several hundred pages. Arguably however, the paragraph sufficiently 
sketches the FECA’s most significant regulations.       
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2.5 The Prelude to the 1974 Amendments 
In his statement regarding the 1971 act, President Nixon referred explicitly to the disclosure 
requirements and argued that “by giving the American public full access to the facts of 
political financing, this legislation will guard against abuses and will work to build public 
confidence in the integrity of the electoral process”.69 However, based on what we now know 
about Nixon’s fundraising activities in 1968, one can only assume that the FECA’s disclosure 
provisions were in fact his greatest concern.
70
 Nevertheless, the law did not go into effect until 
April 7, 1972, and Nixon knew to take advantage of this delay.
71
 Together with the 
Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), he began planning an elaborate scheme to 
raise as much money as possible before the April 7 deadline. Through what can only be 
described as a “fundraising blitz”, Nixon and his associates managed to raise as much as $20 
million from several big donors across the country.
72
 Many donors gave more than $100,000, 
including the founder of McDonalds Ray Kroc, who gave $250,000, and businessman W. 
Clement Stone who donated as much as $2,000,000.
73
 As long as the donations were in the 
hands of the CREEP before April 7, the contributions would not be subject to the FECA and 
were thus perfectly legal. However, Nixon’s express fundraising effort was in fact subject to 
previously established limitations on the money’s sources, and “later allegations 
suggested…that some of it had come from corporations or from abroad”.74   
 The confusion surrounding the actions of the CREEP is illustrated in a 1972 
confidential report by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Banking and 
Currency. After it was discovered that some of Nixon’s campaign money originated in 
Mexican banks, the Committee on Banking and Currency issued a preliminary report 
addressing the issue. Initially, the report declares that “the $89,000 of Mexican bank checks 
which went into the Republican campaign and then into the account of Bernard Barker…raise 
tremendous questions for the Committee”.75 Furthermore, the Committee clarifies that “we do 
not know whether these funds were raised in the United States or Mexico and we do not know 
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whether they are the type of funds which could be legally contributed to or received by a 
political committee”.76 As a later investigation would show, the Mexican bank checks were in 
fact part of a donation from the president of the Gulf Resources and Chemical Company, 
Robert Allen.
77
 A total of $100,000 was funneled “through a Mexico City bank to Dìaz de 
Leòn, head of Gulf Resources’ Mexican subsidiary, who carried the loot over the border”.78 
This all happened on April 5 1972, and constitutes the “last gasp” of the CREEP fundraising 
scheme.
79
 “Hugh Sloan, CREEP treasurer, later described an ‘avalanche’ of cash pouring into 
the group’s coffers – all of it secret”.80      
2.5.1 Watergate 
Nevertheless, as already established, the activities of the CREEP did not remain a secret for 
long. According to the Committee on Banking and Currency’s report, the money that was 
funneled through Mexico ended up in the account of a man named Bernard Barker, who in 
fact was one of five men who in June 1972 were caught breaking into the headquarters of the 
Democratic National Committee. Their unsuccessful burglary “lit the fuse on the biggest 
political scandal in modern American history”, commonly known as Watergate.81 As it was 
revealed that the men who had broken into the DNC were instructed by the President to bug 
the building, a full-blown investigation of the Nixon administration commenced.
82
 
Apparently, the break-in was part of a larger scheme on part of the President to control what 
he and his associates “regarded as a hostile political environment”.83 In fact, “convinced from 
the outset of his presidency that he faced a coordinated and ruthless opposition from 
Democrats…wiretaps of White House aides and reporters, done on Nixon’s orders, had begun 
as early as 1969”.84 In addition, the investigation revealed the extent of the Nixon campaign’s 
corrupting activities including the funneling of contributions through Mexico and the fact that 
the DNC burglars had been paid with CREEP money. Nevertheless, in a remarkable 
endeavor, Nixon managed to keep the public, Democrats, and the law enforcement out of the 
loop, at least temporarily. Thus, the 1972 election was not affected by the developing situation 
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and the Republicans emerged victoriously. In early 1973 however, the scandal blew open and 
Nixon was castigated for his wrong-doings.
85
 As time went by and the scope of the scandal 
began to surface, Nixon was threatened with impeachment and in August 1974 he resigned.
86
 
 In a discussion of campaign finance reform in the 70s, one simply cannot avoid 
mentioning Watergate. In essence, the disclosure provisions of the 1971 reform “provided a 
paper trail for investigators to follow” and thus contributed to the extensive scope of evidence 
that would eventually bring Nixon down. In addition to compromise Nixon however, the 
evidence revealed the inadequacy of the 1971 reform as a whole. While the act’s main 
purpose had been to decrease campaign spending, the figures from the 1972 election exposed 
a development towards increased expenditures. According to David Adamany and George 
Agree, “the Nixon presidential campaign managers spent a staggering $56 million – more 
than double the previous high of $25 million reached in the 1968 Nixon-Agnew canvass”.87 In 
addition, Nixon’s Democratic opponent George McGovern “spent $49 million, more than four 
times Hubert Humphrey’s 1968 costs”.88 As a result of these findings, as well as other pieces 
of evidence illustrating the weaknesses of the 1971 reform, it was agreed that the law needed 
to be amended. The decision to revise the law was in fact also aided by the Watergate scandal 
itself. As mentioned earlier, this thesis is based on the theory of partisan reform, which argues 
that “politicians seek reforms when they perceive that their party or faction appears to be 
losing influence or competitiveness relative to other groups”.89 According to this theory, 
scandal does not play an important role when it comes to campaign finance reform. However, 
one can argue that the 1974 FECA is the exception to the rule. “If ever scandal proved 
decisive in campaign finance reform”, Raymond La Raja argues “it was the events 
surrounding the Watergate burglary that was linked to President Nixon’s reelection 
committee”.90   
2.6  The 1974 FECA Amendments 
Although Watergate had generated strong public support for reform and the 74 midterm 
elections strengthened the Democratic majority in Congress, “it was not easy passing 
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amendments to the FECA”.91 Liberal Democrats in the Senate were especially quick to 
advance reform proposals. They took advantage of the favorable attention to reform which 
was generated by Common Cause, a newly established organization devoted to legislative 
lobbying for campaign finance reform.
92
 During the 1972 election, Common Cause had run a 
project monitoring the financing of congressional races. The endeavor “revealed the amounts 
spent, the size of gifts, the special interest contributions, and the money edge of incumbents in 
every congressional race in the country”.93 Such research contributed to an increased public 
awareness regarding campaign finance which arguably benefitted reformers in terms of public 
support. Nevertheless, as the Watergate scandal unraveled and the inadequacy of the 1971 
reform began to surface during the summer of 1973, the Democratic Senate introduced a 
measure “providing spending and contribution limits, strengthening full disclosure, and 
establishing an independent enforcement agency”.94 In addition, Senators Ted Kennedy (D-
MA) and Hugh Scott (R-PA) brought forth a proposal to establish public funding for 
congressional general elections.
95
 Initially, the Senate decided to put the provision on hold. 
Nevertheless, southern Democrats and Republicans were generally pessimistic about the 
proposed regulations and several prolonged filibusters followed.
96
 The Senate delays 
continued until April 11
th
 1974 when S. 3044 was finally passed.
97
 This bill, in addition to 
containing the same provisions which were introduced in 1973, also established “public 
financing of primary and general election campaigns for Federal elective office”.98 
Furthermore, the bill clarifies that Federal office is defined as “the office of the President, 
Senator, or Representative”.99 Thus, the measure effectively proposed public financing of 
both congressional and presidential elections.      
 However, this broad provision met resistance in the House where many representatives 
were keen on protecting their incumbency advantage.
100
  For months, reform proposals were 
held up by disbelieving representatives from both parties. The most conspicuous opponents of 
reform were perhaps Representative Wayne Hays, chair of the Administrations Committee 
and Representative John Dent, chair of the Subcommittee on Elections who “held protracted 
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hearings through the end of the session”.101 On the 8th of August 1974 however, the House 
finally presented a proposal which had both added to and deducted certain provisions from the 
Senate bill. First of all, the House bill introduced “public financing of presidential nominating 
conventions”.102 Secondly, it “rejected public financing of congressional campaigns and 
approved only a weak enforcement agency”.103 Thus, the stage was set for a standoff in 
conference committee.          
 In conference the discussions were many and the atmosphere was tense. According to 
David Adamany and George Agree, the conferees were “faced with 138 points of difference” 
and they “deliberated for thirteen days”.104 The main issue of disagreement was arguably the 
Senate proposal establishing public financing for congressional elections. On the 30
th
 of 
September however, “the Senate conference members dropped this part of the bill after they 
won concessions from the House members to support higher spending limits in congressional 
campaigns and a strong independent electoral commission to enforce the law”.105 Thus, after 
deadlock in conference, the bill was eventually passed with bipartisan support and President 




 In a clever move, the 
Democrats had pushed for reform at a time when they had the advantage of a Congressional 
majority and when public opinion was increasingly in favor of increased regulations. In fact, 
numbers show that the attitude towards public financing of presidential campaigns had 
reversed itself in the years between 1964 and 1973. In 1964, opinion polls revealed that 71 
percent of Americans were against public financing.
107
 In 1973 however, “65 percent favored 
tax support for both presidential and congressional campaigns”.108 Thus, although the 
Republicans were appalled by some of the bill’s provisions and realized that it would 
“preserve the Democratic majority”, they really had no choice but to support it.109 At that 
particular point in time, considering the Watergate revelations, no one could afford opposing 
increased regulation of campaign finance.        
 Technically, the 1974 reform were a collection of adjustments to the 1971 Federal 
Election Campaign Act. Nevertheless, the amendments were wide-ranging and strengthened 
the FECA of 71 considerably. Thus, the FECA of 1974 came to “stand as the most 
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comprehensive reform of the campaign finance system ever adopted”.110 As in 1971 however, 
the act’s provisions were mainly designed to benefit the Democratic Party.111 First of all, the 
provision establishing public funding in presidential elections “addressed the quadrennial 
Democratic predicament of finding money to keep up with the Republican presidential 
nominee”.112 If a candidate in a general election chose to accept public funds, he would not be 
allowed to accept private donations and he would be subject to a $20 million spending 
limit.
113
 Public funding was also made available to the national party committees in 
connection with their expenses towards the nominating conventions. If they chose to accept 
the offer, the committees could receive funds matching, but not exceeding, the $2 million 
spending limit for nominating conventions.
114
 For primary elections, the rules regarding 
public funding were slightly more complicated. In essence “major party candidates seeking a 
presidential nomination may receive matching grants for each individual contribution up to 
$250, after qualifying by raising $5000 in such contributions in each of twenty states”.115 
However, they could not receive more than a total of $5 million, or half of the $10 million 
spending limit for primaries, in public matching funds.
116
 In addition, “the bill included a 
number of amendments designed to strengthen the disclosure and enforcement procedures of 
the 1971 act”.117 This entailed the establishment of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), a 
bipartisan agency which would serve as a campaign finance watchdog.
118
    
 The FECA of 1974 also set up new and broader limits on contributions and spending 
which ultimately would benefit cash poor Democrats.
119
 As already mentioned, presidential 
candidates were not allowed to spend more than $10 million in primary elections and $20 
million in general elections. For Senate candidates however, the expenditure limit was set to 
“$100,000 or $0.08 times the voting-age population of the state in a primary election, 
whichever was greater, and no more than $150,000 or $0.12 times the voting-age population 
in a general election, whichever was greater”.120 While House candidates in multidistrict 
states were not allowed to spend more than $70,000 in a primary or general election, 
candidates in “states with a single representative were subject to the ceilings established for 
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Senate candidates”.121 In addition, the 74 amendments restricted the amount that national 
party committees could spend in support of a candidate.
122
  With regards to political action 
committees, the act stated that “independent expenditures made on behalf of a candidate were 
limited to $1,000 a year”.123 Because of the Democratic Party’s disadvantage regarding 
financial resources, these limits would not hurt them as much as it would hurt the 
Republicans. In essence, because the Republican Party had grown accustomed to a higher 
level of campaign spending, they would feel the effects of the expenditure limits to a much 
greater extent.           
 In 1976 however, the expenditure limits were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo.
124
 The lawsuit was filed by a group of Senators, including James 
Buckley (R-NY), shortly after the 1974 amendments were signed into law.
125
 The Senators 
complained that several provisions of the 1974 FECA were in violation of the First 
Amendment which confirms that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of 
speech”.126 In the ruling, the Court argues that “the Act’s expenditure ceilings impose direct 
and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech”.127 Moreover, the Court refers to 
and questions the constitutionality of three specific aspects of the act’s restriction on 
expenditures. First of all, the Court declares that “the governmental interest in preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on 
independent expenditures”.128 Second, it is argued that “the primary governmental interest 
served by the Act – the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process – 
does not support the limitation on the candidate’s expenditure of his own personal funds”.129 
Lastly, the Court considered the limitations on over-all campaign expenditures and stated that 
“no governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on the 
quantity of political expression imposed by § 608(c)’s campaign expenditure limitations”.130 
Thus, the ruling repealed the expenditure limits imposed by the 1974 amendments, “except 
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for those presidential candidates receiving public funds”.131     
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld most of FECA’s limitations on contributions, 
except the restrictions on how much a candidate and his immediate family could contribute to 
the candidate’s own campaign.132 Thus, when Congress, as a response to the Court’s ruling in 
Buckley v. Valeo, further amended the FECA in May 1976, it was established that there 
would be no limit on the amount that candidates and their families wished to contribute to 
their own campaigns. If a candidate received public funding however, the limit was set to 
$50,000.
133
 Nevertheless, most of the 1974 amendments regarding contributions were 
retained, including the provision that “an individual was allowed to contribute no more than 
$1,000 per candidate in any primary, runoff, or general election and could not exceed $25,000 
in annual aggregate contributions to all federal candidates”.134 Regarding political action 
committees however, a provision declared that they could not donate more than $5,000 per 
candidate per election, with no aggregate limit.
135
 Thus, with regards to political influence 
through campaign contributions, individuals were at a disadvantage compared to political 
action committees. In addition, the extent of the concessions granted to candidate committees 
and political action committees revealed a deemphasized role for national party organizations 
considering fundraising. This was believed to benefit the Democrats who were less reliant on 
centralized fundraising and had more to gain from a decentralized and candidate-centered 
system.
136
              
 However, the 1974 amendments also “allowed corporations and unions with federal 
contracts to establish and operate PAC’s to make political contributions”.137 Since it was 
mostly labor unions which had established PACs up until then, this provision was believed to 
ultimately benefit the Democratic Party. As mentioned, the 1907 Tillman Act prohibited 
corporations from using their treasury funds for political contributions.
138
 However, the 
legality of labor union contributions was not addressed until the 1940s when their political 
involvement surged. As a result of the New Deal policies of the Democratic Party during the 
30s, “labor organizations increasingly tied themselves to the Democrats through political 
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contributions and get-out-the-vote operations”.139 In fact, “labor union expenditures in 
campaigns almost doubled between 1936 and 1944, from roughly $770,000 to $1,300,000”.140 
This development was greatly disturbing to members of the Republican Party which swiftly 
proposed counteractive reform. In 1943 Congress passed the Smith-Connally Act which 
“banned labor organizations from making political contributions through union dues they 
collected from members”.141 Reformers argued that it would only be right to “put labor unions 
on exactly the same basis, insofar as their financial activities are concerned, as corporations 
have been for many years”.142 However, because this particular provision was included in a 
bill that would only be in effect during wartime, Republicans needed to make the statute 
permanent as soon as WWII drew to a close. They regained control of Congress in 1946 and 
in 1947 they managed to pass the Taft-Hartley Act which, not only reestablished the 
prohibition on labor union contributions, but extended it to cover political expenditures as 
well.
143
            
 However, labor unions had already found a way to circumvent the legislation by 
setting up separate political action committees funded by voluntary donations from union 
members.
144
 The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) established the first official PAC 
in 1943. The PAC “was funded by contributions from members from seven unions” and its 
resources were mainly used in support of the Roosevelt-Truman ticket in 1944.
145
 However, 
in addition to using PAC money as direct contributions, labor organizations “continued 
spending general treasury funds (collected through union dues) on activities that only 
indirectly – but substantially – affected elections, such as ‘educational’ expenditures to 
sponsor registration drives, GOTV campaigns, and printing of the voting records of 
legislators”.146 Labor unions quickly discovered the benefit of this system and established 
several PACs at a rapid speed. At the same time, corporations exerted political influence by 
taking advantage of the limited restrictions on individual contributions. In essence, corporate 
contributions were disguised as the individual donations of affiliated persons of wealth and 
the business community thus saw little need to establish PACs.
147
 Consequently, the number 
of non-union PACs at the time of the FECA amendments’ passage was insignificant and the 
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fact that the business community might eventually take advantage of the PAC system was 
perceived as unlikely. Thus, the 1974 statute permitting both labor unions and corporations 
with government contracts to establish PACs was mainly perceived as an effort to further 
validate union PAC activity and both labor and Democrats believed that it was worth the risk 
of effectively opening up for corporations to establish PACs.
148
 However, what Democrats 
and other reformers could not foresee was the massive organization of the business 
community that had in fact already begun, but the effects of which would soon become 
apparent.           
2.7 Conclusion 
With social unrest, foreign threats, and fiscal challenges the 1960s were turbulent years in the 
U.S. The left-wing grew increasingly strong, liberalism dominated the political scene, and a 
number of social reforms were passed. Simultaneously, a growing number of conservatives 
began to express their concerns about this development and united in an effort to defeat the 
liberal hold of American politics in general and the Democratic Party in particular. With an 
emphasis on the grassroots, the right-wing expanded their political influence and eventually 
gained control of the GOP. The conservative endeavor included experimentation with 
alternative fundraising techniques to attract small contributors, with direct-mail figuring 
prominently. The right-wing fundraising strategies were hugely successful and benefited 
Republican candidates trying to keep up with the rising costs of running political campaigns 
which were increasingly dependent on the media. As the decade drew to a close, generous 
amounts of money were virtually flowing into Republican campaign coffers. Democrats, on 
the other hand, had always had a difficult time raising money and had traditionally been more 
dependent on non-monetary support from labor unions. As a result, they were less able to 
adjust to a political environment in which campaigns became gradually more expensive. The 
Democrats anxiously stood by and watched as they fell behind the Republicans in the 
campaign money race and eventually lost the 1968 presidential election. Thus, in an effort to 
impede the financial advantage of their opponents, the Democratic Party engaged in an effort 
to reform the entire campaign finance system. With a considerable congressional majority, 
Democrats managed to get the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments 
passed despite the fact that the legislation was mainly designed to benefit the Democratic 
Party. The main bulk of the provisions were intended to hurt the Republican fundraising effort 
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and put Democrats ahead in the campaign money race. However, despite the obvious 
Democratic concessions central to the FECA, these measures did not bring an end to the 
financial advantages of the GOP. Conversely, the reform of the 1970s created a campaign 
finance environment marked by a “flow of money outside the party structure and into the 
hands of candidates and interest groups”.149 Furthermore, this development served to benefit 
the Republican Party because right-leaning groups were especially quick to adapt to these 
changes and take advantage of the new opportunities to influence politics. Thus, as we shall 
see, the FECA ultimately backfired on the Democrats.  
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3 Business PACs and Republican 
Electoral Success 
3.1 Introduction 
A political action committee (PAC) is basically a committee that is “organized for the purpose 
of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates”.1 Moreover, “PACs are simply 
a residual category: political committees other than those of political parties”.2 In addition, to 
be regarded as a PAC and be subject to PAC specific restrictions, a committee must “receive 
contributions from more than fifty people and contribute to at least five candidates for federal 
office”.3 In the U.S., political action committees have been part of the political landscape for 
approximately seventy years. During that time, however, several socioeconomic and 
legislative developments have altered their political position radically. While PAC activity 
constituted only a small piece of the campaign finance puzzle in the 1940s, today PACs have 
come to dominate the system of campaign finance. Political action committees are involved in 
the financing of electoral politics on a number of levels, and both parties and candidates have 
come to depend on their services.        
 Nevertheless, there are several different types of PACs which play different kinds of 
roles in campaign financing. In general, political action committees “can be divided into two 
broad types depending on their organizational structure: the connected and the non-
connected”.4 The non-connected PACs are “without parent organizations” and “are free to 
solicit any American citizen”.5 Connected PACs however, are affiliated with corporations, 
unions, or membership organizations and are only allowed to solicit their owners, employees, 
or members.
6
 Furthermore, connected PACs can be divided into five subcategories depending 
on their parent organization’s characteristics: labor PACs, corporate PACs, PACs of 
membership organizations, of cooperatives, and of corporations without stock.
7
 In addition, 
PACs can adopt different measures to exert political influence. In essence, they can donate 
money directly to congressional or presidential candidates, or they can use “independent 
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expenditures” to campaign on behalf of a candidate.8      
 As will be thoroughly outlined, the FECA and all its amendments resulted in a 
considerable increase in the political influence of political action committees. Following these 
legislative initiatives, the number of PACs and the sum of their political contributions grew 
speedily. However, the development towards their increased political influence was arguably 
dominated by one particular PAC category. Corporate PACs, or business PACs, experienced 
unparalleled growth in the wake of the FECA and quickly manifested their presence in 
electoral politics. This development was not foreseen by the political left which had 
envisioned that it would primarily be labor, their main ally, which would take advantage of 
the expanded opportunity for organizations to establish PACs. To the dismay of Democrats, 
however, the business community, the long-standing ally of the Republican Party, was quick 
to realize the PAC potential and thus followed an explosion of the number of business PACs. 
Their direct contributions to candidates and parties were prominent in the financing of the 
1978 and 1980 congressional elections and represent one of the unintended consequences of 
the campaign finance reform of the seventies. To be sure, however, the business PAC 
explosion is not the only product of the FECA which had a significant effect on campaign 
financing. The legislation also led to an increase in non-connected PACs which engaged in 
independent expenditures. Nevertheless, this development will be further examined in the 
next chapter. The following chapter, however, will feature an analysis of the business PAC 
explosion with special regards to the partisanship of business PACs as demonstrated by their 
direct contributions to congressional candidates in 1978 and 1980. This study functions as the 
first part of an endeavor to determine the effects of the 1970s legislation on the Republican 
Party.            
 This chapter will seek to illuminate the immediate effects of the campaign finance 
reform of the seventies and attempt to determine whether these effects favored the political 
right. The first part of this chapter will thoroughly examine the socioeconomic, legislative, 
and political developments which facilitated the significant expansion of business PACs in the 
seventies. Then, attention will be directed towards the statistics of business PAC growth 
compared to other types of PACs, labor in particular. This overview will be followed by a 
discussion of several theories of the political partisanship of business as regards to corporate 
characteristics. Furthermore, in order to determine the extent to which the business PAC 
explosion favored the political right, I will examine the involvement of corporate PACs in the 
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financing of the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections. These particular elections have been 
chosen because of their pro-Republican outcomes and because they coincide with the first 
phase of the business PAC explosion. 
3.2 Socioeconomic Conditions Encouraging the Business PAC 
Explosion 
3.2.1 The End of the Climate of Cooperation 
The postwar era in the U.S. was marked by economic stability and a continuously growing 
middle class. The 1950s especially was a decade of unprecedented economic prosperity and 
an unusual degree of financial equality among U.S. citizens. According to Robert Reich, 
American society at that time adhered to a system of democratic capitalism.
9
 “Roughly 
between 1945 and 1975”, he argues “America struck a remarkable accommodation between 
capitalism and democracy”.10 During this period corporations, labor movements, and the 
federal government operated within a climate of cooperation and worked together for the 
common good. They viewed themselves not as opposing entities, but as distinct forces which 
depended on each other to maintain their own positions in society and continue the positive 
economic trend. Compared to today, the number of businesses was very modest and 
competition was minimal. The few big corporations that were operational knew that, in order 
to secure stable production and financial returns, they needed the cooperation of the labor 
movement and the support of the public.
11
 Thus, “the companies agreed to give their workers, 
organized by industry, a higher share of their profits”.12  In addition, “they negotiated with 
government over how the additional benefits of economic growth would be distributed, while 
also protecting jobs, communities, and, eventually, the environment”.13 By combining “a 
hugely productive economic system with a broadly responsive and widely admired political 
system”, rivalry was avoided and economic stability was ensured.14  
 Nevertheless, many researchers will agree that the 1970s were marked by a dramatic 
change in the relationship between the business community, the labor movement, and the 
federal government in the U.S. More specifically, this decade saw the end of the climate of 
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cooperation which had characterized American society since the end of WWII. The number of 
corporations multiplied and the economy continued to grow, but “the institutions that had 
negotiated to spread the wealth and protect what citizens valued in common began to 
disappear”.15 The number of labor unions plummeted, large corporations controlling different 
branches of industry were phased out, the number of regulatory agencies decreased, and the 
focus of CEO’s was increasingly directed towards personal profit.16 Thus, “the postwar 
Keynesian coalition that formerly accommodated the conflicting interests of big business, 
organized labor, and the welfare state” eventually collapsed and the business community 
gained a disproportionate amount of power in American society.
17
 Nevertheless, while the 
actual events of the 70s are certain and indisputable, there is considerable disagreement with 
regards to why this change occurred. According to Reich, the system of democratic capitalism 
dissolved because of the emergence of Cold War technology. Arguably, the technological 
developments during the war produced new goods and services which in turn “created 
possibilities for new competitors, beginning in transportation, communications, 
manufacturing, and finance”.18 Furthermore, “these cracked open the stable production system 
and, starting in the late 1970s and escalating thereafter, forced all companies to compete more 
intensively for customers and investors”.19 Thus, American society had been engulfed by 
what Reich dubbed supercapitalism. He further argues that the increased competition amongst 
corporations was eventually played out on the political arena as corporations “sought to gain 
competitive advantage through public policy”.20 However, I argue that the increased political 
influence of the business community during the seventies can be explained with reference to 
other important developments of that particular period.           
 Reich mentions three distinct theories which attempt to explain the increased flow of 
corporate money into politics in the seventies. One theory suggests that this development 
resulted from “a deal between big business and the Republican Party that begun with the 
election of Ronald Reagan and has continued through the administration of George W. 
Bush”.21 Reich however, dismisses this explanation on the grounds that corporate political 
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giving has been largely bipartisan.
22
 As we shall see later, this is a relatively accurate 
observation as Democrats have in fact received their fare share of corporate donations. 
Nevertheless, for reasons which will be explained later on, I argue that the GOP has profited 
substantially more from the political involvement of corporations than the Democratic Party 
has. However, while Reich objects on the grounds of bipartisan corporate donations, I object 
to this theory based on the fact that the development towards rising corporate contributions 
and the increased political influence of the business community actually commenced before 
Reagan won the 1980 election. As will be thoroughly explained at a later stage, the 
Republican gains in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections can arguably be attributed, at 
least partly, to the political involvement of corporations during the seventies.   
 The next theory mentioned by Reich suggests that the escalating flow of corporate 
money into politics is connected to “the increasing size and scope of the federal 
government”.23 The theory argues that with a government in possession of growing regulatory 
power comes increased political involvement of those seeking to ensure that regulations are in 
their favor. Reich however, argues that this deduction cannot be used to justify the 
developments during the seventies mainly because “regulation declined after 1980”.24 While 
this might be true, Reich also declares that “the largest increases in postwar public spending at 
all levels of government occurred between 1947 and 1973”.25 If one examines these 
regulatory measures further however, one might come to the conclusion that the expansion of 
corporate political influence was a reaction on part of the business community to preceding 
governmental initiatives. As mentioned earlier, the 1960s were marked by an increasingly 
growing radical Left and a liberal domination of American politics. Despite the election of a 
Republican president in 1968, these developments continued well into the 70s. The 
implications for the business community became increasingly apparent in the late sixties 
when several governmental regulations restricted a number of corporate activities. David 
Vogel has argued that “from 1969 to 1972, virtually the entire American business community 
experienced a series of political setbacks without parallel in the postwar period”.26 Jacob S. 
Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that “Washington undertook a vast expansion of its regulatory 
power, introducing tough and extensive restrictions and requirements on business in areas 
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from the environment to occupational safety to consumer protection”.27   
 With regards to consumer protection, a large number of laws were enacted in the 60s 
and 70s. Because a complete analysis of this legislation is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
emphasis will be put on the two key laws passed between 1969 and 1972. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1971 required “consumers denied credit on the basis of reports from credit 
agencies to be given access to their reports and to be allowed to correct inaccurate 
information”.28 The Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 “created the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, an independent federal agency, to establish and enforce consumer 
product safety standards”.29 Together with similar consumer protection acts passed in the 
same period, these legislative measures were perceived with contempt by the business 
community which felt that their interests were basically ignored.
30
 Furthermore, the federal 
government passed a number of acts protecting the environment. When the Clean Air Act was 
amended in 1970, specific standards for air quality were implemented and retributions for 
noncompliance were established. The main goal of the act was to “protect public health and 
public welfare and to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants”.31 The main objective of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 was to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”.32 Furthermore, the act prohibited 
the release of toxic materials into waters and established specific time frames within which 
their goal of uncontaminated waters should be reached.
33
 Because the growing pollution 
problem was often identified as being in direct connection with the actions of business 
institutions, a great number of corporations viewed this legislation as an attack on the interests 
of the business community.
34
 Thus, one can argue that the increased political influence of 
corporations in the seventies was the result of an effort on part of the business community to 
obtain a certain amount of control over the government which they felt had turned against 
them.             
 The third theory mentioned by Reich “attributes the escalating flow of money into 
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politics to a conspiracy of big business and Wall Street seeking to usurp the machinery of 
government and co-opt both political parties”.35 To some extent, this explanation relates to the 
preceding argument that the business community came together in the face of what they 
perceived to be a federal attack on their interests. Nevertheless, Reich argues that this theory 
does not hold up either. “Far from conspiring with one another”, he argues “firms have 
become steadily more competitive with one another”.36 However, while a certain degree of 
competition amongst corporations is unavoidable, the 1970s were in fact marked by an 
unprecedented level of cooperation on part of the business community. As we shall see, 
leaders of different companies organized into strong coalitions and worked together to 
achieve political goals.
37
 Thus, I disagree with Reich’s opposition to the proposed theories. I 
also disagree with Reich’s argument that the changes which occurred during the seventies 
were the direct result of technological developments and ensuing corporate competitiveness. 
However, I do not dismiss his analysis entirely as I can agree that the increased 
competitiveness of corporations might have motivated businesses to assert themselves on the 
political arena. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this tells the whole story of what really 
happened during the seventies.  In my view, the increased flow of corporate money into 
politics and the growing political influence of the business community was the result of 
several parallel developments. I argue that the escalating political involvement of corporations 
was the result of a determined effort on part of the business community to counter federal 
anti-business regulations, and that this endeavor was aided by recently enacted campaign 
finance reform, the development towards more expensive political campaigns, and an elevated 
political position of interest groups in particular.  
3.2.2 The Powell Memorandum 
While I agree that technological developments contributed to the growth of the business 
community during the seventies and stimulated corporate competition, I do not agree that this 
simply translated into increased political influence for American companies. Rather, I argue 
that the increased presence of business in Washington was mainly the result of organized 
corporate cooperation, the source of which can arguably be found in what is commonly 
known as the Powell memo. On August 23
rd
 1971, the soon to be Supreme Court Justice 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. submitted a confidential memo to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The 
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memo described an ongoing attack on the business community and suggested possible 
responses. Powell begins his memo by stating that “no thoughtful person can question that the 
American economic system is under broad attack”.38 He continues by affirming that “the 
assault on the enterprise system is broadly based and consistently pursued”.39 Furthermore, he 
identifies the sources of the attack, the tone of the attack, and the responsibilities of the 
business executives as well as the Chamber of Commerce. Lastly, Powell introduces several 
ways in which the business community can strike back and defend themselves against future 
attacks. Regarding the sources of the attack, Powell argues that they include “the 
Communists, New Leftists and other revolutionaries”.40 Of the tone of the attack, he points 
out that it has become increasingly hostile. More specifically, he calls attention to certain 
statements allegedly made by Ralph Nader including that “a great many corporate executives 
belong in prison”.41           
 In addition, Powell argues that “a prerequisite to any effective action – is for 
businessmen to confront this problem as a primary responsibility of corporate management”.42 
However, he highlights the fact that an uncoordinated effort on the part of the business 
community will not be sufficient. Thus, the Chamber of Commerce is requested to take on the 
task of uniting corporations and organizing an effective retaliation.
43
 Conclusively, Powell 
suggests specific measures that will inhibit their opponents and strengthen the role of business 
in general. These measures include restructuring the schools and the media, which in his 
opinion are basically controlled by leftists. More importantly, Powell emphasizes the 
significance of reinforcing the political influence of the business community. He argues that 
“one does not exaggerate to say that, in terms of political influence with respect to the course 
of legislation and government action, the American business executive is truly the ‘forgotten 
man’”.44 While reforming the schools and the media would eventually influence public 
opinion and create a more hospitable environment for the business community, Powell urges 
corporate executives and the Chamber of Commerce not to wait for this to happen. He argues 
that “business must learn the lesson, long ago learned by Labor and other self-interest 
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groups”.45 “This is the lesson,” he continues “that political power is necessary; that such 
power must be assiduously cultivated; and that when necessary, it must be used aggressively 
and with determination – without the embarrassment and without the reluctance which has 
been so characteristic of American business”.46      
 However, “Powell was just one of many who pushed to reinvigorate the political clout 
of employers”.47 As the situation turned for the worse in the early 70s, considering the 
increased governmental emphasis on environmental and consumer protection, he was joined 
by several representatives of the business community, including senior Washington 
representative for Proctor and Gamble Bryce Harlow who declared his determination to 
“prevent business from being rolled up and put in the trash can by that Congress”.48 Many 
pro-business advocates began to articulate their grievances with the leftist tilt of American 
society and the federal government, and in the process they came to realize that they shared a 
number of political goals. People like Powell and Harlow “recognized that business had 
hardly begun to tap its potential for wielding political power” and thus began the 
“organizational counterattack of business” which would be so characteristic of the 70s.49
 Arguably heeding Powell’s call, the business community united in a large scale effort 
to gain considerable political influence. More specifically, they focused on extensive lobbying 
and established several pro-business groups and foundations, including the Business 
Roundtable and the Heritage Foundation. The Heritage Foundation was founded in 1973 and 
is a think-tank working to shift “public opinion and policy in a conservative direction”.50 
According to their manifesto, their mission is “to formulate and promote conservative public 
policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, 
traditional American values, and a strong national defense”.51 In other words, the Heritage 
Foundation “sought to set the political agenda, to provide argumentative weaponry for the 
conservative cause, and to train and house reliable policy specialists who could staff business-
friendly administrations”.52          
 The Business Roundtable was founded in 1972 and it was “designed to mobilize high-
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level CEOs as a collective force to lobby for the advancement of shared interests”.53 It was the 
first organization to restrict its’ membership to top CEOs only and “within five years the new 
mega-organization had enlisted 113 of the top Fortune 200 companies, accounting for nearly 
half of the economy”.54 The Roundtable was a success. Through effective lobbying, it 
managed to significantly reinforce the influence of the business community in Washington. 
“The Roundtable has made a lot of difference,” deputy treasury secretary Charls Walker once 
argued.
55
 “They know how to get the CEOs into Washington and lobby; they maintain good 
relationships with the congressional staffs; they’ve just learned a lot about Washington they 
didn’t know before”.56           
 Most importantly however, corporations realized that they could exert a great deal of 
political influence simply by contributing money to parties and candidates. To be sure, 
business had practiced political giving in the past. However, these contributions had been 
largely uncoordinated (and predominantly illegal) and could not match the size and scope of 
the financial and in-kind support provided to parties and candidates by the labor movement. 
Thus, in order to outmaneuver organized labor in the area of political giving, corporations 
needed to both coordinate and increase their donations. Fortunately for the business 
community, their increased desire for political influence coincided with an increased need for 
campaign money as well as the enactment of new campaign finance laws which opened up for 
corporations to establish political action committees. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
prior to the 1974 amendments to the FECA, PACs were mainly run by labor unions. 
However, as a result of this new legislation the number of business PACs virtually exploded 
and, as we shall see, eventually surpassed the number of labor PACs. In addition, because of 
the traditional connection between business and the Republican Party, this development 
would ultimately favor the GOP. Thus, the provisions of the FECA backfired on the 
Democrats who, in 1974, were convinced that they would be the major beneficiaries of PAC 
growth.  
3.3 Political and Legislative Conditions Encouraging the Business 
PAC Explosion 
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Although corporate PACs were not officially legalized until the FECA was amended in 1974, 
the process of authorizing their establishment began with the 1971 reform. The original FECA 
actually “allowed corporations and labor unions (1) to communicate on any subject (including 
partisan politics) with stockholders and members, respectively, and their families, (2) to 
conduct nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives directed at these same 
constituencies, and (3) to spend company and union funds to establish and administer a 
‘separate segregated fund’ to be used for political purposes – that is, to set up political actions 
committees”.57 These provisions were highly supported and partly drafted by the labor 
movement which at the time was threatened by a court of appeal’s ruling that one of their 
PACs was “compulsory and union financed rather than voluntary and member financed”.58 If 
the Supreme Court were to maintain this decision, the activities of this particular PAC would 
have been exposed as illegal and the labor movement would have suffered a detrimental blow. 
Thus, notwithstanding the obvious concessions to corporations inherent in the before 
mentioned provisions, labor deemed it necessary that they be implemented. In order to 
safeguard their own interests, labor essentially gave business “a virtual carte blanche to 
establish PACs”.59 However, because corporations had previously shown little interest in 
following the PAC model to gain political influence, few believed that they would take 
advantage of such committees in the future.       
 Initially, labor’s tactic seemed to be working smoothly. The court of appeals ruling 
was reversed and union PAC activity was continued without mentionable competition from 
the business community. The reason for this is arguably twofold. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the disclosure requirements of the FECA were not implemented until April 
1972, roughly five months prior to the presidential election. Thus, candidate committees, most 
notably CREEP, had ample time to tap businesses for direct contributions which would not 
have to be accounted for. Another explanation for the absence of corporate PACs in 1972 is 
related to a lawsuit filed by the pro-reform organization Common Cause against TRW Inc. in 
1972. In essence, Common Cause charged that TRW, “a large company with major 
government contracts, maintained an illegal campaign fund composed of money from 
employers”.60 By referring to the particular section of the FECA which prohibited government 
contractors from contributing to political campaigns, Common Cause not only highlighted the 
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obvious misconduct of TRW, but also questioned whether or not this restriction was 
compatible with the other provisions authorizing the establishment of corporate PACs.
61
 After 
all, most corporations had government contracts. As a result, a number of companies refrained 
from establishing political action committees in fear of violating the law and ending up like 
TRW, which ultimately had to give up the practice and return all illegally solicited funds.
62
 
 Nevertheless, “labor was also concerned about the Common Cause suit, because a 
number of unions were government contractors by reason of their federal manpower training 
and development contracts”.63 Thus, when the FECA was amended in 1974, the labor 
movement championed a provision reversing the ban and effectively allowing both unions 
and corporations with government contracts to establish PACs.
64
 Once again, labor believed 
that the benefit of safeguarding their own PAC related activities exceeded the risk of granting 
corporations the same authorities. However, this time they were painfully wrong in their 
assumption. After all, “the majority of government contractors are corporations”.65 
Nevertheless, in addition to the legal basis provided by the FECA, other aspects of the 
legislation further encouraged businesses to set up PACs and rendered the subsequent 
explosion of corporate PACs inevitable. As mentioned earlier, compared to individuals, PACs 
benefited disproportionately from the contribution limits established in 1974. While 
individual contributions were limited to $1,000 per candidate per election with an annual 
aggregate limit of $25,000, PACs could contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per election 
with no aggregate limit.
66
 The purpose of these limits was primarily to thwart the lopsided 
political influence of wealthy people like W. Clement Stone. However, “Congress apparently 
overlooked the incentive for collective action it was creating with PAC limits five times 
greater than those placed on individuals”.67       
 As already mentioned, the business community’s newly emergent desire to exert 
greater political influence significantly boosted their incentive to establish PACs. In addition, 
so did the fact that interest groups had eventually gained a favorable position in American 
society in general and American politics in particular. In fact, the organizational endeavor of 
the business community conveniently coincided with a development towards decreased party 
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loyalty and weaker party organizations.
68
 Political parties had actually begun to lose ground 
quite early in the 20
th
 century when certain campaign laws left them in possession of 
“relatively few incentives – material, solidary, or purposive – to attract prospective donors”.69 
Increasingly, donors were attracted to individual candidates and issue-specific groups rather 
than national party organizations. Nevertheless, parties remained in relative control until the 
1960s when new technology, especially the television, created a direct link between political 
candidates and the public.
70
 “Advancements in survey research, computerized data 
processing, and mass media advertising provided candidates with new tools for gathering 
information about voters and communicating messages to them”.71 In addition, with the help 
of private political consultants as well as new fundraising technology, it became increasingly 
easier for candidates to run their own campaigns without being dependent on party 
organizations.
72
 By the 1970s, a declining number of people had a favorable view of political 
parties and “more voters were refusing to vote the party line, choosing instead to split their 
ticket between candidates of different parties for Congress and the presidency”.73 Thus, new 
technology facilitated a political environment in which party adherence was less significant 
and campaigns became predominantly candidate-centered.  Moreover, citizens became 
generally more reluctant to channel their political influence through party organizations and 
they began searching for alternative options. Before long, “interest groups became the 
political organization of choice for many Americans concerned about specific (and even 
narrow) interests and issues”.74 At the same time, candidates who distanced themselves from 
the party organizations needed to find alternative sources of funds. Thus, they looked to the 
increasing number of interest groups which eventually were granted the right to establish 
political action committees. Through these PACs, interest groups could finance candidate 
campaigns and in that way take on the role of financial contributor which had previously been 
held by the parties.
75
 In essence, as political campaigns became more candidate-centered and 
more dependent on the media, political parties lost control of this part of the electoral process 




 La Raja, Small Change, 145. 
70
 Ibid., 161. 
71
 Paul S. Herrnson, “The Revitalization of National Party Organizations,” in The Parties Respond: Changes in 
American Parties and Campaigns, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 48. 
72
 Herrnson, “The Revitalization of National Party Organizations,” 48. 
73
 La Raja, Small Change, 161. 
74







 Thus, the “historic division of labor in which parties had mobilized 
support in elections and interest groups brought influence to bear on officials already elected” 
officially came to an end.
77
         
 Yet another factor contributing to the growth of PACs, and especially business PACs, 
during the seventies was the Federal Elections Commission’s 1975 SUN-PAC ruling. 
Although the 1974 amendments to the FECA basically gave the green light to corporate 
PACs, some companies were still quite unsure about the specific rules regarding the 
establishment and operation of such PACs. One of these companies was the Sun Oil Company 
which in July 1975 asked if the FEC could determine the legality of their plan to “use 
corporate funds to establish, administer, and solicit contributions for a political action 
committee”.78 Eventually, the FEC decided that the company was allowed to:  
(1) use general treasury funds to establish, administer, and solicit 
contributions to SUN-PAC, its political action committee, (2) solicit 
contributions to SUN-PAC from both stockholders and employees, and (3) 
establish multiple PACs, each with separate contribution and expenditure 
limits, as long as the monies came solely from voluntary contributions.
79
  
In essence, the FEC validated that the Sun Oil Company, and other corporations, could use 
company money to operate PACs. Thus, businesses did not have to use part of what they 
received in voluntary contributions to cover overhead costs. Instead, they could funnel all of 
this money directly to political candidates.         
 The SUN-PAC ruling was a huge concession to corporations wanting to exert more 
political influence, and “in the six months following FEC’s decision, over 150 corporations 
established PACs, bringing the number in existence to nearly 300”.80 According to the 
prominent business analyst Professor Edwin M. Epstein, labor watched this development with 
apprehension and decided to seek a congressional reversal of the recently established 
parameters for corporate political activity. Thus, when the 1976 amendments to the FECA 
were drafted, union lobbyists worked intensively to establish “a new and politically 
                                                 
76
 Sorauf, “Political Action Committees,” 123  and Frank J. Sorauf and Scott A. Wilson, “Political Parties and 
Campaign Finance: Adaptation and Accomodation Toward a Changing Role,” in The Parties Respond: Changes in 
American Parties and Campaigns, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 248. 
77
 Sorauf, “Political Action Committees,” 123. 
78
 Ibid., 130. 
79





acceptable balance between union and corporate rights in federal elections”.81 The final 
provisions of the bill were believed to primarily benefit the labor movement which regained 
some of its PAC power relative to business. Unions and corporations were granted relatively 
equal concessions with regards to who they could solicit for contributions.
82
 In addition, 
“organized labor achieved a key objective when it was permitted to use payroll deduction 
plans (‘check-offs’) to collect from its members if the company PAC used that method with 
its stockholders or executive/administrative personnel”.83 Most importantly, while the 1976 
amendments provided that it was still legal to establish multiple PACs, it was added that all 
committees affiliated with a specific company or union would be regarded as one entity in 
terms of contribution limits. Thus, even if a corporation or a union established say five 
separate PACs, these five PACs combined could not contribute more than the $5,000 
contribution limit per candidate per election.
84
 However, although the 1976 amendments 
restored some of what labor had lost as a result of the SUN-PAC ruling, corporations emerged 
triumphant from the legislative adjustments of the seventies. As we shall see, the number of 
business PACs grew rapidly at the same time as labor’s political clout atrophied, and 
eventually business gained the upper hand and established itself as a permanent fixture of 
American politics.  
3.4 The Business PAC Explosion 
Since the 1970s, the number of political action committees has steadily increased. According 
to the Federal Election Commission, 608 PACs were registered in 1974.
85
 In September 2012 
however, the number of operating PACs had climbed to 6,464.
86
 Although this increase has 
developed over approximately forty years, annual statistics reveals that the highest percentage 
of PAC growth occurred in the immediate years following the amendments to the FECA. In 
the two years between 1974 and 1976 the number of operating PACs nearly doubled, from 
608 to 1,146.
87
 In 1980 the number had risen to 2,551, and in 1984 there were no fewer than 
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4,009 operating PACs in the U.S.
88
 In the following years however, the PAC growth slowed 
down temporarily. The number of PACs lingered around 4,000 until 2007 when it had 
climbed to 5,048.
89
 Nevertheless, as evidenced by the 6,464 PACs that were registered in 
2012, a significant increase occurred once again in the five years following the 2007 tally. As 
will be illustrated at a later stage, the reason for this particular development is connected to a 
2010 Supreme Court ruling opening up for the establishment of yet another type of political 
action committee frequently dubbed Super PACs.       
 Nevertheless, what these numbers do not reveal is the fact that it is primarily corporate 
PACs which have contributed to the last forty years of PAC growth. In 1974, only 89 
corporate PACs had registered with the FEC, compared to 201 labor PACs.
90
 Two years later, 
however, the number of corporate PACs had more than quadrupled and climbed to 433.
91
 In 
the same timeframe, labor PACs experienced modest progress adding only 23 to their 
numbers. Thus, the number of corporate PACs was suddenly twice as high as the number of 
labor PACs, and in just two years business had effectively gained control of “labor’s long 
time and essential political mechanism”.92 Between 1976 and 1984, the number of business 
PACs had risen by 388.4 percent, reaching 1,682. From then on, the figures are rather stable 
with only a slight increase towards 2012 when the number had climbed to 1,843.
93
 For 
organized labor however, the figures are rather depressing. Between 1980 and 1982, the 
number of labor PACs rose from 297 to 380.
94
 However, since then the number has lingered 
around 300, and in 2012 the count was only 301.
95
 Thus, based on these statistics one can 
arguably assume that in a swift and sweeping move, business replaced labor as the most 
influential interest group in electoral politics.     
 However, in an effort to calculate PAC influence one cannot rely on the numbers 
provided above. In order to determine the political influence of different types of PACs, it is 
necessary to examine the size and scope of their political contributions, their receipts, and 
their total disbursements. In 1978 the number of corporate PACs was 785 and the number of 
labor PACs was 217.
96
 Based on these figures, one might simply infer that PAC contributions 
to congressional candidates in that year derived predominantly from business PACs. 
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However, numbers from the Federal Election Committee show that while corporate PACs 
contributed $9.5 million to congressional candidates in 1978, labor PACs contributed $9.9 
million.
97
 Thus, despite the numerical imbalance between labor and corporate PACs, they 
were almost at an equal level considering contributions. However, this comparison is rather 
simplified and does not accurately illustrate the scope of business’ influence in electoral 
politics.            
 According to Epstein, it is the FEC’s classification of PACs which is at the root of 
these misleading figures. In addition to the labor/corporate distinction, the FEC separates 
other types of PACs into four distinct categories; “No-Connected PACs (for example, 
Business-Industry Political Action Committee), Trade/Membership/Health (for example, 
National Association of Realtors), Cooperatives (for example, Associated Milk Producers, 
Inc.), and Corporations without Stock (for example, California Almond Growers 
Exchange).”98 However, considering the fact that the main bulk of these particular groups and 
associations most likely can be considered to be business-related in some way, these 
distinctions are rather misleading. In essence, one can arguably assume that at least half of the 
PACs categorized as neither labor nor corporate are in fact associated with business, and in 
that case the previous estimates come off as rather skewed.
99
 According to the FEC, the 
number of such non-labor and non-corporate PACS was 651 in 1978.
100
 Furthermore, their 
contributions to congressional candidates in the 1978 midterm elections totaled an 
approximate $ 15 million.
101
 Thus, if one assumes that at least half of these contributions 
derive from PACs that are somehow related to business, the total amount of contributions 
from business rises to approximately $17 million. The statistics regarding the amounts raised 
and spent by PACs in 1978 can also be interpreted in the same fashion. At first look, the 
record of that year reveals that the total receipts and disbursements of what is defined as 
corporate PACs almost paralleled those of labor PACs. However, if half of the non-labor and 
non-corporate PACs are in fact related to business in one way or another and if their receipts 
and disbursements are included in the corporate PAC estimate, the matter becomes an entirely 
different one. “Based on these estimates”, Epstein argues “business and business-related 
groups out-raised and out-disbursed labor groups by almost two to one in 1978 and out-
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contributed them almost 70 percent”.102 Nevertheless, whichever way one decides to interpret 
the PAC statistics of 1978, there is no denying that, in the few years following the FECA 
amendments, corporate PACs had increased their financial worth and their contributions to a 
much greater extent than labor PACs had. Thus, “whatever measures one uses, it is apparent 
that business related PACs (both of the corporate and non-corporate varieties) played a far 
more important role in 1978 than they had in any election theretofore”.103   
 Further on in his 1979 analysis, Epstein argues that it is highly likely that business will 
“increase both the size and the vigor of their PAC operations in the future”.104 By comparing 
the number of corporate PACs with the number of corporations in 1978, he reaches the 
conclusion that “the market for potential PAC formations is virtually untapped”.105 According 
to his numbers for 1978, business PACs “represented only 22 percent of the 3,755 U.S. 
corporations with reported assets of $100 million or more (1974) and a meager 3.4 percent of 
the 23,834 corporations with reported assets of $10 million or more”.106 Furthermore, he 
argues that for the 1978 election cycle, corporate PACs raised and donated only a fraction of 
what they really were capable of.
107
 However, based on the sudden increase in their receipts 
and contributions, as well as their remarkable financial potential, Epstein argued that it was 
likely that business PACs would continue to expand their funds and their political 
donations.
108
 “Surely by 1982,” he continues “there could be 1,000 corporate PACs spending 
a total of some $50 million (an average of $50,000 apiece) and distributing $25 - $30 million 
directly to congressional candidates”.109 As it would turn out, in 1982 there were 1,469 
corporate PACs contributing a total of $28 million to congressional candidates.
110
 Thus, 
Epstein was right in his assumptions. The number of business PACs virtually exploded after 
1978 and their financial contributions became increasingly larger. Already in 1980, the 
amount of corporate PAC (not including business-related PACs) donations to congressional 
candidates reached $19 million, and they were out-contributing labor by approximately 50 
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 In the following years, business PACs continued to donate more and more cash to 
congressional races and in 2010 the total amount had risen to $ 153.7 million.
112
  
3.5 The Political Partisanship of Business PACs 
As previously mentioned, the Republican Party has considered business their political ally for 
a long time. The connection between the GOP and corporations was already visible in the late 
nineteenth century when “Mugwump and Progressive notions of ‘education’ politics spread 
and party spectacle declined”.113 Increasingly, political campaigns depended on huge amounts 
of cash in order to attract voters. Furthermore, one of the first who successfully adjusted to 
this new era of electoral politics was Republican presidential candidate William McKinley’s 
campaign manager Mark Hanna. Fundraising for the 1896 election, Hanna cleverly turned to 
that particular section of American society which experienced an unparalleled degree of 
financial growth and which was in position to donate fairly large sums. He focused most of 
his attention towards businesses and he systematically charged them according to their net 
worth. Hanna managed to raise incredible sums for the Republican candidate and, as a result, 
he explicated the benefits of staying connected to the corporate elite. Nevertheless, one should 
not assume that these benefits went unnoticed by Democrats and that the GOP could go on 
and tap the business community for resources without any competition from the opposing 
party. In fact, at the time when political campaigns became increasingly sophisticated and 
increasingly expensive, the Democratic Party also “received a portion of funds from 
corporations”.114 However, these donations were “based on more personal relationships and 
local ties” and did not come close to matching the corporate contributions to the Republican 
Party. The reason for this is primarily based on the fact that the GOP platform has 
traditionally been pro-business and that they have developed a natural affinity with the 
business community. Thus, corporate contributions to the Republican Party have generally 
been based on the party’s policy stance towards business rather than pre-existing and sporadic 
alliances.
115
 Repeatedly, the GOP has financed political campaigns with corporate money and 
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for decades it has been described as the party of business.
116
      
 Based on this account, one might assume that the main bulk of the business PACs 
which were established during the seventies supported Republican presidential and 
congressional candidates. However, the political partisanship of business is not as clear cut as 
that supposition would entail. In essence, rather than being a homogeneous entity, the 
business community does in fact consist of several different sectors with dissimilar interests. 
Furthermore, it is not a given that all of these disparate interests match the policies of the 
political right at all times. On the whole, the fact that there are distinctions within the 
corporate division which, to a certain degree, affect the political leniency of businesses is 
generally accepted by theorists. However, there is fundamental disagreement regarding the 
nature of these distinctions as well as the degree to which they affect the political unity of the 
business community. In essence, pluralist theorists argue that “policies that benefit one sector 
of business are often detrimental to others; hence corporations frequently find themselves 
opposed to one another in the political arena”.117 On the other hand, Marxist and elite theorists 
argue that “fundamental interests in defending the system of private property and production 
for profit override whatever divisions exist among corporations”.118 Nevertheless, even the 
theorists believing that businesses are united behind a central interest also “make distinctions 
between the more conservative and more liberal sectors of the capitalist class”.119  
 Thus, despite certain differences, there exists a broad recognition of the fact that there 
are cleavages within the business community which might somehow affect political giving. 
According to Val Burris, there are six different theories which seek to explain the partisanship 
of business based on specific corporate characteristics. Four of these theories, the core-
periphery-, the inner-circle-, the managerialist-, and the domestic-multinational theory, are 
related in the sense that they all argue that “it is the more central and dominant firms that tend 
to be politically moderate or liberal.
120
 Moreover, their argument is based on the hypothesis 
that larger more competitive firms are less fearful of governmental regulation and are more 
willing to cooperate with the authorities for the benefit of the economic system as a whole.
121
 
However, Burris argues that these four theories, collectively referred to as the theory of 
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corporate liberalism, falls short in the light of statistics regarding corporate PAC 
contributions.
122
 Based on the FEC’s record of PAC contributions in the 1982 Congressional 
election, Burris concludes that while the size of firms might account for diminutive 
differences as regards to political partisanship, larger companies are no more liberal than 
smaller companies.
123
 In fact, “the more profitable and oligopolistic firms are, if anything, 
more conservative than the less profitable and more competitive firms”.124 Thus, the theory of 
corporate liberalism is, according to Burris, not valid.    
 Furthermore however, he argues that the two remaining theories, the Yankee-Cowboy 
theory and the regulatory environment theory, are more or less supported by the statistics 
from the 1982 midterm elections. The Yankee-Cowboy theory is largely based on regional 
distinctions and is a theory in which “eastern banks and Midwestern manufacturing 
corporations are seen as moderate to conservative in political orientation, while rising Sun 
Belt firms in industries like defense, oil, agribusiness, textiles, and construction are viewed as 
more ultra-conservative”.125 However, there is considerable disagreement among Yankee-
Cowboy theorists regarding the reason for this regional divide. While some attribute the 
differences in political leniency to the conservatism entrenched in Southern and Southwestern 
culture and the liberalism inherent in the culture of the North and the Northeast, others 
emphasize the “different industrial mix between the regions”.126 Nevertheless, none of these 
rationalizations have been sufficiently examined.      
 The regulatory environment theory on the other hand, “argues that differences in 
corporate political behavior are primarily a reflection of different regulatory environments”.127 
In essence, the theory argues that a firm’s regulatory environment determines whether a 
corporation contributes according to ideology or pragmatic concerns. “From an ideological 
standpoint”, Burris argues “most corporations prefer Republicans over Democrats and 
conservatives over liberals.”128 “Many corporations, however, temper this ideological 
conservatism with a pragmatic concern for maintaining access to influential incumbents, 
regardless of party or ideology”.129 Firms which have traditionally been accustomed to 
cooperate with regulatory agencies and congressional committees, or which are government 
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contractors, are more likely to be pragmatic and supportive of incumbents.
130
 Furthermore, 
“firms with less immediate interest in industry-specific regulation and contracts are 
hypothesized to be less constrained by the need to maintain access to incumbents and 
therefore freer to follow their ideological preference for conservatives, including Republican 
challengers of incumbent Democrats”.131 In addition:  
 
firms that have the most antagonistic relationship to government regulation 
– those that have been embroiled in the greatest conflict with the newer 
multi-industry regulatory agencies like the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administrations – are 
hypothesized to be the most willing to risk the displeasure of incumbents in 
order to elect a more Republican and conservative Congress.
132
   
  
Burris argues that, while some of the aspects of the Yankee-Cowboy theory remain 
unfounded, “the evidence of regional differences in business political partisanship is 
sufficiently impressive to warrant further investigation”.133 As mentioned, the evidence 
mainly consists of information gathered from the FEC on corporate PAC contributions during 
the 1982 midterm election. Only the 1,000 largest corporations were included in the analysis. 
Moreover, this quantitative study evaluates the corporations’ political partisanship according 
to the percentage of their contributions to incumbents, Republicans, and New Right 
candidates. As will be further examined in the next chapter, the New Right was an 
ultraconservative network of organization which developed during the 1970s. Nevertheless, 
according to Burris, the numbers reveal that “several of the industries highest in contributions 
to Republicans and New Right candidates are also industries in which Sun Belt firms are 
overrepresented”.134 Corporations based in New England and the Mid-Atlantic States, 
however, generally contribute far less to New Right candidates.
135
  Furthermore, there is an 
apparent tendency on part of corporations located in the Sun Belt to be more supportive of 
non-incumbents than incumbents.
136
 Nevertheless, Burris questions the accuracy of the Sun 
Belt/Frost Belt dichotomy and does not give the Yankee-Cowboy theory his full support. In 
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essence, he argues that there are too many unanswered questions relating to the theory’s 
parameters and that the numbers from the 1982 elections directly contradicts some of the 
theory’s basic assumptions.137         
 With regards to the regulatory environment theory, however, Burris is far more 
positive in his judgment.  According to the statistics, he argues, “traditional regulated 
industries like drugs, transportation, and utilities are among the highest in the percentage of 
contributions to incumbents”.138 Furthermore, in 1982 these industries contributed much less 
to Republicans and New Right candidates than to Democratic candidates.
139
 “Industries with a 
high frequency of environmental and labor violations (e.g. chemicals, oil refining, paper and 
wood products)”, on the other hand “are generally low in contributions to incumbents and 
high in contributions to Republicans and New Right candidates”.140 Thus, the statistics from 
the 1982 Congressional elections seem to verify the regulatory environment theory in that 
those corporations which are more antagonistic towards federal regulation of environment and 
labor are more likely to follow their ideological conviction and contribute to non-incumbents, 
Republicans, and New Right candidates.  
Conversely, corporations which are more positive towards industry-related regulation 
and which are operating in cooperation with the government tend to be more pragmatic 
considering political contributions. Thus, they usually support incumbents in order to remain 
in close relation with policymakers. However, Burris makes sure to emphasize the fact that 
the legitimacy of the regulatory environment theory cannot be confirmed based on the 
statistics from the 1982 elections only. In fact, the theory has certain weaknesses and can be 
said to pose more questions than answers. For example, the group of anti-regulation firms is 
not as cohesive as previously suggested. While they do share a reluctance to support 
incumbents and an inclination to support candidates from the political right, there are a 
number of variations as regards to the percentage of their contributions to the different 
categories of recipients. Thus, Burris argues that “further research is needed to determine 
whether antagonism to government regulation is indeed the common factor underlying the 
political conservatism of these industries and to develop more refined indices for measuring 
such antagonism”.141        
 Nevertheless, connecting the partisanship of business to the size, the location, or the 
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federal regulation of corporations, is undeniably a complicated task. In essence, the business 
community is both a complex and diversified entity and there are too many variables which 
have the potential to influence a corporation’s political lenience. However, the type of 
quantitative study completed by Burris reveals certain tendencies on part of different 
corporate categories with regards to whom they most likely will support. In addition, the 
analysis illustrates the fact that although most corporations agree with many of the ideological 
perspectives of the political right, including smaller government and lower taxes, many 
choose to contribute in opposition to their ideological convictions and support incumbents 
regardless of party affiliation. Thus, one can justifiably question whether or not the right 
benefited disproportionately from the growth of business PACs during the seventies. 
However, based on statistics regarding corporate PAC contributions to Democrats and 
Republicans in 1978 and 1980, I will argue that they did. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
right wing profited the most in the early years of the business PAC domination.  
 
3.5 Business PACs and Republican Electoral Success 
While the particular numbers used in Burris’ analysis provides an overview of the 
contradicting patterns of political giving existing among the top 1,000 corporations in the U.S. 
in the 1982 congressional election, the applied statistics do not provide an overview of the 
partisanship of business PACs as a whole. More simplified reports, however, reveal that 
corporate PACs contributed as much as $ 22.2 million to Republican congressional campaigns 
in 1982.
142
 At the same time, Democrats only received $ 11.5 million from such corporate 
sources.
143
 Thus, there is no doubt that the main bulk of corporate PAC contributions during 
the 1982 midterm elections went into the hands of Republican candidates, and one can 
legitimately argue that business PAC donations favored the political right over the left.   
 In fact, statistics from numerous elections reveal that business PACs consistently give 
more to Republicans than to Democrats, and a number of studies have exposed links between 
corporate contributions and Republican electoral success.
144
 Furthermore, research has 
“shown the importance of corporate PACs in financing candidates of the ideological far 
right”.145 Nevertheless, it is important to mention that many of these studies concentrate on 
the elections that were held during the early years of the business PAC explosion. More 
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specifically, the elections of 1978 and 1980 are recurrent focal points in analyses reaching 
conclusions involving a predisposition on part on corporations to support Republicans. 
Considering the fact that one of the main objectives of this chapter is to determine the 
immediate effect of the business PAC growth on the political right, the following analysis will 
also examine the these two particular elections. However, it is essential to remember that 
these are isolated events and that they do not signify a continued trend in American electoral 
politics. In fact, L. Sandy Maisel has argued that “PACs became more ‘risk averse’ as they 
grew and matured” and that “the percentage of contributions going to challengers and open-
seat candidates in congressional campaigns declined steadily in the 1980s”.146 If this applies 
to corporate PACs as well, one can argue that, as time went by, corporations increasingly 
contributed according to pragmatic interests rather than ideological conviction. Furthermore, 
if contributing according pragmatic interests entail support for incumbents, this, in turn, 
suggests that business PACs gradually gave more to Democrats. The reason for this is based 
on the fact that Democrats controlled the House through the 1980s and the Senate from 1986 
to 1992.
147
 This is also supported by the statistics on corporate PAC contributions to 
congressional candidates through that particular decade. More specifically, the amount of 
money given to Democrats by business PACs grew more rapidly than the amount contributed 
to Republicans.
148
 To be sure, the main bulk of corporate donations still went to the political 
right. However, after a while the gap between Democrats and Republicans narrowed 
considerably. In 1988 for example, corporate PACs gave $ 23.5 million to Democrats and $ 
26.9 million to Republicans.
149
 Nevertheless, as we shall see, in the early years of business 
PAC growth, the political right was the predominant beneficiary of corporate contributions.     
3.6 The 1978 Congressional Elections 
In 1978, 785 corporate PACs were registered with the FEC.
150
 As mentioned earlier, there are 
several reasons to count in at least half the registered trade-, health-, and membership PACs as 
well. However, in this particular analysis I will only refer to those PACs specifically defined 
as corporate PACs by the FEC. Thus, the following discussion of the sum of corporate 
political contributions in 1978 pertains exclusively to these 785 PACs. Nevertheless, the 
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statistics on corporate donations to Congressional candidates are somewhat challenging. 
While the book Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook presents a document claiming that 
corporate PACs contributed a total of $ 9.5 million in 1978, David B. Magleby operates with 
another report stating that corporate PACs gave $ 6.5 million to Democrats and $ 11.1 million 
to Republicans.
151
 That would bring the total to $ 17.6 million, exceeding the estimate 
presented in Campaign Finance Reform by $ 8.1 million. One reason for this deviation might 
be related to the fact that the numbers collected by Magleby include “aggregate PAC receipts 
for all congressional candidates, including those who lose in the primaries”.152 Therefore, I 
have chosen to rely on the statistics presented in Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. 
Nevertheless, this record of corporate PAC contributions only display the sum total and does 
not specify the percentage going to either Republicans or Democrats. Thus, the following 
discussion will be based on a chart published on the Campaign Finance Institute’s webpage 
which details the beneficiaries of business PAC contributions and which operate with 
approximately the same sum total as the document in Campaign Finance Reform: A 
Sourcebook. The chart is produced on the basis of numbers from the Federal Election 
Commission and is attached to this thesis (appendix A).        
 According to the table provided by the CFI, the total amount of money contributed to 
congressional candidates by the 785 corporate PACs operating in 1978 was $ 9.8 million.
153
 
Of that, $ 6.2 million went to House candidates while $ 3.6 million went to Senate candidates. 
Furthermore, with regards to candidates for the House, 22 percent of the total $9.8 million 
were donated to Democratic incumbents and 18 percent were given to Republican 
incumbents. With regards to challengers, however, only 1 percent was given to Democrats 
while 10 percent went to Republicans. Furthermore, while 4 percent of the total was donated 
to Democratic candidates for open seats, 8 percent was given to Republicans for open seats. 
Considering Senate candidates, however, 6 percent went to Democratic incumbents while 14 
percent went to Republican incumbents. Thus, Republican incumbents received 
approximately $ 1.3 million in business PAC contributions while Democratic incumbents 
received corporate support of an estimated $ 588,000. In addition, only 2 percent of the total 
contributions by business PACs went to Democratic challengers. Republican challengers, 
however, received 7 percent. Moreover, with regards to the open seats, corporate PACs 
distributed 3 percent of their contributions to Democrats and 6 percent to Republicans. Thus, 
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although corporate contributions to incumbent House candidates favored Democrats, the main 
bulk of business PAC contributions to congressional candidates in 1978 was distributed to 
Republicans. All in all, 63 percent of the $ 9.8 million donated by corporate PACs were 
received by Republican House and Senate candidates.    
 Although the 1978 midterms did not serve to end the longstanding Democratic 
majority in the House and Senate, the election boosted Republican congressional power to a 
considerable extent. As a result of the election, Republicans gained 15 seats in the House and 
3 seats in the Senate.
154
 However, “by historical standards, these were relatively small 
gains”.155 Nevertheless, if one takes a closer look at the post-election composition of the 
Congress with regards to the amount of conservative and liberal Representatives and Senators, 
a conservative advantage is detectable. “In the Senate”, for instance “five prominent liberal 
Democrats were defeated for reelection, including Dick Clark of Iowa, Floyd Haskell of 
Colorado, and Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire”.156 Furthermore, “ten new Senators 
were deemed more conservative than their predecessors; only four were more liberal than 
their predecessors”.157 In addition, almost all of the newly elected Representatives from both 
parties were in favor of conservative policy proposals including tax cuts and less federal 
spending.
158
 Thus, although Democrats held on to the majority, the 1978 elections revealed 
the emergence of a more conservative political climate in which Republican candidates fared 
better and Democratic incumbents were increasingly vulnerable.
159
 Whether or not the 
election can be regarded as a Republican success per se is certainly debatable. However, I 
argue that it marked the beginning of a more dominant GOP and that it “put Republicans back 
on the road to long term success”.160        
 A crucial question which remains to be answered however, is whether or not the 
growth of business PACs contributed to the Republican electoral gains of 1978? As already 
established, 63 percent of the money contributed by business PACs to congressional 
candidates that year were in fact donated to Republicans. Thus, one can assume that 
Republican candidates were given the upper hand advantage in the campaign finance race. 
However, it would be wrong to assert that the business PAC explosion would directly 
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translate into Republican electoral success. In fact, a multitude of PACs were in play during 
the 1978 elections and the total amount of their contributions to congressional candidates is 
estimated at $ 35 million.
161
 Furthermore, the percentage of this amount going to Republican 
candidates was approximately 45.
162
 Thus, despite the recent growth of business PACs and 
the Republican bias of their contributions, Democrats were still the main beneficiaries of PAC 
donations as a whole. In addition, of the total amount spent by congressional candidates in 
connection with the 1978 elections, only 17.1 percent was derived from PACs.
163
 This 
illustrates that candidates still relied on other sources for campaign funds and that, even 
though the reliance on PACs was much greater than before, the combined impact of PACs 
was still quite limited.         
 As a result, statistics do not provide unequivocal evidence for a direct link between the 
business PAC explosion and the election turnouts of 1978. However, it is important to make 
notice of the tendency on part of corporate PACs to support Republican challengers. As 
previously illustrated, 10 percent of the amount donated by such PACs went to Republican 
House candidates challenging incumbents. Conversely, only 1 percent went to Democratic 
challengers in the House. With regard to Senate candidates challenging incumbents, 
Democrats received only 2 percent of the total PAC contributions while Republicans were 
given 7 percent. This pattern arguably illustrates a determined effort on part the business 
PACs to aid the GOP in their attempt to ward off liberal Democrats.
164
 In fact, researchers 
have argued that the 1978 elections were marked by a change in corporate priorities and that 
prior to this corporate PACs gave primarily on the basis of pragmatic interests. For example, 
Edwin M. Epstein has claimed that before 1978, business PACs “demonstrated the clear 
propensity to be what management scientists term ‘risk averters’ rather than ‘risk takers’” and 
that they “gave overwhelmingly to incumbents rather than to challengers”.165 In addition, 
leading campaign finance researcher Herbert E. Alexander has argued that “to the 
consternation of Republicans and conservative groups in general, considerable business PAC 
money has gone to liberal Democratic senators and representatives who are chairmen or 
members of key legislative committees and some of whom also receive funds from labor 
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unions”.166            
 In time for the 1978 elections however, the business community arguably reevaluated 
their goals and decided to make strategic changes considering their political giving. In 
essence, it was broadly agreed that corporations needed to contribute on the basis of their 
ideology, rather than maintain their connections with those already in office. In fact, 
prominent conservative figures in the business community, including the chair of both 
PepsiCo and the Business Roundtable Donald Kendall, distributed letters arguing that 
“business should give to ‘pro-business’ candidates”.167 By doing so, the business community 
might be able expand their political impact and “change the character of Congress”.168 Thus, 
in 1978 business PACs “gave their money to races in which there was a significant political 
difference between the two candidates, and to elections which were close enough that 
additional money to the ‘pro-business’ candidate had the potential to affect the election 
outcome”.169 Corporate contributions were essentially distributed among congressional 
candidates according to where the donations would have the largest impact in terms of getting 
Republicans elected. Thus, the growth of business PACs might have contributed to 
Republican electoral success to a much greater extent than previously assumed, even if 
Epstein’s argument regarding the misleading FEC categorization of PACs is disregarded. In 
essence, it was not the number of business PACs in 1978 which had the greatest influence on 
the election returns, but the way in which these PACs distributed their money. Thus, one can 
justifiably agree with Hacker and Pierson that the 1978 election marked “a new era of 
campaign finance”.170 “Not only were corporate contributions growing even bigger, 
Democrats had to work harder for them”.171       
 In conclusion however, it is important to keep in mind that while money certainly is an 
important factor with regards to electoral success, it alone does not win elections. Several 
factors contributed to the Republican gains in 1978, including the declining approval rate of 
President Carter, the ever growing inflation rate which created broad support for conservative 
fiscal policies, as well as the persisting tension with the Soviet Union which made the 
uncompromising attitude of the GOP seem gradually more appealing.
172
 Furthermore, the 
conservative opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty also strengthened the party before the 
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elections. In essence, when Carter agreed to hand over “control of the waterway to Panama by 
the end of the century”, he basically gave up what had been perceived as symbol of American 
power for a long time.
173
 Nevertheless, the treaty was in fact backed by a congressional 
majority. However, the conservative antagonism towards the deal mirrored the attitude of the 
general public, especially those considered to be the most ardent Republican supporters. Thus, 
the issue “galvanized the base of the GOP” and brought forth a “flood of contributions for the 
National Committee and political action committees”.174 A detailed description of the 
multitude of factors contributing to the Republican gains in the 1978 elections is definitely not 
within the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to highlight the fact that business 
PAC contributions contributed to the Republican advantage only to a certain extent, and that 
other factors should not be dismissed or ignored. 
3.7 The 1980 Congressional Elections  
As of December 31
st
 1980 there were 1,206 corporate PACs in the U.S.
175
 Thus, they 
constituted approximately 47 percent of the total number of PACs which at the time was 
estimated at 2,551.
176
 The amount of corporate PAC contributions to congressional candidates 
in 1980 is previously cited as $ 19 million. This number is retrieved from a document 
published in Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook which is based on FEC statistics. 
However, according to the report published on the CFI webpage, the total amount of 
contributions from business PACs was $ 18.1 million in 1980.
177
 Seeing as the CFI also cites 
the FEC as their source, this incongruity is rather difficult to explain. Nevertheless, for the 
following discussion I have chosen to rely on the chart from the CFI which, as mentioned, is 
attached to this thesis (Appendix A). According to the chart, the total amount of PAC 
contributions in 1980 is estimated at $ 51.9 million. Thus, the $ 18.1 million contributed by 
corporate PACs constituted approximately 35 percent of the total. Furthermore, corporate 
PACs gave $ 11.7 million to candidates for the House and $ 6.4 million to Senate candidates. 
With regards to House candidates, 23 percent of the total $ 18.1 million went to Democratic 
incumbents while 21 percent was donated to Republican incumbents. Only one percent 
however, was contributed to Democratic challengers. Republican challengers, on the other 
hand, received 13 percent of the total amount contributed by corporate PACs to congressional 
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candidates. Furthermore, Democratic candidates for open seats were given only one percent 
while Republican open seat candidates received 6 percent. With regards to Senate candidates, 
9 percent was contributed to Democratic incumbents and 5 percent went to Republican 
incumbents. Democratic challengers, however, received less than one percent while 17 
percent was donated to Republican challengers. In addition, Democratic candidates for open 
seats were only given one percent of the total amount contributed by corporate PACs. 
Republican open seat candidates received 4 percent. As a result, approximately 66 percent of 
the total amount contributed by corporate PACs to candidates for the 1980 congressional 
elections was given to Republicans. Republican candidates thus received roughly $ 12 million 
in corporate PAC contributions, while Democrats were left with approximately $ 6 million. 
 The 1980 congressional election was a huge success for the Republican Party. While 
they did not manage to win the House, they gained control of the Senate for the first time 
since 1955.
178
 Nevertheless, they experienced huge gains in the House as well. 34 seats were 
picked up by Republicans, leaving them with a total of 192 Representatives compared to the 
Democrat’s 242.179 Furthermore, in the Senate, the GOP gained 12 seats reaching a total of 
53.
180
 Conversely, Democrats were left with 46 senators. In each chamber, one seat was won 
by an independent.
181
 While the regained control of the Senate might seem as the primary 
indicator of Republican success their advancement in the House was actually equally 
promising. In fact, as a result of their large gains “Republicans had a good chance of working 
a majority with the assistance of conservative southern Democrats fearful of defeat in 1982 if 
they did not cooperate with a popular incumbent President”.182 As will be further discussed in 
the next chapter, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan won the 1980 presidential election in a 
landslide. Nevertheless, the results from the congressional elections that year illustrated that 
the tide was turning and that the increasingly conservative Republican coalition was a 
substantial threat to the long-standing Democratic and liberal domination of American 
politics.            
 However, the fundamental question remains: was the electoral success of Republicans 
in 1980 a result of the increased flow of corporate money into politics? To a certain degree, it 
was. But as with the 1978 elections, it is important to keep in mind that money does not win 
elections and that other factors, both social and political, deserve credit as well. Nevertheless, 
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these factors will not be included in the following discussion as the analysis is strictly devoted 
to exposing the degree to which the business PAC explosion facilitated the Republican gains. 
In essence, I argue that while the numbers displayed above do illustrate a modest 
predisposition on part of corporate PACs to contribute to Republicans, the figures do not 
sufficiently indicate the degree to which these contributions helped Republican candidates 
win seats. However, a closer look at the way in which business PACs distributed their 
donations in 1980 reveals that they might have had a greater impact on the election outcome 
than previously assumed. As demonstrated above, corporate PACs gave considerably larger 
amounts to Republican challengers than Democratic challengers. This indicates that 
businesses were more willing to take risks to get conservative candidates into office. It also 
indicates that they were strategists attempting to enhance their electoral influence. In addition 
however, it illustrates a tremendous effort on part of the Republican Party to successfully 
cultivate corporate PAC support. In fact, some of the PAC money did go straight to the 
parties’ congressional committees. And thus, some of the distributing choices were made by 
these committees. Furthermore, the 1980 elections reveal that the Republican congressional 
committees excelled at this task. According to Professor of Legislation Richard Briffault, “the 
national Republican congressional committees dramatically outdistanced their Democratic 
counterparts in raising PAC money and distributing it to Republican candidates”.183 Thus, the 
GOP’s clever allocation of PAC funds combined with the “increased willingness of PACs to 
contribute to Republican challengers against Democratic incumbents” indicates that business 




3.8 Conclusion       
The business PAC explosion of the late seventies and early eighties had a significant impact 
on the financing of American political campaigns. In addition, it had a positive effect on the 
political right. The traditional ties between the Republican Party and the business community 
proved crucial as the FECA changed the way parties and candidates raised campaign money. 
Increasingly, politicians from both sides of the aisle had to look towards organized interests 
rather than wealthy individuals for contributions. Democrats had depended on labor for 
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decades, but in the wake of FECA the number of labor unions declined and the labor 
movement atrophied.
185
 At the same time, however, the business community flourished and 
developed a desire to be more politically influential. In addition, both socioeconomic and 
legislative developments encouraged corporations to establish political action committees. 
Thus, the number of business PACs multiplied in a relatively short time and labor lost its’ 
position as the main contributor to political campaigns. Nevertheless, corporations were cash 
flush and became increasingly attractive for both parties wishing to fill the financial gap 
created by recent campaign finance legislation. For Republicans, however, it would be much 
easier to woo the business community. Not only did they benefit from their traditional 
connection with the capitalist class dating all the way back to the Mark Hanna era, they also 
had the advantage of a party platform which could easily be described as pro-business. Thus, 
“while both parties have felt compelled to mobilize higher-income citizens, the Republicans 
have found the goal much more consistent with their aims”.186 The GOP further strengthened 
their relationship with the business community during the seventies, and in the process they 
secured substantial financial aid which would assist them in several elections in the future, 
including the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections. However, one can argue that this 
development has not primarily served to hurt the Democratic Party, but that part of the 
American public which in the process has been rendered virtually insignificant. More 
specifically, as money became increasingly important in political campaigns, political actors 
looked towards the affluent for support. And although the Republicans were the ones with a 
pre-existing connection with business, Democrats also saw the benefit of pursuing these 
interests. Thus, as both parties have increasingly diverted their attention towards the affluent, 
the political influence of the mainstream has been severely diminished.
187
 Nevertheless, one 
can argue that the corporate support of the GOP in the late seventies and early eighties 
contributed to the significant expansion of conservative political power in the 1980s, 
frequently dubbed the Reagan Revolution. However, the conservative success was also aided 
by other factors, including the development of ideological political action committees 
engaging in independent expenditures, which is the main focus of the next chapter.     
 
 
                                                 
185
 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American 
Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 115. 
186
 Hacker and Pierson, Off Center, 115. 
187
 Ibid., 116. 
77 
 
4 Independent Expenditures: NCPAC 
and Republican Senate Gains 
4.1  Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the rise of business PACs in the late seventies was 
the result of both an increased desire on part of the capitalist class to influence politics and a 
number of legislative measures which effectively opened up for corporations to establish 
political action committees. The impact of this development on campaign financing was first 
made apparent in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections when huge amounts of corporate 
money were donated to congressional candidates. As previously illustrated, the details of the 
distribution of these funds reveal a slight Republican bias on part of the newly emergent 
business PACs as well as a predisposition to give to conservative candidates in position to 
defeat liberal incumbents. Nevertheless, the Republican electoral success in 78 and 80 cannot 
solely be attributed to the preceding explosion of business PACs and the increased corporate 
inclination to contribute according to their conservative ideology. In fact, the emergence of 
PACs in the seventies served to benefit the Republican Party in a number of ways and the 
direct contributions from corporate PACs only partly represents this tendency.  
 The post-FECA world of campaign finance was more or less dominated by political 
action committees. Before reform was enacted in the seventies, there were few restrictions on 
campaign contributions and expenditures. Parties and candidates received huge donations 
from various sources, mostly wealthy individuals, and they continued to spend the money 
without limitation. However, as a result of the FECA and its amendments, the financing of 
political campaigns was restricted on a number of levels and politicians had to reevaluate their 
fundraising strategies. In addition, both individuals and different types of organizations had to 
figure out how to maintain their political influence. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent 
that the gaps created by the extensive FECA regulations could be filled by PACs and, before 
long, the number of such committees had multiplied.      
 As briefly mentioned, PACs can be divided into different categories based on the 
structure of their organization, and the main distinction is between connected and 
nonconnected PACs.
1
 Because they are administered by corporations, and are thus affiliated 
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with a “parent organization”, the business PACs discussed in the previous chapter can be 
characterized as connected PACs. Nonconnected PACs, however, are not associated with a 
parent organization but are often founded by “an individual political entrepreneur, or a group 
of them”.2 Furthermore, these PACs tend to be more ideologically pure than the connected 
PACs and their goals and strategies often differ from those of other PAC categories. More 
specifically, nonconnected PACs have frequently waged their support for challengers and 
have traditionally been more inclined to engage in what is commonly referred to as 
independent expenditures.
3
 Independent expenditures are defined by the FEC as “expenditure 
for a communication ‘expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or 
suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political 
party or its agents’”.4 In 1976 the Supreme Court ruled that limits on such expenditures were 
unconstitutional, and thus individuals and organizations (including PACs) were basically 
given permission to spend unlimited amounts on independent campaigns either supporting or 
opposing specific candidates. Initially, the independent expenditure option received only 
modest attention, and its role in the financing of the 1976 election was relatively small. Two 
years later, however, independent expenditures assumed a more extensive role in campaign 
financing with conservative ideological PACs “accounting for most of the activity”.5   
 While the business PAC explosion can arguably be said to have benefited Republicans 
because corporate executives decided to follow their ideological convictions and donate most 
of their money directly to conservative congressional candidates, one can argue that the 
authorization of unlimited independent expenditures came to benefit the GOP because of a 
remarkable effort on part of the right wing to take advantage of this new opportunity to affect 
electoral politics. Thus, this chapter will be dedicated to an analysis of the effect of the 
independent expenditure endeavor of the New Right on the outcome of the 1978 and 1980 
congressional election. Initially, the independent expenditure phenomenon will be thoroughly 
examined and emphasis will be put on the legislative basis for its emergence. Subsequently, a 
discussion of the effect of the independent spending of PACs on election outcomes will be 
provided. This section will be followed by an outline of the emergence of the New Right as 
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well as a review of the movement’s main goals and strategies. Furthermore, attention will be 
directed towards the National Conservative Political Action Committee, hereinafter referred 
to as NCPAC, and its involvement in the 1978 and 1980 congressional elections. 
Conclusively, I will attempt to compare and contrast the business PAC explosion with the 
independent expenditure phenomenon in terms of their contributions to the electoral success 
experienced by the GOP in 1978 and 1980.  
4.2 Independent Expenditures 
The advent of independent expenditures as a tangible PAC strategy can be attributed to the 
1976 Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo. As described in the second chapter of this 
thesis, the contribution and expenditure restrictions established by the 1974 amendments to 
the FECA were quickly challenged in the courts. Emphasizing the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech, a number of Senators, both Democratic and Republican, questioned the 
constitutionality of this legislation and asked for a judicial review. The Supreme Court 
“equated political spending with political speech and determined that the expenditure 
limitations, by imposing ‘direct quantity restrictions on political communication,’ trenched 
directly on protected core political expression without commensurate justification”.6 
Contribution limits, however, were not seen as infringing First Amendment rights and were 
deemed an essential feature of the effort to prevent corruption. Ultimately, the contribution 
restrictions established by the FECA were sustained while the limits on expenditures, i.e. 
“money spent by a candidate or noncandidate in communicating directly to the voters”, were 
ruled unconstitutional.
7
 Thus, candidates, except those for the presidency who had accepted 
public funding, were given permission to spend as much as they desired in connection with 
their own campaigns. In addition, individuals and groups, such as PACs, were allowed to 
spend unlimited amounts of money for the purpose of influencing elections provided that their 
efforts were not in any way coordinated with a candidate or his campaign.   
 Thus, PACs could legally engage in what is usually referred to as independent 
expenditures. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the distinction created by the Buckley 
court between independent expenditures, which by definition entails express advocacy, and 
what was labeled issue advocacy. In essence, the Court defined independent expenditures as 
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expenditures used “for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate for federal office”, and they maintained that organizations 
which subsidized this kind of communication were required to “abide by federal laws 
restricting the size of individual donations, barring corporate and union contributions, and 
requiring public disclosure of their contributions”.8 More specifically, if a message included 
certain words and phrases like “’vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for 
Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject’”, the communication had to be financed with 
“hard money” i.e. funds which are subject to campaign finance laws.9 However, the Court 
established that the financing of communication devoid of such expressions fell completely 
outside the campaign finance law. In essence, it was argued that “expenditures for speech that 
does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidate – i.e., expenditures for issue 
advocacy – may neither be limited in amount nor subjected to [contribution restrictions or] 
disclosure requirements”.10         
 Hence, the 1976 Supreme Court ruling basically left PACs with three distinct strategic 
choices with regards to how they could influence electoral politics. They were still able 
choose the more traditional option and contribute directly to candidates or parties. Despite the 
fact that the limitations on such donations were still in effect after Buckley, most of the early 
PACs, including business PACs, actually chose to follow this particular strategy.
11
 The 
second option was to finance issue ads. As already explained, this strategy was not regulated 
by any means and can thus be considered an obvious choice for cash flush PACs seeking to 
influence the electorate. Nevertheless, despite its apparent benefits, several years went by 
before the issue advocacy approach gained substantial recognition. As argued by Law 
Professor Lillian BeVier “the [issue advocacy] strategy seems so obvious that, at least in 
hindsight, the surprising fact is that it was not until the 1996 election campaign that political 
operatives began fully to exploit it”.12 The independent expenditure option, however, received 
considerably more attention from PACs in the immediate post-Buckley years and, as we shall 
see, the utilization of this newly emergent opportunity, primarily by conservative ideological 
PACs, made a significant impact on the financing of elections in the late seventies and early 
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 It could easily be assumed that independent expenditures would figure prominently in 
the first election after the Buckley decision. Nevertheless, the financing of the 1976 election 
was marked by a dependence, on part of both PACs as well as candidates, on the more 
traditional strategies.
14
 This condition can perhaps be explained with reference to the short 
amount of time which transpired between the authorization of the independent expenditure 
option and the ensuing election. As the Buckley decision was reached approximately eight 
months prior to Election Day, candidates had little time to “work independent expenditures 
into their strategies”.15 Furthermore, the limited dependence on independent expenditures in 
the 1976 election can perhaps also be explained with reference to the lack of experience on 
part of political operatives with the FECA and its legal parameters. Many were unsure about 
the rules of the game and hesitated to engage in this newfangled strategy.
16
 In addition, it was 
assumed that candidates would have more to gain from direct donations than from campaigns 
run independently by for example PACs. Furthermore, the absence of independent 
expenditures in the financing of the 1976 presidential election specifically, can arguably be 
attributed to the failure of the Buckley decision to review section 9012 (f) of title 26 of the 
FECA which restricted individuals and groups to “expenditures of no more than $1,000 on 
behalf of any publicly funded candidate”.17 As already mentioned, public funding was only 
made available to candidates for the presidency and in 1976 both Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter accepted this alternative.
18
 Thus, the utilization of independent expenditures to 
campaign on behalf of the presidential candidates of that year was automatically restricted. 
 Nevertheless, independent expenditures assumed a more pivotal role in the financing 
of the 1978 congressional elections and several conditions contributed to its eventual 
emergence. First of all, because candidates for Congress could not be publicly funded, section 
9012 (f) of the FECA did not constitute an obstacle for individuals or PACs wishing to use 
the independent expenditure option to support or oppose any of the candidates up for election. 
In addition, PACs had arguably begun to realize the inherent benefits of independent spending 
and they had developed a genuine interest in the new strategic option created by Buckley.
19
 
Thus, the 1978 midterms can arguably be credited as the first elections in which the 
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independent expenditure option created by the Supreme Court received significant attention, 
at least from PACs.
20
 According to the Campaign Finance Institute, non-party independent 
expenditures for the House and Senate elections of that year amounted to approximately $ 
300,000.
21
 In and of itself, however, this number does not indicate an extensively expanded 
dependence on such spending. However, as will be illustrated at a later stage, on what and 
how these expenses were used amplified their ultimate impact. Nevertheless, the interest in 
this strategic option continued to increase and, in connection with the 1980 congressional 
elections, non-party groups made over $ 2,000,000 in uncoordinated independent 
expenditures.
22
 Furthermore, despite the fact that both Reagan and Carter received public 
funding, and regardless of the fact that section 9012 (f) was still on the books, huge amounts 
of independent expenditures were also made in connection with the 1980 presidential 
election.
23
 According to Richard Briffault, political operatives had simply come to assume 
that “independent spending could not be limited even in a publicly funded campaign”.24 
Consequently, non-party committees made as much as $ 13.7 million in independent 
expenditures either supporting or opposing the 1980 presidential candidates.
25
 What is more, 
however, the figures from the 78 and 80 elections reveal that the PACs which ran the most 
elaborate independent campaigns were somehow connected to the conservative movement. 
The reason for this will be further examined in connection with the discussion below of the 
New Right and the ventures of NCPAC, one of its most powerful and influential PACs. 
Nevertheless, before the strategies and accomplishments of this specific PAC will be outlined, 
attention will be paid to the role played by independent expenditures in American electoral 
politics as well as its potential to affect election outcomes.  
4.3 The Significance of Independent Expenditures in the 
Financing of Political Campaigns 
The emphasis placed on PAC independent expenditures in this analysis of the connection 
between the campaign finance reform of the seventies and the Republican electoral success in 
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1978 and 1980 necessarily needs to be validated. A number of actors applied a number of 
distinct methods in the financing of these particular elections, and it would be wrong to argue 
that only one or two of these ventures had a significant impact on the electoral outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the initial effect of the FECA and its 
amendments in light of the electoral gains experienced by the GOP in the immediate years 
following the establishment of the legislation. Rather than describing this success as an 
automatic consequence of the FECA, however, emphasis is placed on the ways in which the 
political right adjusted to and took advantage of the opportunities which materialized within 
the new campaign finance environment. These opportunities were numerous and varied and 
altogether they are far beyond the scope of this thesis. The choice was thus made to highlight 
the campaign finance tactics and strategies produced by the FECA which were predominantly 
employed by conservative leaning groups and which, if properly utilized, had the most 
potential to influence election returns. As reviewed in the preceding chapter, the opportunity 
to establish business PACs was readily seized by the business community which, as a result of 
tradition as well as political compatibility, had strong ties to the Republican Party. In addition 
to the fact that the financial contributions of these particular PACs far exceed those by PACs 
affiliated with other sections of society, they were also disproportionately donated to 
conservative challengers. The opportunity to establish business PACs was thus, for the most 
part, seized by conservative leaning associations which, by means of their tactical choices, 
maximized the electoral impact of the direct contribution strategy. This chapter, however, is 
devoted to an in-depth analysis of the independent expenditure option which, as already 
illustrated, was also a product of the reform of the seventies and which, at least initially, was 
most frequently employed by conservative PACs. Nevertheless, there would be no reason to 
examine the right-wing commitment to independent spending if there was cause to believe 
that this particular approach had little impact on electoral outcomes. As a result, the following 
paragraphs will be devoted to a thorough investigation of the possible effects of independent 
expenditures on elections.          
 In a 2002 article, political science professors Richard N. Engstrom and Christopher 
Kenny made an effort to determine the possible effects of independent expenditures by 
clarifying “the relationship between independent spending and the behavior of voters”.26 
While their research is primarily centered on Senate Elections, the results of their study 
arguably reflect the impact of independent expenditures on a more general level. In addition, 
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they are primarily focused on PACs. Thus, their report serves as a sufficient starting point for 
the following, more wide-ranging, discussion of the impact of PAC independent expenditures 
on general electoral returns. Based on a number of observations, Engstrom and Kenny 
initially remarks, “[w]e hypothesize that independent expenditures significantly affect voter 
preferences”.27 First, they argue that the fact that “interest groups, and PACs especially, have 
spent and continue to spend a great deal of money conducting independent campaigns” 
indicates that there exists a general perception exists that these efforts are, somehow, 
constructive.
28
           
 Second, they suggest that because the independent campaigns run by PACs are usually 
quite well-organized, their effectiveness in terms of their impact on voter behavior is elevated. 
According to Engstrom and Kenny, “PACs carefully screen races to find those most likely to 
be influenced by additional campaign spending and…they run batteries of surveys to 
determine advertising strategies that would be most effective”.29 Third, they detect that “there 
are advantages independent spenders have over official campaign organizations that make 
their expenditures more effective”.30 In essence, because they are not accountable to anyone 
but their own professional managers, PACs which run independent campaigns are completely 
free with regards to which tactic to choose as well as what kinds of messages to communicate 
to the voters. As PACs are not in any way responsible to their contributors, “many persons 
lend their names or give financial support to causes or tactics they would object to if they 
were fully apprised of the committee’s activities”.31 Furthermore, seeing as candidates in no 
way can be connected to PACs making independent expenditures on their behalf, these 
committees can make “accusations of questionable accuracy and ethics without fear of 
directly harming the candidate they support”.32 “Groups like ours,” director of NCPAC Terry 
Dolan once argued, “could lie through its teeth and the candidate it helps stays clean”.33 
According to Engstrom and Kenny, the lack of accountability on part of those making 
independent expenditures strengthens the notion that such spending has great potential to 
affect election returns.
34
          
 On the basis of these observations, the researchers argue that independent expenditures 
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most likely will affect voter behavior. More specifically, they assume that “expenditures for 
the incumbent and against the challenger should help the incumbent, and expenditures for the 
challenger and against the incumbent should help the challenger”.35 According to Engstrom 
and Kenny, however, studies relating to the accuracy of this assumption are very few and far 
between. Most of the research on independent expenditures, they say, simply reports the 
money spent and only provides an overview of the role played by such spending in the 
financing of American elections. Some stress the fact that independent expenditures assume 
different roles in the electoral process depending on who makes them. Margaret Latus, for 
example, makes notice of the predominance of ideological PACs engaging in such 
expenditures in the late seventies and early eighties and argues that, at that particular time, 
independent campaigns were overly negative.
36
 When non-ideological PACs began to employ 
this strategy in the mid-eighties, however, most of the independent expenses went towards 
more positive and supportive communication. Furthermore, in concert with a number of other 
professionals, Latus emphasizes the potential threat of independent expenditures, at least as 
controlled by ideological PACs. Political scientist Larry J. Sabato has argued that “the 
frequent use of negative, even vicious, messages and tactics…makes any sort of civility on 
politics much more difficult to achieve”.37 Yet, other professionals maintain that although the 
independent spending of certain groups might be overwhelming at times, independent 
expenditures are actually “only a small part of total PAC spending” and should not be 
perceived as a threat to democracy.
38
 The early successes of NCPAC are quoted as the 
exception to the rule.
39
          
 Because a complete account of the historiography of independent expenditures is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the preceding discussion only mentions a fraction of 
the accumulated observations on the topic. Nevertheless, one can argue that the main bulk of 
the conducted research makes the following general discoveries:  
[i]ndependent expenditures are usually pro-Republican and anti-Democrat, 
they are concentrated on presidential and senate races, and they vary widely 
in amounts spent. Also, non-connected PACs seemed to be the most 
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frequent independent spenders, until 1984 and 1986 when connected PACs 
began spending large amounts.
40
 
Engstrom and Kenny argue that, while these observations do indeed acknowledge the role of 
independent expenditures in American elections, they do not contribute to a broader 
understanding of the ultimate effect of such spending in terms of its ability to influence 
voters.
41
 According to Michael Malbin, however, “there is no way to begin estimating how 
much, or what the expenditures might mean politically”.42 In essence, Malbin argues that the 
statistics presented by the FEC regarding the amounts dedicated to independent campaigning 
have the potential to give a false impression of its actual influence. This statement rests on the 
fact that independent expenditures are often used to finance “other activities than 
campaigning”.43 Nonconnected PACs, for example, are required to use some of the money on 
overhead costs. They are not affiliated with a parent organization which can draw from its 
treasury to finance operational costs such as labor, materials, and utilities, and thus, they have 
to cover these expenses themselves.
44
 In addition, they often “‘spend’ some of the money 
raising new funds”.45 As a result, Malbin argues, “the dollars’ effect on swaying voters” is 
further diluted and the “figures available tell us very little about the nature of independent 
expenditures”.46 However, while they recognize the accuracy of the presented information, 
Engstrom and Kenny disapprove of Malbin’s interpretation of the facts. They argue that this 
“lack of uniformity” exists at all levels of campaign spending, for example with regards to the 
different problems incumbents and challengers encounter in the financing of their own 
campaigns.
47
 Much like nonconnected PACs, challengers have to cover certain operational 
costs like rent and salaries themselves. As a result of a number of tax-payer funded benefits, 
however, incumbents do not have to worry about such expenses.
48
 Thus, Engstrom and Kenny 
ultimately argue that “though these problems are real, they do not prevent researchers from 
measuring spending’s effect on voters”.49        
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 In order to measure the actual effect of such spending on voter behavior, Engstrom and 
Kenny have employed “an individual-level analysis of congressional vote choice” in the 88, 
92, and 96 Senate elections.
50
 While a complete analysis of their approach has no place in this 
particular thesis, it is useful to mention the fact that they have considered independent 
spending as both an exogenous as well as an endogenous variable. In essence, they assert that 
because “the location and amount of this spending depends on certain characteristics of the 
election, such as the vulnerability of the incumbent and the quality of the challenger” 
independent expenditures are “almost certainly endogenous to the process”. This endogeneity 
is thus acknowledged in order to ensure that the final estimates are precise.   
 On the whole, the results from Engstrom and Kenny’s qualitative analysis reveal that 
“independent spending by PACs can affect the vote decision and that the effects are 
particularly evident when modeled as endogenous variables”.51 Furthermore, it is noted that 
the degree to which such spending is influential is somewhat contingent on the nature of the 
sponsored campaign. In essence, the statistics reveal that independent expenditures have had 
greater effect on election returns in periods when ideological PACs have spent predominantly 
on negative campaigning. Nevertheless, while independent spending on negative 
communication is perceived as a more influential approach, such spending might not produce 
the desired result, at least not for those who support an incumbent. In fact, the statistics from 
specific elections dominated by negative communication suggest that “challengers have a 
better chance of winning when the campaign turns negative, and a worse chance of victory if 
the independent messages are of a positive nature”.52 Apparently, this is true regardless of 
whether the constructed campaign is supposed to help the challenger or not. “Mudslinging 
campaigns”, it is argued, “create an environment of doubt, giving the challenger an 
opportunity to close the gap with the incumbent”.53 Conversely, “feel good, positive 
campaigns…leave intact the prevailing status-quo climate of opinion that usually favors the 
incumbent”.54          
 Overall, however, Engstrom and Kenny’s statistical model reveals that “independent 
spending against the incumbent helps the challenger [while] independent spending for the 
incumbent hurts the challenger”.55 Thus, they conclude that independent campaigns do enjoy 
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a certain amount of influence in terms of affecting voter behavior, but that these effects 
“depend on the electoral context, the type of independent spending, and the type of 
candidate”.56 On the whole, the statistics as interpreted by Engstrom and Kenny imply that a 
candidate cannot “afford to cross a group with the resources and the will to launch an 
independent effort to unseat him or her” and, on the basis of this statement, I argue that the 
emphasis placed on independent expenditures in the following analysis of the connection 
between right-wing campaign financing endeavors and GOP electoral gains in the late 
seventies and early eighties is sufficiently justified.
57
 
4.4 The New Right 
As briefly mentioned, the 1950s saw an increase in the number of conservatives voicing their 
grievances with the liberal bias which arguably permeated American politics at the time. As a 
result of a relatively stable Democratic congressional majority, as well as an overwhelming 
number of moderate Republican representatives, liberalism continued as a vital political force 
for decades after the demise of FDR’s New Deal. Conservatives decried the development at 
large, but were especially concerned about the direction of the Republican Party which they 
considered as their main vehicle for political influence. Nevertheless, at least throughout the 
fifties, the conservative voices remained on the periphery of the political discourse and gained 
little recognition. With the emergence of Barry Goldwater in the early sixties, however, the 
political right began to organize into a more coherent movement which manifested itself both 
as “an independent entity and a dominating presence in the Republican Party”.58 The 
conservative movement had thus eventually become “an effective political contender”.59 Their 
full potential to influence politics, however, was arguably not reached until the mid-seventies 
when the movement morphed into what is usually referred to as the New Right. In the 
aftermath of some of the political events of the early seventies, including the Watergate 
scandal and the electoral triumph of Gerald Ford, members of the conservative movement 
realized that, in order to avoid “losing the entire battle to the left”, something had to be 
done.
60
 Consequently, a number of conservative strategists convened to discuss how to 
effectively boost their political clout. This endeavor was largely lead by “Richard Viguerie, 
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direct-mail fundraiser; Howard Phillips, head of the Conservative Caucus; Paul Weyrich, head 
of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC) and of Coalitions for America; 
John Terry Dolan, longtime head of the National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(NCPAC); and Jesse Helms, founder of the National Congressional Club”.61 “The term New 
Right refers to these leaders and the strategy and network of organizations they created”.62 
 The New Right was basically an independent network of organizations developed 
outside of the Republican Party structure. Independence was not stressed, however, because 
of a desire to separate the movement from the GOP. On the contrary, the leaders of the New 
Right figured that a certain degree of autonomy would enhance their ability to use the party as 
a vehicle to further their policies.
63
 Nevertheless, in order to expand their political clout while 
at the same time maintain their independence, the movement had to find their own source of 
funding. This would not prove especially difficult, seeing as a number of wealthy 
conservative businessmen, including beer magnate Joseph Coors, industrialist John Olin, and 
newspaper tycoon Richard Scaife, were increasingly willing to “put their money where their 
ideology was”.64 As already mentioned, the main aspects of the conservative ideology served 
the interests of the business community very well and the predisposition of business 
operatives to support the conservative cause has already been established. Nevertheless, the 
inclination on part of certain businessmen to support the New Right was arguably 
strengthened by the movement’s relentless dedication to trounce pro-union reform. The 
electoral victories of Republican Senators Orrin Hatch and Richard Lugar in 1976 are often 
quoted as early New Right achievements. Furthermore, the election of these key conservative 
Senators would become a determining factor in the defeat of the Labor Law Reform as well as 
common situs picketing legislation in 1978.
65
 Hatch and Lugar led the congressional 
opposition to these pro-labor initiatives and their eventual success arguably proved to 
Corporate America that the New Right “was now a sophisticated movement that could deliver 
electorally”.66 As a result, “corporations and conservative foundations began to fund the 
infrastructure of the New Right on a major scale”.67      
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 This source of funding provided the New Right with a solid point of departure in their 
quest for increased political influence. Their strategic approach was multifaceted and included 
both a concerted effort to “dominate and direct the public policy debate” as well as an 
emphasis on “conservative legal activism”. While think tanks, such as the Heritage 
Foundation referred to in chapter three, were supposed to provide the intellectual justification 
for conservative ideas and beliefs, groups such as the Institute for Justice would work to block 
liberal legislation.
68
 More importantly, however, the New Right invested much of their 
resources in an effort to build conservative electoral power, and in this endeavor they 
followed two specific strategic approaches. First, they created a network of organizations 
which would “select, train, and support Right Wing candidates”.69 This venture was largely 
led by Weyrich’s CSFC which was basically a conservative PAC established in 1974 to 
counter the liberal National Committee for an Effective Congress.
70
 Nevertheless, the CSFC 
engaged in a number of activities to further the conservative cause, including lobbying, 
publishing, and general politicking.
71
 In addition, it provided both guidance and financial 
support to conservative challengers for Congress. The CFSC was indeed started with “seed 
money from the Coors family”, but their continued work was, like so many other New Right 
projects, mainly sponsored with help from the movement’s leading fundraiser Richard 
Viguerie.
72
 Nevertheless, Viguerie’s tactics and achievements will be further outlined in the 
following, more extensive, discussion of the second strategy employed by the New Right in 
their effort to build conservative electoral power. While one can certainly argue that the 
CSFC, at least to a certain extent, contributed to the electoral success experienced by 
conservative candidates in both 1978 and 1980, their efforts will not receive further attention 
in this thesis. This decision is made on the basis that they did not take advantage of the 
independent expenditure loophole provided by the campaign finance reform of the seventies. 
As we shall see, however, the New Right strategy which involved launching massive attacks 
against liberal incumbents was largely realized through extensive independent expenditure 
campaigns, mainly on part of NCPAC, one of the movement’s most resourceful PACs.73  
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4.5 The National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(NCPAC) 
The National Conservative Political Action Committee was an ultraconservative PAC 
established by a number of New Right strategists in 1975.
74
 It was headed by John Terry 
Dolan and it quickly became one of the largest PACs in the country, at least in terms of 
expenditures. In a 1984 report for the Congressional Research Service, Joseph E. Cantor 
provided an overview of the biggest PAC spenders in every election between 1976 and 1982. 
His data reveals that while NCPAC was narrowly outspent by the pro-Reagan Citizens for the 
Republic and Jesse Helms’ National Congressional Club in 1978 and 1982 respectively, it 
ranked number one in both 1976 and 1980.
75
 On a more general basis, however, the figures 
display a tendency of conservative PACs to spend substantially more than other committees. 
“The top two PAC spenders in each of the four elections,” Cantor argues, “were conservative 
groups whose dollar totals were distinctively higher (and more dramatically so with each 
succeeding election) than the next others on the list”.76 In 1976, the trend was noticeable but 
not striking. While NCPAC ranked at the top of the list with an estimated $2,878,490 in total 
expenditures, the CSFC followed closely with $ 2,249,451.
77
 Number three on the list was an 
issue-oriented conservative group called the Gun Owners of America Campaign Committee 
which had apparently spent $2,094,821.
78
 Thus, the second and third largest spenders were 
only separated by approximately $150,000 and the gap was not that obvious. In 1978, 
however, “the top two [represented by the pro-Reagan Citizens for the Republic and NCPAC] 
spent [roughly] $4.5 and $3.0 million, with the second largest exceeding the third by 50 
percent – a gap of $1 million”.79 Two years later the trend was even more noticeable with 
NCPAC and the Congressional Club spending around $7 million each and exceeding number 
three on the list by approximately $4 million.
80
 This gap was more than matched in 1982 
when the top two PAC spenders, the same two as in the previous election, are listed with 
roughly $10 million in total expenditures each and the third on the list is only reported to have 
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 Interestingly, however, the conservative PACs ranking high according to expenditures 
did not show up on the corresponding lists of major campaign contributors. “While 
contributions to Federal candidates constituted at least half, and often well over half, of 
adjusted expenditures by virtually every other PAC on the top spenders list, this was far from 
true for the nonconnected PACs”.82According to Cantor, this was a result of the growing 
tendency on part of PACs, especially those of conservative bent, to engage in independent 
expenditures, and in this respect, NCPAC is presented as the prime example. Of the 
$7,530,060 spent by NCPAC in 1980, only $237,357 was donated directly to candidates.
83
 
Approximately $3.3 million of their expenses, however, were counted as independent 
expenditures made for the purpose of influencing the electorate.
84
 The same tendency was 
evident in 1982, when NCPAC is reported to have dedicated only 2.6 percent of their 
expenses to directly support federal candidates. Contrastingly, 31.4 percent went towards 
independent campaigning. While Cantor does not provide an estimate regarding NCPAC 
independent expenditures for the 1978 elections, Alan Crawford has argued that the 
committee only contributed $212,000 directly to candidates during that particular election 
cycle.
85
 Thus, in light of NCPAC’s overall expenditures for that year, which is reported at 
$3,030,408, one can assume that their independent expenditures were of some significance.
86
 
Nevertheless, based on the report by the CFI estimating the total amount of non-party 
independent expenditures at $303,033 during the 1978 congressional elections, there is reason 
to believe that NCPAC’s independent spending for this midterm did not come close to that of 
1980 and 1982.
87
 Nevertheless, while other PACs are also reported by Cantor as having 
engaged in independent expenditures during this particular period, one can argue that it was 
NCPAC, using such expenditures to subsidize large scale attacks on liberal incumbents in 
both 78 and 80, which brought this specific campaign finance strategy to the nation’s 
attention.
88
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4.6 The 1978 Elections 
Arguably, 1978 “was the first year in which large amounts of money were allocated by 
conservative groups in a concerted effort to defeat selected senators”.89 Furthermore, the 
elections of that year were the first in which NCPAC significantly proved its ability to 
influence electoral outcomes. As mentioned in chapter three, the Republican Party gained 
three Senate seats and fifteen House seats as a result of the 1978 midterms. To be sure, these 
gains can be explained with reference to a number of distinct factors, such as the coinciding 
emergence of business PACs or the general declining approval of Democratic fiscal and 
foreign policies. Nevertheless, the Senate gains in particular, are often quoted as a direct result 
of NCPAC’s wide-ranging independent expenditure campaigns against specific Democratic 
incumbents.
90
 Consequently, the following outline of their role the 1978 midterms will focus 
on their investment in Senate races. Nevertheless, it is important to note that because NCPAC 
independent spending figures from this particular election has been difficult to locate, the 
discussion will, for the most part, be based on textual accounts of the committee’s 
involvement in specific races.          
 The 1978 elections were held in a political environment significantly marked by the 
congressional disagreement over the Panama Canal issue. The New Right had been invested 
in the subject ever since President Carter, in September 1977, signed the treaty effectively 
giving Panama full authority over the canal from the year 2000.
91
 The Canal Zone had been 
part of U.S. territory for a long time and a number of right-wingers decried that Carter’s 
approval of the treaty signaled American weakness. In essence, “the New Right found no 
reason to admit limits on the United States’ ability to exert its influence and power to confront 
the Soviet Union and other threats around the globe”.92 As a result, a number of conservative 
groups, such as CSFC and NCPAC, launched extensive campaigns against ratification of the 
agreement in the Senate. While a complete account of this endeavor is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it is important to mention NCPAC’s effort to make Senate incumbents aware that a 
vote in favor of the treaties would significantly hurt their chances of reelection in the 
upcoming midterms.
93
 Nevertheless, despite the New Right’s relentless campaigning, the 
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Panama Canal treaties were approved by the Senate on March 16 1978 by a vote of 68-32.
94
 
Thus, the New Right was only two votes short of preventing ratification. The incumbents 
refusing to succumb to the threats from NCPAC would soon come to regret their resolve, 
however, as they ended up on the committee’s infamous “hit-list”.95   
 The main candidates on NCPAC’s hit-list for the 1978 elections were Floyd Haskell 
(D-CO), Dick Clark (D-IA), Thomas McIntyre (D-NH), and Walter Huddleston (D-KY).
96
 Of 
these, Haskell, Clark, and McIntyre were eventually defeated. Hinde claims that, “the biggest 
upset on election day was the defeat of Senator McIntyre at the hands of a relatively green 
New Right operative, Gordon Humphrey”.97 McIntyre had expressly supported the Panama 
Canal treaties and he realized that he “would be in for heavy and sustained fire from the 
Right”.98 As predicted, he did become the main target of a number of right-wing ads aired in 
his home state prior to Election Day and a great number of these were part of NCPAC’s 
independent expenditure campaign. Nevertheless, the NCPAC ads did not simply condemn 
McIntyre for voting in favor of the Canal treaties, they also accused him of being too liberal 
with regards to fiscal policy and it was argued that the high taxes he championed would 
severely hurt the economy.
99
 In addition, seeing as a number of New Hampshire residents had 
recently relocated from Boston, the head of NCPAC came up with the brilliant strategy to air 
their ads on Boston TV. That way, their messages could potentially reach more voters.
100
 For 
his defense, McIntyre claimed that “the choice was between him and political extremism and 
that Humphrey was an agent of national right-wing tacticians seeking to use New Hampshire 
as a base of operations”.101 Nevertheless, his efforts were futile and in the end he lost to the 
conservative newcomer.
102
         
 Furthermore, Lee Edwards argues that NCPAC was instrumental in the defeat of 
Democratic Senator Floyd Haskell of Colorado.
103
 Terry Dolan’s PAC wished to see 
Haskell’s conservative challenger William Armstrong capture the Senate seat and thus, they 
constructed a number of ads criticizing the incumbent. Again, the Panama Canal issue was of 
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importance and Haskell was widely criticized for this decision to support the treaties.
104
 In 
addition, he was condemned for his liberal fiscal policy as represented by his opposition to tax 
cuts.
105
 Moreover, the Right argued that “Haskell had lost touch with the attitudes and 
concerns of his constituents”.106 Much like McIntyre in New Hampshire, the Colorado 
incumbent attempted to counter the attacks by stating that “voters were faced with a choice 
between a rigid ideologue and a pragmatist”.107 Nevertheless, Armstrong eventually won the 
race and it the negative approach employed by NCPAC was increasingly viewed as especially 
effective.           
 In Iowa, Democratic Senator Dick Clark was defeated by Republican challenger Roger 
Jepsen. To a certain degree, one might argue that this outcome was a result of tradition since, 
at that time, Iowa had “never elected a Democrat to a second term in the U.S. Senate”.108 
Nevertheless, Jepsen’s triumph can also be attributed to the New Right’s, and especially 
NCPAC’s, negative campaign against Clark.109 Like in New Hampshire and Colorado, much 
of the communication was focused on the incumbent’s support for the Canal treaties earlier 
that year. In addition to the television and radio commercials hammering Clark for his 
position on Panama, NCPAC actually sent letters directly to the voters explaining why they 
should vote against him. “Dear Friend”, one such letter began, “you and I have the best 
opportunity this year to defeat a Senator who voted to give away the Panama Canal. I’m 
referring to the campaign in Iowa against Senator Dick Clark”.110 Furthermore, ads were aired 
charging the Democrat with being the “’most liberal Senator’ and an appeaser of the Soviet 
Union”.111 In addition, the New Right denounced both his stand on tax credits as well as his 
advocacy for abortion rights.
112
 According to Thomas Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, NCPAC 
passed out flyers at churches claiming that Clark was a baby killer.
113
 This instance is also 
reported by Ira Shapiro who claims that this was a decisive issue in the Iowa Senate race. 
Apparently, polls conducted seven days prior to Election Day indicated that Clark had a 
comfortable lead on his conservative challenger. When the election was just two days away, 
however, NCPAC launched their seminal attack. According to Shapiro, Clark’s brother in-law 
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called the Senator on the last Sunday before the election to warn him about the right-wing’s 
latest venture. As he and Clark’s sister had exited their Catholic church, they had found “a 
pamphlet on their windshield that pictured a fetus and attacked Clark for favoring 
abortion”.114 Unfortunately for the Democrat, however, “every car in the parking lot had the 
pamphlet, and that was the case at Catholic churches all over the state”.115 Thus, with the 
backing of the New Right, Jepsen “stormed from behind to upset Clark”, and eventually the 
liberal incumbent was dethroned.
116
         
 One can argue that “1978 provided a modest victory for the political right”.117 
Through their independent campaigns, NCPAC was instrumental in the defeat of three liberal 
incumbents and thus, it made a significant contribution to the erosion of the “solid Democratic 
majority in the Senate”.118 Some liberal incumbents, such as Senator Walter Huddleston of 
Kentucky, held their ground and managed to win reelection. Yet, in other races, the right wing 
experienced partial success. In New Jersey, for example, NCPAC successfully managed to 
unseat Democratic Senator Clifford Case in the primary, but failed to get the conservative 
challenger Jeff Bell elected in the general election.
119
 Nevertheless, Bell’s success in the 
primary “symbolized how far conservatism had come”.120 Thus, NCPAC’s actual power to 
influence elections arguably extended that represented by their involvement in the three 
Republican Senate gains. Overall, one can claim that NCPAC “emerged as a major force in 
the [1978] campaign”.121 Despite the committee’s achievements, however, NCPAC had yet to 
reach its full potential in terms of shaping electoral outcomes. As we shall see, the 1980 
elections were marked by even greater conservative gains which, to a considerable extent, 
were facilitated by NCPAC’s expanded efforts to unseat liberal incumbents.   
4.7 The 1980 Elections 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the amount of independent expenditures made in 
connection with the 1980 elections, both presidential and congressional, totaled 
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 As mentioned earlier, NCPAC accounted for approximately $3.3 million of 
the independent spending and a large amount of it apparently went towards attacking the 
liberal Senate incumbents on their updated hit list.
123
 The CFI has reported that an estimated 
2.2 million was made in independent expenditures in the 1980 congressional elections, and of 
this, approximately $1.6 million was directed at Senate races.
124
 Furthermore, according to 
David Mark, $1.2 million of this full amount was counted as NCPAC expenditures. Thus, one 
can argue that NCPAC accounted for most of the independent spending in connection with 
the 1980 Senate election.         
 As mentioned in chapter three, the 1980 election was a tremendous triumph for the 
GOP. Not only did Ronald Reagan win the presidency, the Republican Party also picked up 
34 seats in the House and 12 seats in the Senate.
125
 Despite losses, the Democratic House 
majority persisted. The Senate majority, however, was captured by the Republicans. Thus, the 
election significantly strengthened the GOP’s position in Congress. Nevertheless, while the 
party’s general success can certainly be explained with reference to a number of both 
socioeconomic and political factors, the details regarding the extended use of independent 
expenditures in connection with this election arguably legitimize the assumption that such 
spending had a significant impact on the electoral outcome. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, approximately 72 percent of the independent spending reported in 1980 was made for 
the purpose of supporting a Republican candidate, whether presidential or congressional.
126
 
Furthermore, only 2.4 percent was spent in support of Democratic candidates. With regards to 
expenditures against candidates, 11.3 percent opposed Democrats while 0.68 percent opposed 
Republicans.
127
 Thus, the extended use of independent expenditures in 1980 undoubtedly 
favored the political right. Furthermore, while the percentage regarding expenditures for 
Republican candidates is significantly amplified by the large amount spent in support of 
Reagan by such non-connected PACs as Citizens for the Republic, the percentage of 
independent spending against Democratic candidates is considerably enlarged on account of 
the massive NCPAC attacks on liberal Senate incumbents. Arguably, NCPAC was 
instrumental in the election of at least five Republican challengers in the 1980 election, and 
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thus, a closer look at the specific activities of this particular group is warranted.    
 The NCPAC hit list for the 1980 election included Senators Gaylord Nelson of 
Wisconsin, Birch Bayh of Indiana, Frank Church of Idaho, John Culver of Iowa, George 
McGovern of South Dakota, Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, and Alan Cranston of 
California.
128
 Of these, Nelson, Bayh, Church, Culver, and McGovern were defeated. Since a 
complete account of the entire volume of NCPAC attacks against these particular Senators is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the following analysis of the committee’s 1980 
activities will be limited to a discussion of its most hard-hitting campaigns against Bayh, 
Church, and McGovern.         
 According to C.J. Bailey, NCPAC spent a total of $180,724 attacking liberal 
incumbent Birch Bayh.
129
 Inspired by their success in the 78 midterms, and perhaps hoping to 
get a head start in the verbal fight, the conservative PAC launched their negative campaigns 
against their identified targets for the 1980 election quite early. In some instances, attack ads 
were actually aired as early as “a year or more before the incumbents were up for re-
election”.130 The following commercial thrashing Senator Bayh was part of an early NCPAC 
strike: 
The 30-second television commercial opens with a picture of a large 
baloney surrounded on a cutting board by other meats. Suddenly a cleaver 
slices through the baloney and a voice says, “One very big piece of baloney 
is Birch Bayh telling us he’s fighting inflation”. The price tag appears on the 
sliced baloney reading $46 billion and the voice says, “That’s how much 
deficit spending Bayh voted for last year alone”. Pause. “So to stop 
inflation, you’ll have to stop Bayh first”. And then the kicker: “Because if 
Bayh wins, you lose”.131 
This ad represents a typical 1980 NCPAC attack. As mentioned, it was aired early in the hope 
of damaging the candidate’s reputation “before the clutter of heavy television campaigning 
was evident” and before the opposing candidate “had the resources or campaign organization 
to respond in kind”.132 Furthermore, the commercial represents a tendency on part of NCPAC 
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to construct highly negative ads emphasizing issues which were deemphasized by their 
targets, most notably inflation and defense spending.
133
 As will be demonstrated below, these 
topics also permeated a number of ads attacking both Church and McGovern. With regards to 
the subject of defense spending, however, it would seem that NCPAC was a little short on 
hard facts, at least with regards to Senator Bayh. In fact, one NCPAC ad “accused him of 
voting for an amendment to cut the 1979 defense budget by $1.4 million when Bayh had 
actually been absent for the vote”.134 Nevertheless, despite a certain degree of inaccuracy, the 
negative campaign against Bayh eventually bore fruits. The Democratic Senator struggled to 
counter the attacks from the Right and eventually he lost to conservative Dan Quale by 
160,000 votes.
135
          
 C.J. Bailey reveals that NCPAC spent $339,068 criticizing Senator Frank Church in 
the 1980 election.
136
 In their effort to defeat Church, NCPAC actually created a separate 
committee, called the A.B.C. (or Anything But Church) committee, which would be largely 
responsible for distributing anti-Church ads.
137
 In essence, the “ads purchased by the A.B.C. 
committee highlighted Senator Church’s liberal voting record, his support for deficit 
spending, and his alleged poor record in supporting national defense expenditures”.138 One of 
the first ads aimed at Church“…showed an empty Titan missile silo in Idaho, saying the silo 
was empty because of Church’s opposition to a strong national defense”.139 However, it was 
soon revealed that the “silos were empty because the Air Force had replaced the obsolete 
Titan system with Minutemen missiles” and that Church had actually supported this proactive 
measure.
140
 As a result, “NCPAC sidestepped the controversy by calling the ad only 
symbolic”.141 Nevertheless, NCPAC continued to stress Church’s position on national defense 
in a letter sent directly to the voters labeling him as “‘the radical who singlehanded has 
presided over the destruction of the FBI and CIA’”.142 Furthermore, NCPAC publicly 
denounced the Senator for voting in favor of a personal pay raise. As would be revealed at a 
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later stage, however, this allegation was actually false.
143
 According to Ronald L. 
Hatzenbuehler and Bert W. Marley, Church made serious efforts to counter the attacks from 
the Right.
144
 He was quick to invalidate the misguided NCPAC ads, and he highlighted the 
fact that he was the victim of vicious attacks. “It’s the dirtiest campaign in Idaho history”, 
Church once said, and he added that “they [NCPAC] know I will rebut this things, but they 
also know that it takes a long time for the truth to catch up with the charge”.145 In the end, the 
Democrat lost to his Republican challenger Steve Symms by 4,262 votes and it has been 
argued that the NCPAC attack had a significant effect on this particular electoral outcome. 
According to polls taken before and during the election, Church’s approval rating in Idaho 
sank steadily as the negative campaign progressed.
146
      
 During the 1980 election, NCPAC apparently spent as much as $222,044 against 
Senator George McGovern of South Dakota.
147
 The propaganda was wide-ranging and the 
Democrat was accused of being both pro-welfare and pro-abortion as well as against a strong 
national defense.
148
 According to Richard M. Marano, however, the basic message of the 
NCPAC attacks was always the same: “George McGovern is out of step with his people”.149 
One notable ad criticizing the South Dakota incumbent “showed a basketball player dribbling 
a ball as an announcer said: ‘Globetrotter is a great name for a basketball team, but it’s a 
terrible name for a senator. While the energy crisis was brewing, George McGovern was 
touring Cuba with Fidel Castro’”.150 In essence, NCPAC tried to send a message that the 
Senator did not invest enough of his time trying to straighten out the problems at home. 
Instead, he used taxpayer’s money travelling the globe. Nevertheless, the most significant 
charge against McGovern was arguably that he supported abortion and was anti-family. Like 
they had done in their campaign against Dick Clark in 1978, NCPAC distributed pamphlets to 
churches all over South Dakota depicting McGovern as a “baby-killer”. The Senator was 
highly offended by this particular tactic and he argued heavily against the accusations. “I 
resent it”, he once declared, “[w]hen I come out of God’s house on Sunday morning and find 
that some misguided political agent has put a leaflet on my car accusing me of being anti-
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family and a killer of babies. Who appointed these single issue-advocates to play the role of 
God in judging the rest of us by their standards?”151 Furthermore, “he expressed outrage that 
he, with five children, and four grandchildren, could be called ‘antifamily’”.152 Nevertheless, 
McGovern did not manage to successfully counter NCPAC’s broad attack and eventually he 
received only 39 percent of the South Dakota vote. His conservative challenger James 
Abdnor, however, was triumphant with 58 percent of the votes.
153
    
4.8 Conditions Contributing to NCPAC’s Success 
As demonstrated above, NCPAC ran massive independent campaigns against a number of 
incumbent liberal Senators up for re-election in both 1978 and 1980. They experienced some 
initial success in 1978, as they were instrumental in the election of three conservative 
Republican challengers. In 1980, however, their efforts produced even greater results as they 
made considerable contributions to the defeat of five liberal incumbents. While they were 
among the top independent spenders during these years, however, their achievements cannot 
simply be attributed to the comparatively large amounts they spent on campaigning. A certain 
degree of research has been done on the subject of NCPAC’s success during these years and 
while some have argued that their triumphs derived from their inherent values, others have 
focused on the specific strategies employed by the committee.
154
 According to Larry Powell, 
however, a number of factors, both external and internal, contributed to NCPAC’s 
achievements.           
 First of all, NCPAC, as an independent organization, benefited from a steady decline 
in party loyalty. Between 1952 and 1978, a study has argued, a decreasing number of voters 
reported that they identified with a specific party.
155
 Arguably, voters were thus increasingly 
inclined to follow the instructions of more issue-specific groups which did not campaign on 
the basis of party platforms. According to Powell, the “drop in partisan allegiance was 
crucial” to NCPAC’s success in that the group “lacked the credibility that came with being 
associated with an established party”.156 Second, NCPAC operated in a political environment 
which was increasingly hostile towards Democrats. A study conducted in 1980 revealed that, 
from 1972 and up until then, there had been a steady decline in the number of votes cast in 
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favor of Democratic candidates.
157
 Thus, one can argue that the specific candidates targeted 
by NCPAC, which have previously been identified as Democratic incumbents, were already 
quite vulnerable.          
 Nevertheless, NCPAC’s success also relied on their ability to identify and take 
advantage of the already existing vulnerability of specific incumbents. The committee 
actually used a great deal of money conducting mid-year polls which would reveal the 
public’s perception of candidates they wished to unseat. If the results showed that an 
incumbent had declining approval ratings, NCPAC considered him a weak candidate who 
could probably be defeated.
158
 Thus, it is fair to claim that NCPAC’s high success ratings are, 
at least to a certain extent, a result of the group’s decision only to engage in races in which 
already existing conditions increased the probability of a conservative victory. In addition, 
NCPAC ran a number of polls assessing the general voter’s standing on specific issues and, 
on the basis of these results, the committee determined which issues they would emphasize in 
their campaigns. Furthermore, this pre-acquired knowledge arguably increased the group’s 
chances of success to a great extent.         
 Pre-election polling was just one of many fruitful NCPAC tactics, however. As 
demonstrated by the preceding description of NCPAC’s efforts during the 1978 and 1980 
elections, the committee relied heavily on negative advertising. Furthermore, the decision to 
run a negative rather than positive campaign is certainly a tactical one. According to Powell, 
the reason why NCPAC focused their efforts primarily on negative communication was that 
the committee’s strategists realized the benefits of such an approach. As previously 
mentioned, studies have shown that independent campaigns have more potential to affect 
voter behavior if turned negative. Nevertheless, the leaders of NCPAC were pioneers in the 
art of negative campaigning and thus, their decision to follow such an approach was certainly 
not based on its proven efficiency. Rather, they crafted their strategy based on the assumption 
that a large number of voters were fundamentally disinterested in politics and that they, as a 
result, were more responsive to emotional and negative appeals than to intellectual 
arguments.
159
 For many, they believed, “voting becomes a decision stimulated by an 
emotional attachment to symbols”.160 In fact, at the time, some research existed arguing that 
“using negative appeals made the information more believable”.161 In addition to having an 




 Ibid., 35. 
159







extended influence on voter behavior, NCPAC’s negative approach was also beneficial in that 
it put the targeted candidate on the defensive leaving the committee in control of the 
campaign discourse. As they suffered from repeated attacks from NCPAC, incumbents could 
choose to launch counterattacks or to ignore it. Either way, NCPAC was the one setting the 
campaign agenda. If the targeted candidate responded to the accusations, the issues presented 
by NCPAC would be favored over issues which the incumbent would normally choose to 
emphasize.
162
 Furthermore, if the candidate did not respond to the attacks, NCPAC would be 
able to dominate the focus of the campaign simply by repeating their messages.     
 Last, but not least, NCPAC benefited significantly from their association with the New 
Right. Their connection with the grassroots of the New Right provided the committee with a 
network of volunteer workers which had access to millions of conservative leaning voters. In 
this respect, the Christian Right proved especially valuable. Television evangelist Jerry 
Falwell in particular, used a great deal of his time on the air to “legitimize NCPAC’s cause 
and mobilize the constituencies”.163 More importantly, however, NCPAC was completely 
dependent on the New Right for financial support. As mentioned in the brief discussion of the 
CSFC, the direct mail fundraising efforts of Richard Viguerie provided the basis for much of 
the activity of New Right groups in the 1970s and 1980s, including NCPAC. A young 
conservative during Barry Goldwater’s campaign in 1964, Viguerie “learned the direct mail 
business under an innovative pioneer, Martin Liebman”.164 Realizing the conservative 
movement’s need for more money, Liebman began to mail out thousands of letters to possible 
supporters soliciting small donations. This strategy proved surprisingly successful and the 
Goldwater campaign raised unexpected sums. After what turned out to be an unsuccessful 
campaign, however, Viguerie “went to the office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
which had on the file the names and addresses of all those who had contributed $50 or more 
to Goldwater”.165 He copied the entire list by hand thus set out to build his “direct mail 
empire”.166           
 In the late seventies, Viguerie had managed to assemble “a computer list of several 
million people who responded positively to right-wing appeals”.167 Through direct appeals to 
these individuals, he was able to raise huge sums of money mainly consisting of small 
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donations. Since NCPAC had status as a political action committee and was subject to the 
FECA restrictions on the size and source of contributions, it was completely reliant on the 
small-scale financial support of numerous individuals, and as a result, they asked for 
Viguerie’s services. As would soon become apparent, this partnership proved especially 
valuable to NCPAC which, without the money raised by Viguerie through direct mail, would 
not have been able to launch their successful independent campaigns against liberal 
incumbents in 78 and 80. 
4.9 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the reform of the seventies established a 
campaign finance environment in which political action committees became increasingly 
dominant. Prior to the legislation, both wealthy individuals and organizations had taken 
advantage of the absence of restrictions on individual contributions and donated huge 
amounts of money directly to political candidates and parties. As the FECA regulations put 
effective limits on such contributions, however, those wishing to continue their financial 
involvement in American politics had to change their strategies. Nevertheless, they quickly 
realized the increased potential of PACs which, as a result of the newly enacted legislation, 
were subject to less stringent restrictions than individuals. While the third chapter of this 
thesis illustrates that it was primarily the business community which took significant 
advantage of this opportunity to establish what is characterized as connected PACs, this 
chapter has revealed that, at least initially, it was mostly right-wing interest groups which 
utilized this opportunity to create so-called non-connected ideological PACs. Furthermore, 
while in chapter three it was argued that the emergence of business PACs favored the GOP 
because of the increased inclination on part of the business community to contribute PAC 
money to conservative candidates, in this chapter it is argued that the emergence of 
ideological nonconnected PACs came to benefit the Republican Party because of their 
tendency to use independent expenditures to launch massive attacks on liberal incumbents. 
 As already mentioned, independent expenditures are often referred to as a loophole 
created by the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision that individuals and groups could spend 
unlimited amounts of uncoordinated money for the purpose of influencing the electorate. As 
long as the money spent was accumulated according to the FECA limits on contributions to 
PACs, PACs were allowed to use as much as they desired on communication expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of candidates. Fortunately for the GOP, the emergence of the 
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independent expenditure loophole coincided with the development of the conservative New 
Right which, because of its particular infrastructure, had great potential to take advantage of 
this new opportunity to influence politics. First of all, the New Right was able to raise vast 
amounts of money because their fundraising effort was largely led by Richard Viguerie who 
had fifteen years of experience with direct mail solicitation. According to C.J. Bailey, 
Viguerie helped raise as much as $27 million for conservative groups between 1979 and 1980 
alone.
168
 Of this, approximately $7 million went towards NCPAC which was the main 
conservative PAC engaging in independent expenditures.
169
 As mentioned, it is estimated that 
NCPAC spent roughly $3 million on independent campaigns for the 1980 elections and that 
most of it was directed towards attacking liberal Senate incumbents.
170
 Liberal groups, on the 
other hand, were not as experienced with the direct mail strategy and consequently raised 
considerably less money than the conservatives. In the same period as the New Right is 
reported to have raised $27 million, liberal interest groups were supposedly only able to raise 
$2 million.
171
 As a result, the opportunity of liberals to engage in wide-ranging independent 
campaigns was severely limited.       
 Nevertheless, a successful independent campaign does not solely depend on the 
amount of money spent. The strategy employed by those making independent expenditures is 
also of significance. As noted above, research has established that independent campaigns are 
more likely to be effective if the distributed communication is of a negative nature.
172
 
Furthermore, the very successful campaigns run by NCPAC in connection with the1978 and 
1980 Senate elections were in fact dominated by negative messages. As outlined above, 
NCPAC attacked a number of liberal Senate incumbents charging them with being everything 
from baby killers to Soviet sympathizers. This approach, according to certain polls taken 
during the elections, had an effect on voters. In Idaho, for example, it was revealed that the 
approval rating of Senator Frank Church had dropped significantly after NCPAC had run an 
extensive negative campaign against him.
173
 The ultimate effect of this negative strategy, 
however, was arguably demonstrated by the Republican gains in the 1978 and 1980 
congressional elections. The Senate gains in particular, are quite often quoted as direct results 
of NCPAC’s efforts. Candice J. Nelson has argued that “NCPAC’s use of independent 
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expenditures in 1978 and 1980 is the only example of unequivocal success in using 
independent expenditures to elect or defeat a candidate”.174 Both the ease with which they 
raised money, as well as the strategy they employed, were important factors contributing to 
the group’s eventual achievements. Nevertheless, NCPAC’s political influence began to 
diminish after the 1980 election. According to David Mark, “in 1982, NCPAC targeted six 
prominent liberal senators and spent $3 million, but all of its candidates lost”.175 Apparently, 
Democrats had realized the need to counter the attacks from the right and they had learned 
how to take advantage of the independent expenditure option themselves.
176
 However, despite 
their fleeting success, NCPAC had become a “role model for future conservative groups to 
follow” and they established the model for third-party campaigns in modern elections”.177 In 
addition, they had made significant contributions to Republican electoral triumphs which 
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Although the 1978 election did not give the GOP control of either chamber of Congress or the 
executive branch, it arguably elevated Republicans’ ability to influence politics, at least to a 
certain extent. While the party gained fifteen seats in the House, a total of three were acquired 
in Senate. Thus, the Democratic congressional majority had begun to erode and a shift in the 
political climate was perceptible. The congressional election returns revealed an increased 
tendency of voters to support the conservative cause and the Republicans found several 
reasons to be optimistic. After the 1980 elections, however, a possible turn to the right would 
no longer be a matter of speculation. Not only did the Republicans win the presidency with 
the deeply conservative Ronald Reagan, they also experienced massive gains in Congress. As 
a result of the 34 seats secured by the GOP in the House, the Democratic majority was 
significantly narrowed and the president was provided with a less hostile congressional 
environment. Furthermore, on account of the 12 seats they obtained in the Senate, the 
Republican Party gained control of the upper house for the first time since 1954.
1
 In sum, the 
1980 election was a Republican success story which had major implications not only for the 
party itself, but also for the American political climate at large.     
 To be sure, the Republican electoral gains in 1978 and the party’s ultimate triumph in 
1980 can be explained with reference to a number of factors which defined that particular 
period in American history. The social unrest and economic insecurity which preceded the 
elections arguably had significant impact on voter turnout as well as voter behavior. This 
thesis, however, has emphasized the connection between the campaign finance reform of the 
seventies and the Republican ability to excel in these particular elections. Furthermore, it has 
described the GOP’s electoral gains as an illustration of how the Democratic initiatives to 
restructure the campaign finance system in their own favor ultimately backfired. As outlined 
in chapter two, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments in 1974 were 
part of a Democratic effort to counteract the increasingly visible financial advantages of the 
Republican Party in a campaign environment in which money was essential. Direct 
contributions from individuals were restricted, public financing of presidential campaigns was 
established, and limitations on expenditures were enforced. All of these provisions, it was 
believed, would serve to benefit the Democratic Party which, because of the lopsided 
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proportion of in-kind support provided by their base, had grown accustomed to a lower level 
of cash input and output. Nevertheless, the wide-ranging mobilization of resources which 
occurred on the political right in the aftermath of these regulations proved that the Republican 
money machine could not be neutralized that easily.     
 While a number of studies have focused on the successful Republican fundraising 
efforts in the wake of the FECA regulations, few have devoted their attention solely to the 
way in which the party came to benefit from the increasing flow of money outside traditional 
party structures. Like so many others, Hacker and Pierson have highlighted the impressive 
organizational effort on part of the GOP to adjust to the new legislative parameters for 
campaign financing. The head of the Republican National Committee William Brock, they 
argue, employed a number of techniques, including direct-mail, to solicit vast amounts of 
small donations which would provide the party with huge sums of legal campaign money.
2
 
“As American politics shifted into a new era,” they conclude “Republicans were the first to 
make the crucial evolutionary moves that would allow them to capitalize on the new 
opportunities”.3 Although the post-FECA fundraising endeavors of the GOP probably 
contributed to the party’s electoral success in 78 and 80, however, the focus of this thesis has 
been on the benefits experienced by the party as a result of the disproportionate number of 
conservative leaning groups taking advantage of the new opportunities for political influence 
provided to outside interests by the campaign finance legislation.     
 The increased flow of money outside traditional party structures in the wake of the 
FECA was, in large part, made apparent by the expanded involvement of political action 
committees in the financing of elections. Furthermore, this development arguably came to 
benefit the Republican Party as a result of their strong ties to cash flush interests which 
realized the true range of the PAC potential. As described in detail in chapter three and four, 
the GOP’s traditional bases of support, herein represented by the business community and 
conservative groups, succeeded disproportionately in taking advantage of the new 
opportunities for political influence which were provided by the 1970s reform. Because of 
certain socioeconomic conditions encouraging businesses to get increasingly involved in 
politics, and because of the legislative provisions authorizing them to operate such 
committees, the number of business PACs grew rapidly in the late seventies and early 
eighties. Unions, which had been the previous rulers of the PAC domain, were quickly 
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replaced by the growing number of corporations which managed to consistently outspend 
labor on a large scale.
4
 Furthermore, business PACs proved especially valuable to the GOP 
during the 1978 and 1980 elections when conservative congressional candidates in position to 
unseat liberal incumbents received the main brunt of corporate contributions.   
 Nevertheless, as described in chapter four, the increased activities of nonconnected 
ideological PACs would also be crucial for the GOP in both 78 and 80. Their involvement in 
the financing of these elections was wide-ranging, but for reasons of limited space, this thesis 
has highlighted the significant ventures of NCPAC in connection with the Senate elections 
specifically. Through its clever use of independent expenditures, a loophole created by a 1976 
Supreme Court decision to allow unlimited PAC spending, this conservative New Right 
political action committee was arguably instrumental in the defeat of several liberal 
incumbents. As outlined above, conservative PACs, including NCPAC, benefited from many 
years of direct mail experience and were thus able to assemble vast sums of small donations 
which could be used on independent campaigns. Liberal groups, however, had yet to embrace 
the direct mail strategy and were less successful in raising money even though presidential 
candidate George McGovern had been eager to use this method in 1972. However, the 
effectiveness of the independent campaigns run by NCPAC in 1978 and 1980 relied on more 
than financial factors. As demonstrated above, research has established an elevated value of 
negative campaigns in terms of affecting voter behavior. Furthermore, NCPAC’s strategy 
consisted mainly of distributing negative messages about those candidates whom they wished 
to unseat and voter polls taken in the wake of the committee’s attacks revealed that their 
approach had influenced the opinions of the electorate. Thus, the argument presented in this 
thesis is that the success of conservative candidates in the 1978 and 1980 congressional 
elections was aided by the combined effort of business PACs providing direct financial 
contributions and conservative nonconnected PACs, such as NCPAC, investing their 
resources in efficient attacks against liberal incumbents who they felt needed to be defeated.      
 Furthermore, the financing of the 1978 and 1980 elections also had certain long-term 
effects which are beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, they deserve to be mentioned 
as possible topics for further research. First of all, the increased involvement of corporations 
in the wake of the FECA represented the beginning of a development which would prove 
especially fruitful for the GOP in years to come and which would arguably reach its pinnacle 
with the 2010 Supreme Court decision on campaign financing. In Citizens United v. FEC the 
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Supreme Court established that any limits on the outside spending of corporations and unions 
was unconstitutional.
5
 Thus, businesses, among others, began to set up so-called Super PACs 
through which they channeled unrestricted and vast amounts of money which came from a 
number of sources including their own treasuries. The financial involvement of corporations 
consequently reached new heights and, at least initially, in connection with the 2010 
congressional and gubernatorial elections, the development seemed to benefit the GOP.
6
 
Nevertheless, the current partisanship of business and the impact of Super PACs today is a 
comprehensive topic which cannot be sufficiently outlined at this point. Furthermore, 
however, NCPAC’s use of independent expenditures in 1978 and 1980 did not only serve to 
benefit the conservative challengers during these elections, it also established a model for 
future third-party campaigns to follow. The effectiveness of negative campaigns was 
established and many outside groups continued to rely on this strategy. The negative approach 
became especially widespread in the wake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
which prohibited soft money contributions to parties and which consequently institutionalized 
the role of so-called 527 organizations which became the main vehicle of independent 
expenditures and issue advocacy.
7
 The most renowned of such groups is arguably the 
conservative Swift Boat Veterans for Truth which in 2004 launched an extensive, and 
overwhelmingly negative, campaign against Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, 
who eventually lost the election.
8
 Nevertheless, like with the advent of Super PACs, the 
development of 527s and their dependence on independent expenditures is a wide-ranging 
topic which cannot be fully investigated in this thesis.                
 Finally, one can argue that the financing of the 78 and 80 elections had certain long-
term effects on the political climate in the U.S. As already described, the increased financial 
support provided to conservative candidates by outside sources contributed to significant 
Republican gains in both the House and the Senate and as a result of the 1980 election the 
GOP became a significant congressional force. The newly elected Republican president 
Ronald Reagan was thus arguably provided with extended prospects for achieving his policy 
goals, which to a large extent, were crafted by the increasingly organized conservative 
movement. Consequently, American politics made a highly visible turn to the right, especially 
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with regards to the economy.
9
 During his tenure, Reagan managed to get significant tax cuts 
through Congress and he adopted an anti-labor approach which had serious consequences for 
unions across the country. Republican policy-makers managed to advance the conservative 
cause considerably during the eighties, and in the process they strengthened the position of, as 
well as their bonds to, a number of cash flush interest groups which would prove important to 
the party in future campaign money races. Thus, in conclusion one can argue that the 
campaign finance reform of the seventies and the successful effort of conservative leaning 
outside groups to adjust to the new regulative parameters had significant short- and long-term 
effects on U.S. politics and society.
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